George  Davidson  1825-1911 


x^<* 

REPRESENTATIVE  GOVERNMENT. 


^ 


THE  TRUE  METHOD  OF /REACHING  CONCERTED  ACTION  AND  OF*  FIND- 

•'" 

ING  t  THE    WILL    OF    A    CONCURRING    MAJORITY    IN    THE 
.    ELECTION    OF    REPRESENTATIVES    OF 
^  THE    PEOPLE. 

THE    REMEDY    FOR    THE    EVILS    OF    THE    DELEGATE    SYSTEM    AND    THE 
l\        EVILS    OF    PERMANENT    PARTY    ORGANIZATION. 


THE    CIVIL    SERVICE    EVIL   AND    ITS    REMEDY. 


BY 


THOMAS    D.    INGRAM,    M.  D. 


WEST  CHESTER,  PA.: 
F.  S.  HICKMAN,  PRINTER,  COR.  GAY  AND  CHURCH  STREETS. 

1884. 


j 


Copyright,  1884,  by  THOMAS  D.  INGBAM,  M.  D. 

(All  rights  reserved.} 


PREFACE. 


The  following  pages  are  intended  to  show  the  force  and  applica- 
tion of  a  method  of  direct  voting,  by  which  the  people  of  a  free 
government  may  at  once  reach  concerted  action  in  the  election  of 
their  representatives. 

It  requires  but  a  superficial  examination  by  any  one  familiar  with 
the  present  methods  of  selecting  our  government  officials,  to  dis- 
cover that  a  large  proportion  of  the  corrupt  political  practices  de- 
basing our  government  at  its  every  phase,  are  to  be  found  in  the 
method  of  making  party  nominations,  by  submitting  to  a  series  of 
delegatings,  to  caucuses,  conventions,  conferences  and  so  on ;  and, 
that  they  still  further  result  from  our  submission  to  a  government 
conducted  by  and  wholly  emanating  from  the  one  or  the  other  of 
two  great  permanent  parties,  into  which  the  people  are  divided. 

Recognizing  that  delegates  may  disregard  their  instructions,  or, 
may  barter  away  their  votes  for  personal  ends,  I  asked  myself  the 
question  :  Why  may  not  the  instructions  given  to  delegates,  pro- 
viding them  with  successive  choices  among  the  candidates  so  that 
they  may  finally  reach  concerted  action,  be  placed  upon  paper,  and 
a  count  from  these  papers  when  collected,  in  imitation  of  the  re- 
peated ballotings  of  a  convention  of  delegates,  be  made  to  take  the 
place  of  these  delegates  meeting  in  a  convention.  And  then,  the 
further  question :  If  the  instructions  of  a  district  intended  for  a 
delegate,  may  tkus  be  placed  upon  a  paper  from  which  they  may 
be  counted,  why  not  have  each  individual  voter  cast  his  own  com- 
plete instructions  as  his  vote,  and  thus  have  every  election  decided 
by  the  whole  body  of  voters  concerned,  at  one  direct  election. 


IV 

The  answers  to  these  queries  were  satisfactory  and  complete ; 
and,  when  formulated,  show  that  if  each  voter  will  name  upon  his 
ticket  not  only  his  first  choice  among  the  candidates  in  the  field, 
but,  provisionally  name  such  succeeding  choices  to  whom  he  would 
be  willing  to  yield  in  order  to  reach  concerted  action  with  his 
fellows,  the  voters  throughout  would  thus  provide  the  means  or  the 
returns,  from  which  by  a  simple  count,  may  be  determined  the  can- 
didate upon  whom  a  majority  of  the  whole  number  of  voters  have 
first  concurred. 

This  method  of  reaching  concerted  action  and  of  finding  the 
candidate  upon  whom  a  majority  of  the  whole  body  of  voters  will 
first  concur,  by  one  direct  election,  at  once  made  it  evident  that 
submission  to  the  delegate  system  was  no  longer  necessary.  And 
still  further,  because  by  this  method  of  direct  voting  a  final  election 
can  be  made  from  among  three  or  more  candidates,  with  as  full  an 
opportunity  for  the  whole  body  of  voters  to  reach  a  concurring 
majority  as  when  the  candidates  have  been  reduced  to  two,  having 
each  of  these  the  candidate  of  an  organized  party,  the  party 
method  of  government,  or,  having  the  people  divided  into  two 
permanently  opposing  party  organizations,  was  also  proven  to  be 
unnecessary. 

In  other  words,  it  will  be  shown  that  the  people  of  a  free  govern- 
ment may  select  their  representatives  to  fill  any  official  position 
whatsoever,  at  one  direct  election  by  the  whole  number  of  voters 
concerned,  reaching  concerted  action  and  determining  the  candi- 
date upon  whom  a  majority  of  their  whole  number  will  first  concur, 
without  resorting  to  delegates,  or,  submitting  to  permanent  party 
organization  in  any  form  or  manner. 

Since  the  general  enlightenment  of  the  people,  and  the  many  and 
complete  means  of  conveying  intelligence  to  one  another  and  to 
all  parts  of  the  country,  have  made  them  so  generally  familiar  with 
the  issues  before  the  country,  and  equally  familiar  with  the  leading 
men  in  governmental  affairs,  it  can  no  longer  be  argued  that  dele- 
gating would  secure  superior  wisdom  in  making  a  selection  of  those 


best  fitted  to  fill  our  public  offices.  Nor  can  it  well  be  shown  that 
permanent  party  organizations  are  needed  to  point  out  or  establish 
great  truths  or  principles  for  the  people  to  defend.  But,  when 
once  the  people  have  reclaimed  and  established  their  right  to  select 
their  own  representatives,  by  the  proposed  method  of  direct  elec- 
tions, it  may  well  be  assumed  that  an  honest  and  patriotic  use  of 
the  public  press,  and  other  means  of  extending  general  information 
among  the  people,  will  still  further  enlighten  them  upon  their  duties 
as  sovereigns  of  a  great  country,  and  with  the  responsibilities  ac- 
companying the  use  of  the  elective  franchise. 

After  it  has  been  shown  that  this  method  of  direct  voting  affords 
the  only  true  means  of  reaching  concerted  action,  and  that  it  solves 
with  mathematical  exactness  the  problem  of  finding  upon  whom  a 
majority  of  the  WHOLE  NUMBER  OF  VOTERS  will  first  concur,  it  will 
still  remain  as  a  part  of  the  purpose  of  these  pages,  to  point  out  at 
least  some  of  the  more  prominent  evils  connected  with  the  system 
of  delegating  in  making  party  nominations,  and  as  a  method  of 
electing  men  to  office ;  and  also,  some  of  the  evils  resulting  from 
our  submission  to  permanent  party  organizations  among  us. 

My  aim  will  be  to  show,  that,  by  delegating  the  right  to  elect  men 
to  office,  to  a  few  men,  we  afford  professional  office  seekers  the  op- 
portunity to  autocratically  secure  for  themselves  the  offices  of  the 
government;  and  to  show  further,  that  this  system  of  delegating  is 
not  only  unnecessary  but  dangerous,  that  submitting  to  permanently 
organized  political  parties  in  conducting  our  government  is  un- 
natural and  unnecessary,  and  that  it  is  dangerously  opposed  to  the 
existence  and  continuation  of  political  freedom  among  us. 

Believing  these  propositions  to  be  established  beyond  question, 
I  confidently  urge  that  committees  of  individuals,  and  that  schools 
both  public  and  private  should  take  up  the  purely  philosophical 
problem  herein  proposed  ;  examine  into  its  nature  and  significance, 
familiarize  themselves  with  its  workings,  and  teach  its  truths  to  the 
masses  of  freemen  and  to  their  children  throughout  the  land. 

In  the   greatest   sincerity,    I  further   recommend    that   local   or 


VI 

corporate  organizations  of  men,  and,  that  communities  in  conduct- 
ing their  local  governments  should  at  once  adopt  the  proposed 
method  of  direct  voting  in  the  election  of  all  their  officers.  And 
that  it  should  be  early  adopted  by  the  people  in  conducting  their 
municipal  governments ;  in  the  election  of  all  elective  officers,  and 
in  deciding  every  issue  or  question  where  a  choice  is  to  be  made 
from  among  three  or  more  propositions. 

And  still  further,  I  hope  to  see  it  soon  adopted  by  the  people  of 
the  States  and  Nation,  and  finally,  that  our  National  Constitution 
shall  be  so  amended,  that  the  methods  it  directs  for  .the  election  of 
the  highest  officers  of  our  government,  shall  be  made  to  conform  to 
the  true  spirit  of  popular  rule. 

Let  no  one  hastily  assume  to  pronounce,  that,  although  the  pro- 
posed method  of  direct  voting  may  be  right,  its  introduction  is  an 
impracticable  scheme.  The  primary  question  is,  whether  it  is  right. 
That  which  is  right  is  always  practicable,  and  may  be  very  readily 
introduced  where  the  right  is  respected. 

Respectfully, 

THOS.  D.  INGRAM,  M.  D. 

WEST  CHESTER,  PA.,  May,  1884. 


CONTENTS. 


CHAPTEK  I.— INTRODUCTORY. 

THE   PRINCIPLES    UNDERLYING    THE   STRUCTURE    OF   A    FREE   GOVERNMENT. 

The  basis  of  monarchical  or  autocratic  rule  contrasted  with  the  principles  of 
a  free  government,  1 — The  importance  of  establishing  the  true  significance  of 
political  freedom,  2 — Political  freedom  defined,  2 — The  sentiments  or  convic- 
tions which  arouse  the  desire  for  political  liberty,  4 — The  conditions  necessary 
to  establish  a  free  government,  4 — When  these  sentiments  and  conditions  exist 
among  men  they  are  impelled  to  demand  political  liberty,  4— The  evils  de- 
fended under  the  plea  of  conservatism,  5 — A  Free  Government  is  instituted 
for  mutual  protection  and  not  for  production,  5 — Government  is  a  structure  in 
action,  and  the  methods  adopted  for  conducting  it  are  as  important  as  the 
principles  it  aims  to  defend,  6 — The  people  of  a  Free  Government  have  less 
use  for  a  "  Bill  of  Eights,"  than  they  have  for  a  sure  and  equitable  method  of 
expressing  the  popular  will,  6— Ours,  a  representative  form  of  free  govern- 
ment, 6 — The  will  of  a  concurring  majority  must  be  acceded  to  in  the  selection 
of  representatives,  7 — A  true  method  of  finding  the  will  of  a  concurring  ma- 
jority, the  only  safe  defence  of  equal  political  rights,  7. 

CHAPTEK  II. 

THE  TRUE  METHOD  OF  REACHING  CONCERTED  ACTION,  AND  OF  FINDING  THE 
WILL  OF  A  CONCURRING  MAJORITY. 

In  conducting  an  election,  if  only  two  candidates  are  to  be  selected  from,  the 
problem  is  simple,  8 — But,  when  more  than  two  candidates  are  to  be  selected 
from,  the  problem  becomes  more  complex,  8 — The  conditions  which  this  more 
complex  problem  presents  ;  and  the  necessity  which  demands  that  some  voters 
must  yield  and  support  a  second  choice  in  order  to  concur  with  their  fellows, 
8 — A  method  of  voting  directly  for  the  candidates,  which  provides  the  voters 
a  means  of  reaching  concerted  action,  and  which  affords  the  basis  for  a  true 
solution  of  the  problem  of  finding  upon  whom  a  majority  of  the  whole  number 
of  voters  will  first  concur,  9 — This  method  of  voting  illustrated,  9— The  tally 
sheet  or  the  returns  from  an  election  illustrated,  10— The  method  of  summing 
up  the  returns  from  an  election  illustrated,  and  the  significance  of  this  truthful 


VIII 

method  of  finding  the  candidate  upon  whom  a  majority  will  first  concur,  set 
forth,  11 — The  method  applicable  to  any  number  of  voters  whether  in  a  con- 
vened body  or  widely  scattered,  11 — And  applicable  to  any  number  of  candi- 
dates, or,  to  the  selection  of  one  from  three  or  more  propositions,  12 — This 
method  of  voting  would  make  it  possible  to  conduct  a  purely  democratic  form 
of  government,  12 — Its  great  significance  in  the  selection  of  representatives  of 
the  people  by  a  direct  vote  of  the  whole  body  of  voters  to  be  represented,  12 — 
The  proposed  method  of  a  single  direct  election  compared  with  the  present 
complex  method  of  selecting  our  official  representatives,  12 — The  requirements 
of  the  present  method  made  use  of  in  determining  who  shall  fill  an  official 
place,  12 — Reasons  for  the  origin  and  development  of  the  existing  complex 
method,  13 — The  proposed  method  of  finding  the  will  of  a  majority  compared 
with  its  attempted  solution  by  the  trial  ballotings  of  a  convention,  13 — The 
first  ballot  of  a  convention  of  delegates  compared  to  the  primary  result  by  the 
direct  method  of  voting,  14 — The  difficulties  attending  a  delegates'  making  a 
second  choice  in  order  to  reach  a  concurrence  with  his  fellows,  14 — The  pur- 
poses for  which  an  individual  voter  will  name  a  second  choice  upon  his  ticket, 
14 — The  repeated  ballotings  of  a  convention  often  a  mere  test  of  the  delegates' 
endurance,  15 — When  a  delegate  adopts  a  second  choice  and  thus  adds  his  sup- 
port to  those  who  had  before  made  this  candidate  their  first  choice,  it  has  the  same 
significance  as  when  the  number  of  individual  voters  making  a  candidate  their 
second  choice,  are  added  to  those  who  had  before  made  him  their  first  choice, 
by  the  proposed  method  of  direct  voting,  15 — The  trial  ballotings  of  a  conven- 
tion resemble  a  game  of  chance,  15 — Arbitrary  rules  adopted  by  conventions 
to  modify  the  evils  of  repeated  ballotings,  manifestly  unfair,  16 — The  trial 
ballotings  of  a  convention  illogical  and  uncertain,— delegating  and  redelegat- 
ing  the  party  voice,  the  source  of  evil  and  of  political  corruption,  16 — The  di- 
vision of  the  people  into  permanently  opposing  political  parties  unnatural, 
and  the  source  of  danger  to  our  free  institutions,  17 — Apparent  objections  to 
the  working  of  the  proposed  method  of  direct  voting,  anticipated  and  answered, 
17 — The  supposition  that  a  formidable  number  of  candidates  will  be  voted  for, 
unfounded,  17 — The  fear  that  but  few  of  the  voters  will  name  a  second  choice, 
unfounded,  18 — Eeasons  why  many  voters  will  name  provisional  choices,  18 — 
Principles  which  will  guide  a  voter  in  naming  succeeding  choices,  18 — Further 
directions  for  the  summing  up  of  the  returns  and  final  solution  of  the  problem 
in  all  contingencies,  19 — Examples  where  the  actual  working  of  the  proposed 
method  of  voting  has  been  exhibited,  20 — These  modest  examples  exhibit  the 
same  problem  as  that  presented  in  the  election  of  any  officer  from  a  town  con- 
stable to  the  President  of  the  United  States,  24 — The  universal  application  of 
this  method  of  solving  the  problem  where  a  choice  is  to  be  made  from  among 
three  or  more  persons,  or,  where  a  choice  is  to  be  made  from  three  or  more 
propositions  of  things,  whatsoever,  24— The  adoption  of  the  proposed  method 
of  voting  would  avoid  the  uncertainties  of  trial  ballotings,  the  evils  of  dele- 
gating, and  the  corrupt  practices  of  permanent  party  organizations,  24— It  is 
the  universal  weapon  for  the  defence  of  political  freedom,  25. 


IX 
CHAPTER  III. 

THE  ILLOGICAL  NATURE,  AND  THE   EVILS  ATTENDING  THE   PRESENT   METHOD 

OF  REACHING  CONCERTED  ACTION  AND  OF  FINDING  THE 

WILL  OF  A  MAJORITY. 

Permanently  opposing  party  organizations,  limited  to  two,  dividing  the 
people  of  a  free  government,  shown  to  have  no  natural  or  just  existence,  26 — 
Party  organizations  continuing  to  exist  after  the  original  purpose  of  their 
harmonizing  has  been  accomplished,  are  opposed  to  our  original  compact  of 
National  unity,  27 — A  Party  organization  becomes  permanent  in  order  to  con- 
duct the  delegate  system,  in  making  the  party  nominations,  28 — Other  reasons 
for  permanency  of  organization,  28 — The  Evils  of  the  Delegate  System,  29 — 
The  purpose  of  the  delegate  method  in  determining  upon  a  party  candidate, 
29 — Why  this  method  of  finding  the  will  of  a  majority  of  the  whole  number 
of  voters  is  illogical  and  uncertain  in  its  results,  30 — Primary  delegates 
represent  but  added  majorities,  or  often,  but  added  pluralities  of  the  whole 
number  of  party  voters,  30 — State  or  National  delegates  need  represent  but 
one-fourth  of  the  party  voters,  and  a  nomination  may  be  determined  by  delegates 
representing  the  concerted  action  of  but  one-eighth  of  the  party  voters,  31 — 
Taking  advantage  of  these  possibilities  affords  a  corrupt  means  of  securing  office, 
31 — The  system  of  delegating  and  re-delegating  has  no  relationship  to  the 
principle  forming  the  basis  of  a  representative  government,  32 — Because  the 
delegate  system  is  illogical,  and  because  it  is  so  complex,  it  affords  the  oppor- 
tunities for  the  practice  of  innumerable  political  evils,  32 — It  affords  party 
officers,  and  party  managers,  and  office-seekers  an  opportunity  to  control  the 
party  nominations,  33 — Methods  by  which  a  few  party  managers  determine  the 
delegates  and  thus  pervert  the  will  of  the  people,  33— The  corrupt  bargainings 
of  office-seekers  and  party  managers  in  delegate  conventions,  in  caucuses  and 
conferences,  and  in  secret  committees,  34 — The  repeated  ballotings  of  a  con- 
vention of  delegates  much  like  the  rehearsal  of  a  farce,  while  their  final  de- 
cision has  much  the  nature  of  the  result  of  a  game  of  chance,  35 — The  uncer- 
tainty, and  the  farcical  nature  of  the  repeated  ballotings  of  a  convened  body 
exhibited  in  the  election  of  United  States  Senators,  35 — Recapitulation  of  the 
reasons  why  the  delegate  system  is  illogical  and  uncertain  in  its  results,  36 — A 
review  of  the  opportunities  afforded  for  corrupt  political  practices,  and  of 
some  of  the  evils  attending  the  use  of  this  illogical  system  in  making  party 
nominations,  37 — The  seeming  paradox,  why  so  many  intelligent  voters  should 
submit  to  this  delegate  system,  and  yet,  for  themselves  take  no  part  in  it,  38 — 
Their  "  apathy"  frequently  rebuked  by  superficial  political  philosophers,  39 — 
The  long  habit  of  not  thinking  the  delegate  system  to  be  wrong  has  given  it  the 
superficial  appearance  of  being  right,  39 — The  organizing  of  Vigilant  Com- 
mittees and  their  attempts  at  "  political  reform"  fruitless,  for  want  of  concerted 
action  between  sufficient  numbers,  and,  because  they  have  known  of  no  means 
whereby  large  numbers  of  voters  may  reach  concerted  action  except  by  dele- 
gating, 40 — Reasons  why  any  and  every  attempt  at  "  Political  Reform"  must 
fail  so  long  as  the  people  submit  to  delegating,  41 — The  only  remedy  for  these 
evils  to  be  found  in  the  true  method  of  reaching  concerted  action,  and  of  find- 
ing the  will  of  a  concurring  majority  by  one  direct  vote  of  the  whole  people,  42. 


CHAPTEK  IV. 

THE  EVILS  OF  PERMANENT  PARTY  ORGANIZATION. 

Party  organization  may  be  the  best,  and  may  often  be  the  only  successful 
means  of  reaching  concerted  action  in  advancing  a  great  public  cause,  but,  by 
being  permanently  organized  it  may  become  as  dangerous  a  power  for  evil  as  it 
was  primarily  a  power  for  good,  44 — Permanent  party  organization  is  opposed 
to  the  spirit  of  compact  forming  the  basis  of  our  government,  and  is  prejudicial 
to  the  best  interests  of  the  whole  people,  45 — Opposing  political  parties  in  a 
limited  monarchy  are  natural,  there,  they  represent  a  continual  contest  between 
the  desire  for  freedom,  on  the  one  hand,  and  the  defence  of  monarchy  on  the 
other,  between  the  rights  of  the  masses,  and  the  oppression  of  an  aristocracy, 
45 — There  can  be  no  permanent  contest  among  the  people  of  a  free  country, 
46 — Permanent  parties  among  a  free  people  destroy  the  loyalty  and  love  due 
to  their  country,  and  develop  a  contest  for  power,  46— Permanent  party 
organization  has  substituted  a  love  of  party  for  love  of  country,  47 — Perma- 
nent party  organizations  contesting  for  power  have  made  "spoils"  and  plunder 
out  of  the  public  offices,  and  out  of  every  form  of  government  patronage  or 
favor,  47 — The  great  contests  for  party  favor  at  the  party  primaries  or  delegate 
elections,  48 — Party  platforms  very  often  but  mere  platitudes,  or  schemes  to 
enlist  the  unwary,  48 — Party  success  and  the  party  name  become  the  watch- 
words of  office-seekers,  48 — Permanent  party  organizations  arouse  prejudices 
and  jealousies  which  affect  the  social  and  business  associations  of  the  whole 
people,  48 — Party  organizations  from  their  inherent  evils,  finally  fall  by 
revolution,  49 — But,  the  same  pitfalls  as  before  await  the  organizing  of  a  new 
party,  49 — The  contests  for  power  between  two  opposing  political  parties  have 
made  much  of  the  history  of  our  government,  49 — The  party  in  power  the  one 
enjoying  the  fruit  of  a  mere  contest  for  spoils,  50— Submission  to  party  govern- 
ment, a  government  emanating  from  a  majority  of  the  office-holders  of  the 
dominant  party,  50— The  decision  of  a  party  caucus  final,  50 — The  election  of 
all  officers  determined  by  party  caucus,  and  all  legislation  must  submit  to  the 
decision  of  a  caucus  by  the  dominant  party,  50 — Legislation  is  impeded,  and, 
when  one  branch  of  a  legislature  is  dominated  by  one  party  and  the  other 
branch  by  the  other  party,  important  legislation  may  be  lost,  51 — In  State 
Legislatures  thus  composed,  entrusted  with  the  election  of  United  States 
Senators  and  with  the  apportionments  of  the  state,  political  "  dead-locks"  en- 
sue, 51 — Every  issue  in  every  department  or  division  of  the  government  is 
made  to  have  a  partisan  signification,  and  every  question  is  made  to  yield  a 
share  of  "  spoils"  for  partisan  purposes,  51 — The  contests  for  place  within  the 
party,  and  the  opportunities  to  manipulate  the  delegate  system,  the  scene  of 
the  greatest-  personal  strivings  for  office,  52 — Office-seekers  become  party 
managers  and  manipulators  of  the  delegate  system,  52 — How  a  United  States 
Senator  becomes  the  great  party  "  boss,"  and  how  a  few  United  States  Senators 
become  a  great  oligarchy  of  power  in  the  management  of  the  party,  52 — The 
power  of  a  United  States  Senator  to  secure  his  own  reelection,  53 — The  power 
of  a  few  United  States  Senators  in  determining  the  party  presidential  candi- 
date, 53 — The  right  claimed  by  these  United  States  Senators,  through  "  sena- 


XI 

torial  courtesy,"  to  dispose  of  the  great  appointments  to  office  and  other 
executive  favors,  54— The  offices  of  the  government  filled  by  appointment,  used 
as  "spoils"  and  made  to  purchase  a  control  of  those  intended  to  be  elective, 
54 — The  community  of  purpose  among  office-seekers,  and  their  combining  to 
contribute  to  each  other's  success,  54 — Party  managers  and  party  leaders  avoid 
new  issues  because  they  disintegrate  the  party,  "Fealty  to  party"  their  watch- 
word, and  party  glamour  and  excitement  their  best  hope  for  personal  success, 
55 — All  office-holding  is  afforded  an  autocratic  significance,  and  office-seeking 
becomes  a  life-long  profession,  because  a  few  men  are  entrusted  with  the  power 
to  nominate,  or,  in  other  cases  to  finally  elect  to  office,  and  because  these  few 
men  may  too  often  be  purchased  with  money  or  with  political  favors,  55 — 
Our  government  shown  to  be  an  oppressive  autocracy,  56 — The  evils  of  per- 
manent party  organization  and  the  evils  of  the  delegate  system  recounted  in 
order  to  make  plain  their  remedy,  57 — Gen.  Washington's  farewell  address, 
warning  the  people  of  the  evils  sure  to  result  from  party  organizations  in  a 
free  government,  57 — The  dangers  from  permanent  parties  characterized  by 
geographical  discriminations  realized,  and  the  evils  resulting  from  them  expe- 
rienced, 59  —  Gen.  Washington's  warnings  "against  the  baneful  effects 
of  the  spirit  of  party  generally,"  60 — Political  parties  permanently  de- 
fending the  rights  of  the  people  in  a  monarchical  government,  natu- 
ral and  defensible,  61 — Had  the  people  of  this  government  known  how  to 
reach  concerted  action  without  submitting  to  delegates,  the  evils  of  delegating 
and  of  permanent  party  organizations,  would  have  been  averted,  61 — Our 
government  grown  cumbersome,  and  extravagant  from  submission  to  the  auto- 
cratic rule  of  office-seekers,  62 — The  high  hopes  of  a  free  government  enter- 
tained by  our  fathers,  not  realized,  62 — The  efforts  of  the  people  aiming  at  po- 
litical reform  have  proven  fruitless,  because  they  have  not  removed  the  cause 
of  the  evils  ;  because  they  have  not  known  how  to  avoid  delegating,  and  how 
to  avoid  permanent  party  organizations,  as  means  of  reaching  concerted  ac- 
tion, 62 — To  teach  the  true  means  of  reaching  concerted  action,  and  the  true 
method  of  finding  the  will  of  a  majority  of  the  whole  people  in  selecting  their 
representatives  throughout,  the  aim  and  purpose  of  this  work,  63. 

CHAPTER  V. 

THE    PRESIDENT  AND  VICE-PRESIDENT  OF  THE   UNITED    STATES  SHOULD   BE 

ELECTED  AT  ONE  DIRECT  ELECTION  BY   THE 

WHOLE  PEOPLE. 

AND, 

UNITED   STATES    SENATORS  SHOULD   BE   ELECTED   AT   ONE    DIRECT   ELECTION 
BY  THE  PEOPLE   OF  THE  STATE. 

Considerations  to  be  regarded  in  proposing  amendments  to  our  National 
Constitution,  64 — The  methods  directed  by  the  Constitution  for  the  election  of 
the  superior  officers  of  the  government  shown  to  have  been  the  result  of  com- 
promise, 64 — Evidence  that  this  nation  of  people  recognize  in  themselves  the 
only  true  source  of  all  governmental  authority,  65 — Notes  from  Bancroft's 
History  of  the  Constitution,  65— The  Virginia  plan  of  electing  an  evecutive, 


XII 

and  of  electing  United  States  Senators,  65 — James  Wilson,  the  earnest  defen- 
der of  the  people's  right  to  rule,  66— The  mode  of  electing  a  President  a  per- 
plexing problem,  which  long  baffled  the  convention,  68 — Foremost  in  undi- 
minished  disapproval  of  the  choice  of  the  executive  by  the  legislature  were 
Washington,  Madison,  Wilson,  Gouverneur  Morris,  and  Gerry,  70 — Wilson's 
difficulty  in  finding  a  satisfactory  plan  for  electing  the  President,  71 — Final 
submission  to  an  election  by  electors  meeting  in  their  respective  States,  and, 
in  case  of  a  majority  not  concurring,  the  eventual  choice  to  be  decided  by  the 
House  of  Representatives,  voting  by  States,  72 — Evidence  that  the  most  patri- 
otic members  of  the  convention  desired  to  establish  a  government  with  its  of- 
ficial representatives  elected  directly  by  the  people,  72 — Because  these  true 
patriots  knew  of  no  method  by  which  the  whole  body  of  voters  could  reach 
concerted  action,  they  were  forced  to  submit  to  a  plan  of  delegating  the  power 
to  elect  men  to  office  to  a  few  men,  72 — Evidence  that  they  submitted  to  the 
method  of  delegating  from  necessity  and  not  from  choice,  73 — Electors  en- 
trusted with  the  election  of  a  President,  and  State  Legislators  entrusted  with 
the  election  of  United  States  Senators  recognized  by  the  people  as  having  only 
the  significance  of  delegates,  73 — Electors  are  not  permitted  to  determine  upon 
a  President  by  their  own  choice,  but  are  instructed  with  a  precise  trust,  73 — 
Because  electors  meeting  in  separate  state  colleges  or  conventions,  at  once  lost 
all  significance  toward  reaching  concerted  action,  this  duty  has  been  trans- 
ferred to  party  nominating  conventions,  74 — How  voting  for  electors,  since 
the  adoption  of  the  general  ticket  system  emphasizes  the  evils  of  the  "  unit 
rule,"  75 — How  it  is  possible  for  a  minority  of  the  voters  of  the  country  to 
elect  a  President  in  defiance  of  an  opposing  majority,  75 — The  evils  of  the 
electoral  system,  and  its  perversion  by  the  adoption  of  the  general  ticket  sys- 
tem pointed  out  by  Senator  Ben  ton  and  others  in  1824, 75— Senator  Benton's  de- 
fense of  a  plan  of  direct  voting  for  the  President  and  Vice-President  by  districts, 
76 — Eeasons  why  we  should  not  entrust  the  election  of  a  President  to  electors, 
discussed  by  Benton,  77 — The  evils  then  so  well  pointed  out  as  belonging  to 
the  electoral  system,  now  shown  to  belong  to  delegates  meeting  in  nominating 
conventions,  78 — Reasons  why  the  gratitude  of  a  President  when  elected,  is 
given  to  the  few  delegates  who  nominated  him,  and  not  to  the  great  mass  of  vo- 
ters who  elected  him  to  office,  79 — Summing  up  of  the  evils  resulting  from  our 
delegating  to  a  few  men  the  power  to  determine  upon  party  candidates,  80 — 
The  tendency  to  bargain  for  office  or  favor,  when  nominations  or  elections  are  en- 
trusted to  a  few  men  acting  as  delegates  has  proven  to  be  irresistible,  80 — The 
present  method  of  electing  United  States  Senators  illustrates  the  field  for  in- 
triguing and  corrupt  office-seeking  afforded  by  delegating  the  power  to  elect  men 
to  office  in  its  fullest  extent,  81 — The  method  directed  by  the  constitution  the  re- 
sult of  a  compromise,  81 — Why  it  was  accepted  by  the  patriotic  members  of  the 
convention  quite  irreconcilable,  81 — The  method  defended  by  the  few  men  hold- 
ing the  offices  of  State  legislators,  for  selfish  purposes,  82 — The  same  personal  in- 
terests the  source  of  the  doctrine  of  "  States'  Rights,"  82 — The  method  urged  as  a 
means  of  defending  "  aristocratic  interests "  because  it  afforded  the  opportu- 
nity of  retaining  power  in  the  hands  of  the  few,  82 — James  Wilson's  pure  and 
patriotic  arguments  against  these  doctrines,  83— The  people  now  attempt  to 


XIII 

instruct  their  State  legislators  who  to  support  for  the  United  States  Senator- 
ship,  84 — The  evils  resulting  from  electing  United  States  Senators  by  dele- 
gated authority  graver  than  the  evils  of  delegating  in  making  party  nomina- 
tions, 84 — The  various  series  of  delegatings  joined  together  in  one  great  com- 
plex political  machine  under  the  control  of  party  managers  and  party  lead- 
ers, 85— The  power  of  a  United  States  Senator  to  secure  his  own  re-election 
determines  him  as  the  great  party  "  boss,"  85 — Conclusive  evidence  that  the 
language  and  intent  of  the  Constitution  is  no  longer  respected  by  the  people, 
while  the  submission  to  a  perverted  interpretation  of  its  directions  has  simply 
served  to  complicate  and  increase  the  evils  of  delegating,  86 — The  remedy  for 
the  evils  resulting  from  delegating  to  be  found  in  the  proposed  method  of 
direct  voting,  87 — Amendments  of  the  Constitution  proposed  which  will  at 
once  establish  for  us  a  Representative  Government  truthfully  emanating  from 
the  people's  will,  87. 

CHAPTER  VI. 

THE  CIVIL  SERVICE  EVIL  AND  ITS  REMEDY. 

Why  the  large  number  of  officers  employed  in  the  executive  branch  of  the 
government  may  not  be  elected  directly  by  the  people,  88 — The  method  direct- 
ed by  the  Constitution  for  their  appointment,  88 — The  minor  grades  of  these 
officers  known  as  the  civil  service  of  the  country,  89 — The  use  made  of  the 
appointing  power  has  given  rise  to  the  civil  service  question,  89 — The  power 
of  appointing  men  to  office  made  one  of  the  "  spoils"  of  party  government,  89 
— Other  "  spoils"  of  the  party  in  power,  89 — The  corrupt  use  made  of  the  ap- 
pointing power,  89 — Promises  of  appointments  to  office  exchanged  for  political 
services  in  controlling  party  nominations,  and  for  aiding  in  securing  an  election 
to  office,  89 — This  corrupt  traffic  the  real  civil  service  evil,  90— Other  results  of  the 
evil,  90— Removals  from  office,— Political  assessments,  etc.,  90— Why  this 
traffic  between  the  candidates  for  elective  offices,  and  those  seeking  offices  by 
appointment  is  corrupt,  91 — Why  office-holding  throughout  is  in  no  way  ac- 
countable to  the  people,  92— Our  government  controlled  by  the  few  crafty 
enough  to  secure  its  official  places,  92 — The  civil  service  evil  but  an  outgrowth 
of  the  evils  of  delegating  and  of  permanent  party  organizations,  92 — The 
motive  or  consideration  influencing  the  appointing  powers  but  one  part  of  the 
corrupt  contract,  93 — Why  controlling  nominations  and  deceiving  the  people 
in  the  election  of  their  higher  officers  is  the  graver  evil,  and,  is  the  cause  of 
corruption  in  making  appointments,  93 — The  importance  of  applying  the 
remedy  to  the  cause  of  an  evil,  93 — The  Act  of  Congress,  entitled  "  An  Act  to 
regulate  and  improve  the  civil  service  of  the  United  States"  an  attempt  to  re- 
lieve the  servile  allegiance  of  the  minor  or  appointed  officers  to  their  superiors, 
93 — Why  legislation  against  the  results  of  the  evil,  and  allowing  the  cause  to 
continue,  will  not  stop  the  corrupt  traffic  in  the  offices  of  the  government,  94 — 
Reasons  why  competitive  examinations  should  be  conducted  under  the  direc- 
tion of  the  superior  officer  in  charge  of  the  department  or  branch  wherein  the 
appointments  are  to  be  made,  95 — Why  the  recently  adopted  method  will  in- 
vite insubordination,  and  a  want  of  proper  accountability  from  the  minor 


XIV 

officers  to  their  superiors,  95 — The  argument,  that,  by  substituting  a  commis- 
sion of  examiners,  the  plan  will  relieve  the  President  and  members  of  Congress, 
and  others  of  much  distasteful  work  in  finding  places  for  their  constituents 
based  upon  a  half  told  truth,  96 — What  evidence  can  be  shown  that  this  com- 
mission and  its  examiners  will  not  in  time  conduct  the  same  traffic  in  the 
offices  of  the  government,  as  that  which  has  heretofore  existed,  98 — This  pro- 
posed means  of  reform,  but  a  transfer  of  certain  duties  from  the  higher  elective 
officers,  to  an  appointed  commission,  98 — Why  the  warning  of  penalties  and 
punishments  will  not  correct  the  moral  turpitude  of  office-holders,  98— Elective 
office-holders  have  other  means  of  repaying  party-workers,  99 — Civil  Service 
Keform  cannot  be  secured  by  legislative  enactments  until  legislators  and 
the  Chief  Executive  of  the  nation  are  made  truly  accountable  to  the 
people,  99 — The  management  of  governmental  affairs  compared  to  the  suc- 
cessful management  of  corporate  enterprises  among  men,  99 — To  successfully 
conduct  a  free  government  requires  the  same  guarded  accountability  from 
its  officers  to  the  people,  100 — The  want  of  proper  accountability  due 
from  elective  officers,  traced  to  our  methods  of  electing,  100 — True  Civil 
Service  Reform  can  only  come  when  our  elective  officers  are  made 
truthfully  accountable  to  the  people  for  their  election,  100 — With  the 
adoption  of  the  proposed  method  of  direct  elections,  new  men,  with  new 
principles  will  be  selected  as  our  first  servants  in  the  high  elective  offices, 
101 — These  officers  will  then  be  made  truthfully  accountable  to  the  people,  101 
— Men  appointed  to  the  subordinate  or  minor  offices  will  then  be  made  properly 
accountable  to  their  superiors,  102 — No  form  of  "spoils"  will  then  be  of 
value  in  purchasing  an  election  to  office,  102 — There  will  then  be  no  need  of 
laws  to  prevent  the  higher  or  elective  officers  from  corruptly  using  the  ap- 
pointing power,  103 — Laws  to  restrain  the  officers  entrusted  with  the  law- 
making  powers  from  evil  and  corrupt  schemes  of  self  aggrandizement  will  not 
then  be  needed,  103 — The  proposed  method  of  direct  elections  shown  to  be  the 
true  remedy  for  the  civil  service  evil  and  its  resulting  corruption,  103 — Final 
summing  up  of  the  specific  evils  which  will  be  removed,  and  of  the  true  prin- 
ciples which  will  be  established  by  the  adoption  of  the  proposed  method  of 
conducting  a  government  truthfully  emanating  from  the  people's  will,  104. 


CHAPTER  I.— INTRODUCTORY. 

THE  PRINCIPLES  UNDERLYING   THE  STRUCTURE  OF  A    FREE  GOVERNMENT. 

The  basis  of  every  grade  of  monarchical  or  of  autocratic 
rule  is  the  submission  of  the  many,  to  the  rule  of  a  few  indi- 
viduals, having  either  greater  wealth,  greater  intelligence  or  a 
genius  for  ruling  ;  the  power  of  which,  they  use  in  controlling 
the  masses.  A  monarch  alone  cannot  rule,  but,  by  granting 
extraordinary  favors  to  a  few  individuals  comprising  an  aris- 
tocracy, he  is  supported  and  aided  by  these  in  ruling  the 
many.  These  few  acting  together,  and  establishing  a  vast 
army  of  defense,  which  they  support  by  taxes  wrung  from  the 
labor  of  the  masses,  rule  over  these  masses  and  make  them 
their  subjects. 

In  a  free  government,  sovereignty  is  vested  in  the  whole 
people.  Men  are  elected  to  office  to  serve  the  people,  not  to 
rule  over  them.  When  office  holders  presume  to  be  rulers  of 
the  people,  freedom  is  jeopardized. 

From  our  not  having  the  question,  who  are  our  rulers,  ab- 
solutely and  definitely  established  in  fact  as  well  as  in  theory, 
our  government  has  been  the  scene  of  a  constant  conflict  be- 
tween men  aiming  to  secure  an  autocratic  power,  and  the 
spirit  of  political  freedom  among  the  masses. 

At  the  outset  of  a  discussion  it  is  often  of  great  importance 
to  define  the  meaning  and  full  significance  intended  to  be 
given  to  a  subject  or  proposition,  which  is  itself  to  be  consid- 
ered, and  which  is  to  form  the  basis  of  further  elucidation  and 
defense. 

Strange  though  it  may  seem,  in  a  country  that  boasts  of  hav- 
ing enjoyed  more  than  a  century  of  political  freedom  and  sub- 


mission  to  popular  rule,  it  is  even  here  important  to  determine 
a  standard  for  the  meaning  of  political  freedom,  and  for  the 
significance  of  popular  rule,  before  these  terms,  and  their  true 
signification  may  be  safely  used  as  the  basis  or  subjects  of 
further  discussion. 

It  was  the  different  acceptations  given  to  the  significance  of 
political  freedom,  even  among  the  leaders  of  revolutionary 
times,  that  delayed  the  cause  of  freedom  in  its  struggles  against 
monarchical  rule  and  oppression.  It  was  the  wide  difference 
given  to  the  significance  of  political  freedom,  that  delayed  the 
more  complete  establishment  of  our  national  government, 
even  after  the  right  to  liberty  had  been  secured  by  a  long  and 
unequal  warfare  waged  in  its  defense.  It  was  largely  from  a 
difference  in  the  accepted  signification  given  to  political 
freedom  and  to  the  right  of  the  people  to  rule,  that  our  national 
constitution  became  a  compromise  upon  questions  closely  con- 
cerning our  national  existence,  and  upon  methods  of  conduct- 
ing a  national  government,  which  may  yet  be  shown  to  be  of 
vital  concern  to  the  equal  rights  of  men. 

There  has  been  ever  since,  and  there  is  to-day,  a  wide  dif- 
ference in  the  accepted  significance  of  political  freedom,  or 
submission  to  popular  rule.  So  wide  indeed,  does  this  differ- 
ence remain,  that  selfish  though  successful  politicians  among 
us,  greatly  enjoy  to  taunt  those  who  seek  to  establish  political 
freedom  in  its  fullest  sense,  and  to  uphold  submission  to  popu- 
lar rule  in  its  literal  and  just  signification,  as  being  political 
dreamers,  and  searchers  after  a  Utopia. 

This  wide  range  of  signification  has  not  by  any  means  been 
more  the  result  of  ignorance  of  the  true  meaning  of  political 
freedom,  or  of  the  enjoyment  of  civil  liberty,  than,  like  many 
other  propositions  which  affect  the  interests  of  men,  it  has  re- 
ceived a  modified  acceptation,  varying  in  accordance  with  a 
variety  of  conditions  and  surroundings  affecting  their  personal 
interests. 

Political  freedom,  literally  defined,  means  exemption  from 
the  power  and  control  of  another.  Hence,  those  men  who  de- 
sire to  wield  a  personal  political  power  and  control  over  their 
fellows  attach  a  modified  significance  to  political  freedom. 


Political  freedom  means  fairness  and  equality  of  rights ;  hence, 
those  who  desire  political  place  and  power  for  selfish  gain  at- 
tach a  still  further  modified  significance  to  their  acceptation  of 
political  freedom.  Political  freedom  has  ever  been  in  conflict 
with  the  selfish  desire  of  men  to  rule  over  their  fellows. 
Hence,  every  stage  of  its  successes  has  fixed  a  standard  to 
which  a  large  following  have  submissively  yielded.  Political 
freedom  has,  through  all  ages,  had  many  able  leaders  and 
eager  defenders,  who  have  made  earnest  efforts  to  secure  bet- 
ter methods  for  its  defense  and  protection. 

A  recent  writer,  (Prof.  Isaac  L.  Rice,  in  the  N.  A.  Review 
for  Jan.,  1883,)  in  reaching  a  definition  of  civil  or  political  lib- 
erty, as  it  has  slowly  progressed  from  a  long  contest  with  feu- 
dalism and  aristocratic  oppression  in  England,  has  concluded 
that:  "Civil  liberty  is  the  result  of  the  restraint  exercised  by 
the  sovereign  people  on  the  more  powerful  individuals  and 
classes  of  the  community,  preventing  them  from  availing  them- 
selves of  the  excess  of  their  power  to  the  detriment  of  the 
other  classes."  A  definition  of  civil  or  political  liberty  was 
more  directly  reached  by  the  fathers  of  our  independence, 
when  they  declared  these  truths  to  be  self  evident :  "  That 
all  men  are  created  equal ;  that  they  are  endowed  by  their 
Creator  with  certain  unalienable  rights  ;  that  among  these  are 
life,  liberty,  and  the  pursuit  of  happiness.  That  to  secure 
these  rights,  governments  are  instituted  among  men,  deriving 
their  just  powers  from  the  consent  of  the  governed."  These 
two  definitions  combined,  probably  give  us  a  still  more  practi- 
cal comprehension  of  the  signification  of  political  freedom  ; 
for  while  the  one  proclaims  that  it  comes  by  right  with  the 
creation  of  man,  the  other  warns  us  that  it  requires  a  con- 
stant contest  with  the  selfishness  and  schemings  of  men  in 
order  to  secure  its  defense  and  preservation. 

By  those  who  from  ignorance  as  well  as  from  selfishness, 
disdain  to  inquire  into  the  causes  of  surrounding  conditions, 
such  a  review  will  be  regarded  as  too  "  theoretical " — and  as 
being  of  no  practical  importance.  By  others,  however,  who 
recognize  that  subtle  causes  are  constantly  at  work  moulding 
our  closest  surroundings,  an  inquiry  into  the  true  reasons  for 


the  varied  significations  given  to  political  freedom,  will  be  re- 
garded as  of  the  greatest  practical  value. 

The  sentiment  or  convictions  which  arouse  the  desire  for 
civil  liberty,  and  the  right  to  establish  a  free  government,  can 
only  come  with  the  advanced  degrees  of  civilization  and  en- 
lightenment of  a  people.  It  arises  in  the  breasts  of  men  con- 
scious of  their  own  ability  not  only  to  wring  from  nature  the 
necessities  for  their  own  comfort  and  existence,  but  of  an 
ability  to  so  order  their  own  conduct  in  the  race  for  life  among 
their  fellows,  that  they  shall  be  governed  by  the  strictest 
rules  of  fairness,  and  by  an  acknowledgment  of  equal  social 
and  political  rights  to  all.  It  requires  sufficient  philanthropy 
to  accept  that  others  have  not  only  equal  rights,  but  that  they 
have  an  equal  right  to  exercise  their  political  wisdom  and  in- 
telligence ;  and,  that  the  combined  wisdom  of  all  is  superior 
to  the  conclusions  of  a  few.  It  requires  that  men  shall  be- 
lieve in  the  final  success  of  the  right,  as  far  as  they  may  be 
enabled  to  secure  wisdom  to  determine  upon  the  right,  and 
each  being  a  factor  in  determining  the  final  judgment,  each 
must  have  an  abiding  faith  in  the  judgment  of  his  fellows. 

To  found  a  free  government  demands  intelligence ;  for  with- 
out it,  ignorance  is  but  uncertainty,  and  yields  to  bigotry  and 
selfishness.  To  erect  a  free  government  demands  honesty,  for 
treachery  and  knavery  makes  uncertain  all  that  the  rest  may 
stand  upon,  and  like  ignorance  bows  to  the  most  selfish  pur- 
poses. To  conduct  a  free  government  demands  above  all  else, 
that  men  shall  own  a  sense  of  liberality,  a  sense  of  justice,  and 
an  acknowledgment  of  political  equality  among  their  fellows. 
These  are  no  imaginary  standards,  they  outline  the  only  possible 
conditions  upon  which  a  free  government  may  be  securely  es- 
tablished. When  men  find  themselves  possessed  of  this  in- 
telligence, this  honesty,  this  liberality,  and  this  sense  of  justice, 
acknowledging  the  right  to  political  equality  among  their  fel- 
lows, they  are  impelled  to  demand  for  themselves  and  their  fel- 
lows the  right  to  establish  and  to  enjoy  a  free  government. 

Freedom,  and  equal  civil  rights  have  been  themes  which 
have  stirred  every  noble  heart  and  hand  among  every  enlight- 
ened people  since  the  beginning  of  the  history  of  mankind. 


These  sentiments  have  combatted  with  ignorance  and  bigotry, 
with  dishonesty  and  knavery,  and  with  the  selfishness  of  every 
conceivable  form  of  monarchical,  aristocratic,  autocratic,  and  all 
other  methods  of  tyrannical  rule  which  could  possibly  be  de- 
vised by  men.  The  conflict  still  goes  on,  and  the  ingenuity  of 
selfishness  and  knavery  only  makes  necessary  the  demand 
that  the  standard  of  intelligence,  of  honesty  and  liberality 
shall  mount  higher  in  order  to  secure  surer  methods  for  the 
erection  and  defense  of  a  government  truly  by  the  popular 
will. 

It  is  one  of  the  gratuitous,  as  well  as  one  of  the  most  danger- 
ous arguments  of  men,  that  because  social  and  political  edifices 
are  of  men's  construction,  and  must  necessarily  be  imperfect, 
any  amount  of  imperfection  must  therefore  remain  unchanged 
or  unmodified,  because,  as  they  claim,  "  man  cannot  hope  to 
reach  perfection."  This  doctrine,  the  outcome  of  men's  indo- 
lence, indifference  and  ignorance,  has  been  defended  by  these 
classes  under  the  plea  of  conservatism.  Under  this  same  plea, 
set  up  as  a  defense  lest  any  innovation  or  change  may  bring 
about  injury  or  destruction  of  existing  conditions,  there  is  found 
quite  another  and  distinct  class  of  more  active  workers,  whose 
real  object  is  a  selfish  defense  of  conditions  and  surroundings, 
which  already  contribute  to  some  personal  advantages  for  them 
over  their  fellows. 

Opposed  to  all  these  classes,  unfortunately  quite  large  and 
powerful  in  numbers,  there  are  still  many  others  who,  for  the 
cause  of  humanity,  and  not  for  personal  advantages  alone,  seek 
to  further  unravel  the  just  laws  of  the  universe,  and  find  there- 
in the  basis  for  human  structures,  both  social  and  political, 
such  as  will  establish  for  all  mankind  a  just  and  equitable  re- 
lationship and  protection. 

It  must  be  borne  in  mind  that  the  true  intent  of  a  free  gov- 
ernment is  mutual  protection.  In  no  sense  is  the  purpose  of 
free  government  production  ;  construed  to  this  end  its  con- 
duct must  soon  be  perverted  to  reward  the  selfishness  of  the 
few.  A  free  government,  demanding  proportionately  equal  lia- 
bilities for  its  support  from  all  its  citizens,  can  afford  no  dis- 
criminating advantages  to  any.  As  it  cannot  create,  its  duty  is 


6 

simply  to  protect  all,  so  that  the  greatest  good  shall  be  secured 
to  the  greatest  number,  without  violating  the  actual  rights  of 
any. 

The  constitution  of  a  wisely  established  free  government 
depends  not  more  upon  the  just  principles  it  enunciates,  than 
upon  the  methods  it  directs  for  the  conducting  and  for  the 
preservation  of  these  principles.  Government  is  essentially  a 
structure  in  action,  and  a  government  emanating  from  the 
popular  will  must  find  its  only  safe  defense  in  such  methods  of 
selecting  its  official  representatives  throughout,  as  will  securely 
make  those  entrusted  with  the  responsibitity  of  enacting  and 
executing  its  laws,  truthfully  accountable  to  the  whole  people, 
upon  whom  these  laws  are  to  operate.  A  "  Bill  of  Rights  "  in 
a  monarchical  government  is  a  concession  of  power  from  the 
monarch  for  the  people's  protection  and  defence  ;  an  arbitra- 
ment to  which 'the  people  may  appeal,  while  the  bill  of  un- 
alienable  rights,  in  a  government  whose  sovereignty  is  the 
popular  will,  is  not  limited  to  a  few  written  texts,  liable  to  be 
constantly  misconstrued  and  perverted,  but  remains  embodied 
in  the  increasing  wisdom  and  philanthropy  of  an  intelligent 
people.  Hence,  the  true  means  of  defending  the  primary 
rights  to  which  the  people  originally  subscribe,  must  largely  be 
found  in  that  part  of  their  constitution  which  directs  the 
methods  of  selecting  their  representatives,  and  of  conducting 
their  government. 

A  people  in  possession  of  political  liberty  should  not  be  forced 
to  be  continually  on  the  defense  against  encroachments  of  their 
own  government ;  but,  having  secured  safe  and  equitable 
methods  for  its  continuation,  and  for  a  faithful  representation  of 
the  popular  will,  should  find  in  its  enactments  and  in  their  exe- 
cution a  constant  reflection  of  their  wisest  and  most  patriotic 
desires.  Any  evils,  therefore,  in  the  methods  of  conducting  a 
free  government,  especially  in  the  selecting  of  representatives 
of  the  people,  must  weaken  the  basis  of  the  structure,  obstruct 
its  proper  action,  and  bring  about  discredit  upon  the  just- 
ness of  freedom  itself. 

It  has  long  since  been  decided  that  ours,  from  necessity,  must 
be  a  representative  form  of  free  government ;  hence,  thesignifi- 


cance  we  intend  to  give  to  political  freedom  should  be  our 
standard  in  selecting  the  people's  representatives.  Again,  the 
will  of  a  concurring  majority  has  the  force  of  representing  the 
wisdom  of  the  greatest  number,  and  has  long  been  acceded  to 
as  representing  the  popular  will.  Hence,  the  selection  by  the 
will  of  a  concurring  majority  of  the  popular  vote,  of  such 
representatives  as  embody  in  their  convictions  the  highest 
standard  of  political  freedom,  presents  the  mathematical 
problem  in  the  conducting  of  our  representative  government. 
This  is  indeed  the  great  problem,  in  the  true  solution  of  which 
is  to  be  secured  the  final  defense  of  equal  political  rights. 
War  may  secure  for  us  the  right  to  liberty,  but  here  in  civil 
methods  must  we  be  able  to  erect  and  defend  our  equal  rights 
among  each  other.  The  weapon  in  civil  contests  is  the  ballot, 
and  victory  is  determined  by  the  greater  number ;  hence,  we 
have  reached  the  problem  which  requires  the  finding  of  the 
candidate  upon  whom  a  majority  of  the  voters  will  first  con- 
cur. 


6 

simply  to  protect  all,  so  that  the  greatest  good  shall  be  secured 
to  the  greatest  number,  without  violating  the  actual  rights  of 
any. 

The  constitution  of  a  wisely  established  free  government 
depends  not  more  upon  the  just  principles  it  enunciates,  than 
upon  the  methods  it  directs  for  the  conducting  and  for  the 
preservation  of  these  principles.  Government  is  essentially  a 
structure  in  action,  and  a  government  emanating  from  the 
popular  will  must  find  its  only  safe  defense  in  such  methods  of 
selecting  its  official  representatives  throughout,  as  will  securely 
make  those  entrusted  with  the  responsibility  of  enacting  and 
executing  its  laws,  truthfully  accountable  to  the  whole  people, 
upon  whom  these  laws  are  to  operate.  A  "  Bill  of  Rights  "  in 
a  monarchical  government  is  a  concession  of  power  from  the 
monarch  for  the  people's  protection  and  defence  ;  an  arbitra- 
ment to  which' the  people  may  appeal,  while  the  bill  of  un- 
alienable  rights,  in  a  government  whose  sovereignty  is  the 
popular  will,  is  not  limited  to  a  few  written  texts,  liable  to  be 
constantly  misconstrued  and  perverted,  but  remains  embodied 
in  the  increasing  wisdom  and  philanthropy  of  an  intelligent 
people.  Hence,  the  true  means  of  defending  the  primary 
rights  to  which  the  people  originally  subscribe,  must  largely  be 
found  in  that  part  of  their  constitution  which  directs  the 
methods  of  selecting  their  representatives,  and  of  conducting 
their  government. 

A  people  in  possession  of  political  liberty  should  not  be  forced 
to  be  continually  on  the  defense  against  encroachments  of  their 
own  government ;  but,  having  secured  safe  and  equitable 
methods  for  its  continuation,  and  for  a  faithful  representation  of 
the  popular  will,  should  find  in  its  enactments  and  in  their  exe- 
cution a  constant  reflection  of  their  wisest  and  most  patriotic 
desires.  Any  evils,  therefore,  in  the  methods  of  conducting  a 
free  government,  especially  in  the  selecting  of  representatives 
of  the  people,  must  weaken  the  basis  of  the  structure,  obstruct 
its  proper  action,  and  bring  about  discredit  upon  the  just- 
ness of  freedom  itself. 

It  has  long  since  been  decided  that  ours,  from  necessity,  must 
be  a  representative  form  of  free  government ;  hence,  thesignifi- 


cance  we  intend  to  give  to  political  freedom  should  be  our 
standard  in  selecting  the  people's  representatives.  Again,  the 
will  of  a  concurring  majority  has  the  force  of  representing  the 
wisdom  of  the  greatest  number,  and  has  long  been  acceded  to 
as  representing  the  popular  will.  Hence,  the  selection  by  the 
will  of  a  concurring  majority  of  the  popular  vote,  of  such 
representatives  as  embody  in  their  convictions  the  highest 
standard  of  political  freedom,  presents  the  mathematical 
problem  in  the  conducting  of  our  representative  government. 
This  is  indeed  the  great  problem,  in  the  true  solution  of  which 
is  to  be  secured  the  final  defense  of  equal  political  rights. 
War  may  secure  for  us  the  right  to  liberty,  but  here  in  civil 
methods  must  we  be  able  to  erect  and  defend  our  equal  rights 
among  each  other.  The  weapon  in  civil  contests  is  the  ballot, 
and  victory  is  determined  by  the  greater  number ;  hence,  we 
have  reached  the  problem  which  requires  the  finding  of  the 
candidate  upon  whom  a  majority  of  the  voters  will  first  con- 
cur. 


CHAPTER  II. 

THE   TRUE    METHOD    OF    REACHING    CONCERTED    ACTION,    AND    OF    FIND- 
ING  THE   WILL    OF   A    CONCURRING    MAJORITY. 

In  a  representative  form  of  free  government  the  sovereign 
voters  express  their  will  in  the  selection  of  representatives. 
These  selected  representatives  are  intended  to  embody  the 
principles  and  wishes  of  the  district  or  community  they  are 
entrusted  to  represent. 

In  determining  upon  an  official  representative,  if  only  two 
candidates  are  to  be  selected  from,  the  concurrence  of  a  ma- 
jority of  the  voters  upon  one  of  these  candidates  would  readily 
be  reached  by  a  simple  direct  vote  of  the  whole  body  of  vo- 
ters. Usually,  however,  several  candidates,  standing  for  va- 
rious opinions  are  offered,  so  that  a  simple  direct  vote  would 
seldom  find  a  majority  of  the  voters  concurring  upon  any  one 
of  these  candidates.  The  problem  now  becomes  more  com- 
plex, and  some  provision  must  be  made  by  which  the  voters 
may  further  concur.  It  is  unnecessary  to  urge,  that  if  every 
voter  persistently  supports  his  first  choice  among  the  candi- 
dates, or,  that  without  yielding  one  to  another,  the  concurrence 
of  a  majority  upon  any  one  candidate  can  never  be  reached. 

The  conditions  which  the  problem  now  presents,  are  as  fol- 
lows : 

First.  There  are  several  candidates  offering  for  the  same  of- 
fice in  a  given  district. 

Secondly.  The  voters  of  the  district  are  divided  in  their 
choice  among  these  candidates,  so  that  if  it  were  left  to  a  sim- 
ple direct  vote  no  candidate  would  be  the  choice  of  a  ma- 
jority. 


9 

Thirdly.  In  order  to  reach  concerted  action  or  the  concur- 
rence of  a  majority  upon  one  candidate,  at  least  some  of  the 
voters  must  yield  their  first  choice,  and  support  a  second 
choice  among  the  candidates,  thereby  concurring  with  those 
who  have  made  this  candidate  their  first  choice. 

Fourthly.  Many  voters  have  a  choice  among  the  remaining 
candidates,  and  would  be  willing  to  name  this  second  choice 
provisionally,  lest  their  first  choice  cannot  be  elected.  For 
instance,  a  voter  whose  first  choice  is  A.,  but  fearing  that  A. 
cannot  be  elected,  might  be  willing  to  concur  upon  B.,  in  pref- 
erence to  permitting  a  more  objectionable  candidate  being 
elected. 

Were  all  the  voters,  or  even  a  part  of  the  voters  now,  to  in- 
dicate upon  their  tickets  not  only  a  first  choice  among  the 
candidates,  but  a  provisional  or  second  choice  and  such  succeed- 
ing choices,  as  each  voter  saw  fit  ;  and  were  they  to  deposit  such 
tickets  at  their  various  polling  places,  the  returns,  when  col- 
lected, would  afford  the  basis  for  a  true  solution  of  the  prob- 
lem of  finding  upon  whom  a  majority  would  first  concur. 

Let  us  suppose  that  an  election  is  to  be  made  in  a  district 
containing  10,000  voters,  of  whom  any  number  exceeding 
5000  would  be  a  majority.  Let  us  suppose  further,  that  four 
candidates,  A.,  B.,  G.,  and  D.  have  been  named  by  their  re- 
spective supporters  for  a  position  as  an  official  representative 
of  this  district.  And  still  further  let  us  suppose,  that  each  can- 
didate is  the  first  choice  of  a  nearly  equal  number  of  these 
voters,  or,  so  that  by  a  simple  direct  vote,  there  would  not  be 
the  concurrence  of  a  majority  upon  any  one  candidate. 

If  now  each  voter  in  the  district,  so  disposed,  should  deposit 
at  his  polling  place  a  ticket,  naming  thereon,  not  only  his  first 
choice  among  these  candidates,  but  provisionally,  his  second 
choice,  and  such  succeeding  choices  as  he  thought  necessary, 
the  returns  would  afford  us  the  data  for  a  mathematically  cor- 
rect solution  of  the  problem.  For  example,  one  voter's  ticket 
might  read  : 


Another's  -  Still         £'  And 

' 


f£' 
1  % 


Thus,     •  „  ticket         ?  *'          another's        '  ,  another's 

D.  thus>    IS.  3.         thu8'    \%  thu8>      D.  i. 


10 

It  will  be  perceived  that  each  voter,  by  such  a  ticket,  can 
very  fully  represent  his  order  of  preference  among  the  candi- 
dates, and  that  he  omits  to  recognize  and  thus  opposes,  an 
objectionable  candidate,  by  giving  him  no  preference  what- 
ever. 

Let  us  suppose  the  tally  sheet,  when  the  vote  from  the  va- 
rious polling  places  of  this  district,  has  been  summed  up, 
should  read  as  follows  : 

Whole 

A.  B.  C.  D.         No.  of       Maj. 

Voters. 

As  1st  choice 2500        3000        2200        2300       10,000      5001 

As  2d  choice,      ....      4000        1500          500          200 

New  relative  concurring)      

support,  /     6500        4500        2700        2500 

In  other  words,  the  returns  would  show  that  2500  voters 
had  made  A.  their  first  choice,  that  3000  voters  had  made  B. 
their  first  choice,  that  2200  voters  had  made  G.  their  first 
choice,  and  that  the  remaining  2300  voters  had  made  D.  their 
first  choice;  corresponding  exactly  with  the  result,  had  there 
been  only  a  simple  direct  vote  made,  where  each  voter  names 
only  his  first  choice  among  the  candidates. 

But  no  candidate  has  thus  received  the  support  of  a  ma- 
jority of  the  whole  number  of  voters,  and  we  must  make  use 
of  the  willingness  of  some  voters  to  yield,  as  indicated  by  their 
naming  a  provisional  or  second  choice  upon  their  tickets. 

By  reference  to  the  tally  sheet  again,  it  will  be  seen  that  4000 
voters,  other  than  those  who  had  named  A.  as  their  first  choice, 
now  make  him  their  second  choice.  Or,  as  these  voters  had 
made  either  B.,  G.,  or  D.  their  first  choice,  but  now  make  A. 
their  second  choice,  they  have  indicated  their  willingness  to 
concur  with  the  2500  voters  who  have  already  made  A.  their 
first  choice,  or,  together  they  number  6500  voters  who  would 
now  concur  upon  A.  At  the  same  time  the  record  shows  that 
1500  voters,  other  than  those  who  had  made  B.  their  first 
choice,  are  now  willing  to  make  B.  their  second  choice,  or,  in 
other  words,  that  they  are  willing  to  concur  with  the  3000 
voters  who  have  before  made  B.  their  first  choice.  These 
numbers  together  make  B.'s  new  concurring  support  reach 


11 

4500.  In  the  same  manner  it  will  be  seen  that  500  voters, 
other  than  those  who  had  made  G.  their  first  choice,  now  make 
him  their  second  choice,  and  that  this  number  added  to  the 
2200,  who  have  already  made  him  their  first  choice,  now  make 
his  concurring  support  number  2700.  And  from  the  figures 
it  may  also  be  readily  seen  that  the  new  concurring  support  of 
D.  reaches  2500  of  the  voters. 

It  is  evident  that  the  concurring  support  of  each  candidate 
has  now  a  relative  significance  only,  and  does  not  represent 
distinct  bodies  of  men  standing  apart  for  each  individual  can- 
didate. For  there  are,  in  truth,  a  large  number  of  voters  who. 
are  represented  variously  in  some  two  of  these  numbers. 
These  voters  having  provisionally  yielded  and  named  a  second 
choice,  in  order  to  reach  concerted  action,  and  thus  find  the 
candidate  upon  whom  a  majority  will  first  concur,  have  still 
remained  in  the  support  of  their  first  choice.  Actually,  these 
voters  have  given  their  support  to  either  of  these  two  candi- 
dates, in  opposition  to  any  other  one  contesting  for  the  place, 
but  now  they  make  no  choice  between  the  two  candidates 
they  have  thus  named.  These  final  numbers,  therefore,  have 
the  true  significance,  of  comparing  the  concurring  support  of 
one  candidate  with  that  of  any  other  candidate  successively, 
and  show  a  relative  rather  than  a  distinct  support.  But  they 
truthfully  determine  the  candidate  upon  whom  a  majority  of 
the  voters  have  first  concurred. 

As  the  concurring  support  of  A.  alone  has  reached  a  ma- 
jority of  the  whole  number  of  voters,  it  is  evident  that  he  is 
the  candidate  upon  whom  a  majority  have  first  concurred,  and 
that  the  problem  has  been  solved. 

This  is  a  simple  presentation  of  the  true  means  of  reaching 
concerted  action,  and  of  solving  the  problem  of  finding  upon 
whom  a  majority  of  the  voters  will  first  concur. 

It  is  a  method  equally  applicable  to  any  number  of  voters. 
It  is  applicable  to  those  of  the  smallest  district  having  such  a 
problem  to  decide,  and  equally  applicable  to  the  election  of  a 
President  of  the  United  States  by  a  direct  vote  of  the  whole 
people.  It  is  applicable  wherever  three  or  more  candidates 
are  to  be  selected  from,  and  equally  applicable,  no  matter  how 


12 

many  candidates  are  in  the  field ;  and  thus  affords  the  voters 
an  opportunity  to  find  from  among  any  number  of  candidates, 
the  one  upon  whom  a  majority  will  first  concur. 

It  affords  a  mathematically  correct  solution  of  a  similar  prob- 
lem, presented  when  one  of  three  or  more  propositions  is  to 
be  determined  upon  by  any  convened  body,  or  by  any  num- 
ber of  persons,  however  near  or  far  they  may  be  separated 
from  each  other.  In  short,  by  this  method  of  reaching  con- 
certed action  and  of  finding  the  will  of  a  concurring  ma- 
jority, it  is  possible  to  conduct  a  purely  democratic  form  of 
government,  were  such  a  plan  desirable.  Thus,  it  is  possible 
to  have  every  citizen  take  a  direct  part  in  determining  every 
issue,  in  framing  every  law,  and  in  directing  every  matter  with 
which  their  government  may  be  concerned.  No  odds  how 
great  the  number  of  its  citizens,  or  how  widely  separated  they 
may  be  from  each  other. 

In  a  representative  form  of  free  government,  however,  this 
problem  has  the  greatest  significance  in  making  it  not  only 
possible,  but  absolutely  right  that  every  official  representative 
of  the  people,  who  should  be  accountable  directly  to  the  peo- 
ple, should  be  selected  by  a  direct  vote  of  the  whole  body  of 
citizens  he  is  to  represent. 

Let  us  briefly  compare  this  mathematically  correct  method  of 
finding  the  will  of  a  concurring  majority,  with  the  method  now 
made  use  of  in  conducting  our  government. 

The  present  method  of  determining  who  shall  fill  an  official 
place,  requires, — that  the  voters  of  the  country  shall  be  divided 
into  tivo  permanently  opposing  political  parties. 

It  requires, — that  each  party  shall  determine  upon  a  party 
candidate  by  means  of  a  preceding  or  party  primary  election. 

It  requires, — that  the  voters  of  the  party  shall  vote  for  dele- 
gates, and  in  the  case  of  State  or  National  officers,  that  these 
delegates  shall  again  vote  for  another  series  of  delegates,  and 
so  on. 

It  requires, — that  these  delegates  shall  meet  in  conventions, 
and  that  there,  by  repeated  or  trial  ballotings,  shall  finally  de- 
termine upon  a  party  candidate. 

It  requires, — that  the  party  voters  shall  accept  these  party 


13 

candidates,  so  determined  upon,  and  that  the  voters  of  the  dis- 
trict to  be  represented  shall  make  the  contest  between  these 
two  candidates,  so  placed  before  them.  The  final  voting  being 
merely  a  test  of  party  strength. 

In  the  first  place,  the  attempt  to  solve  the  problem  of  finding 
the  will  of  a  concurring  majority,  has  required  the  people  to  di- 
vide into  two  permanent  party  organizations,  becaus^,  hereto- 
fore, a  final  direct  vote  by  the  whole  mass  of  voters,  would  not 
with  any  certainty  secure  a  concurring  majority,  unless  the 
candidates  were  reduced  to  two,  having  each  of  these  the  rep- 
resentative of  a  permanent  party  organization. 

In  the  second  place,  each  political  party  has  adopted  the 
delegate  system  as  a  method  of  determining  upon  a  party  can- 
didate, because,  there  has  heretofore  been  no  known  means  by 
which  a  large  number  of  voters  widely  scattered,  could  act 
concertedly  or  reach  the  concurrence  of  a  majority,  except  by 
reducing  the  number  of  voters  by  some  accepted  ratio,  so  that 
these  voters  as  delegates,  could  practically  meet  together  in  a 
convention. 

In  the  third  place  when  these  delegates  elected  by  the  people, 
or  delegates  re-delegated  meet  in  convention,  there  has  been  no 
known  means  of  reaching  the  will  of  a  concurring  majority 
except  by  repeated  trials,  or  repeated  ballotings. 

Compared  with  this  exceedingly  complex  procedure,  the 
proposed  method  of  finding  the  candidate  upon  whom  a  ma- 
jority of  the  whole  mass  of  voters  will  first  concur,  requires 
but  a  single  direct  election.  The  voter  casts  a  single  ballot, 
but  simply  expresses  thereon  besides  his  first  choice,  succeed- 
ing provisional  choices  among  the  candidates,  in  order  to  pro- 
vide for  concerted  action  with  his  fellows,  and  in  order  that  a 
majority  may  finally  concur ;  and  further,  that  he  may  have  a 
voice  in  that  concurring  majority. 

The  counting  up  of  the  returns  from  an  election  conducted 
by  the  proposed  method  of  finding  the  will  of  a  majority,  may 
very  properly  be  compared  to  the  trial  ballotings  of  a  conven- 
tion of  delegates,  intended  to  determine  the  same  problem. 
Taking  the  same  district  as  before,  and  supposing  its  10,000 
voters  to  be  diminished  to  100  delegates,  or,  the  number  of 


14 

voters  reduced  in  the  ratio  of  100  to  1,  and  these  100  dele- 
gates to  be  assembled  in  convention  ;  the  first  ballot  of  the 
convention  should  correspond  exactly,  or  in  the  same  ratio,  to 
the  returns  shown  from  counting  the  first  choice  given  to  each 
candidate  by  the  method  of  direct  voting.  In  other  words, 
the  count  would  show,  that, — A.  had  received  the  votes  of  25 
delegates  ;  B.  the  votes  of  30  delegates  ;  G.  the  votes  of  22 
delegates  ;  and  D.  the  votes  of  the  remaining  23, — completing  the 
100  delegates.  And  as  before,  the  ballot  would  show  that  no 
candidate  had  the  support  of  a  concurring  majority. 

In  order  to  reach  a  concurrence  some  of  the  delegates  must 
necessarily  yield  up  their  first  choice,  and  adopt  a  second 
choice  among  the  candidates.  But  who  is  to  yield  ?  This 
question  is  not  an  easy  one  to  decide,  amidst  the  surroundings 
which  here  exist  after  a  convention  has  made  its  first  ballot. 

The  individual  voter  by  the  proposed  method,  may  make  his 
provisional  or  second  choice  upon  his  ticket  at  home,  guided 
alone  by  his  knowledge  of  the  several  candidates,  and  by  his 
willingness  to  yield  and  accept  a  second  choice,  if  he  has  a 
doubt  lest  his  first  choice  among  them  may  not  be  the  choice 
of  a  majority.  He  is  constrained  to  make  a  second  choice 
lest  a  very  objectionable  candidate  upon  the  list  may  have  a 
strong  following  and  be  elected  by  a  plurality,  in  default  of  a 
majority  concurrence.  He  does  not  lose  the  support  he  has  given 
to  his  first  choice  by  providing  a  second,  but  only  gives  his 
second  choice  an  equal  support  with  the  first,  in  case  the  sup- 
port given  as  second  choice  to  the  several  candidates  has  need 
to  be  added  to  that  given  them  as  first  choice,  in  order  to  reach 
a  majority  concurrence  upon  some  one  of  them. 

A  voter  by  naming  a  second,  or  even  a  third  choice,  where 
many  candidates  are  in  the  field,  merely  names  each  in  turn 
as  a  candidate  he  will  willingly  support  in  full  opposition  to 
any  objectionable  candidate  that  may  be  contesting  for  the 
place. 

The  delegate  in  a  convention,  however,  in  order  to  make  a 
second  choice,  must  yield  up  his  first  choice,  and  vote  against 
him  with  as  much  force  as  he  does  against  the  most  objection- 
able candidate  on  the  list.  He  is  constrained,  therefore,  to  hold 


15 

on  to  his  first  choice,  and  submit  to  repeated  ballotings,  ending 
in  the  same  result.  Thus,  the  repeated  ballotings  of  a  conven- 
tion very  often  assume  the  nature  of  testing  the  endurance  of 
the  delegates  assembled.  Finally,  when  a  delegate  yields  and 
adopts  a  second  choice,  he  adds  his  support  to  those  delegates 
who  had  before  made  this  candidate  their  first  choice,  upon 
the  same  principle  and  for  the  same  purpose  that  the  number  of 
voters  making  a  candidate  their  second  choice  are  added  to  the 
number  who  have  already  made  him  their  first  choice,  in  solv- 
ing the  problem  by  the  proposed  method  of  direct  voting. 
But  now,  if  other  delegates  were  to  yield  simultaneously,  it 
might  happen  that  a  change  all  around  would  not  greatly  alter 
the  new  relative  support  given  to  the  respective  candidates. 

Besides,  the  ballotings  of  a  convention  being  a  test  of  the 
endurance,  or  more  often  possibly,  of  the  personal  interests  of 
the  delegates  concerned,  still  other  factors  join  in  determining 
the  final  result.  Because  the  list  of  delegates  is  called  in 
alphabetical  order,  and  the  delegates  answer  with  open  voice, 
those  called  first  must  make  their  choice  without  knowing 
what  those  at  the  X.  Y.  Z.  end  of  the  list  intend  to  do.  On 
the  other  hand,  those  voting  last  have  the  advantage  of  know- 
ing how  the  A.  B.  G.  members  on  the  list  have  voted,  and  may 
be  influenced  accordingly.  This  gives  the  successive  ballotings 
of  a  convention  much  the  nature  of  a  game  of  chance,  where 
at  least  some  advantages  are  secured  to  the  last  player. 

Were  the  successive  ballotings  of  the  convention  conducted 
by  secret  voting,  each  balloting  would  still  be  nothing  more 
than  a  trial  vote,  similar  to  the  schoolboy's  effort  to  solve  his 
problem  by  testing  hypothetical  methods,  until  he  finds  one 
which  "  brings  the  answer.1' 

These  evidences  of  the  illogical  nature  of  attempting  to  find 
a  concurring  majority,  by  repeated  ballotings  or  repeated  trial 
votes,  are  often  attempted  to  be  modified  by  arbitrary  rules 
adopted  to  govern  the  successive  proceedings  of  the  conven- 
tion. Among  these  rules  there  is  one,  quite  often  adopted,  de- 
manding that  the  candidate  receiving  the  lowest  number  of 
votes  at  each  succeeding  ballot  shall  be  dropped  from  the  list, 
until  the  final  ballot  is  a  choice  between  the  remaining  two. 


16 

That  such  a  rule  is  manifestly  unfair,  and  liable  to  give  an  un- 
truthful result,  is  made  evident  by  the  fact,  that  not  infrequently 
a  candidate  who  is  the  first  choice  of  but  a  few,  may  be  the 
second  choice  of  many,  or,  may  represent  an  intermediate 
opinion  or  policy,  and  be  the  one  upon  whom  a  majority  of 
the  delegates  would  have  first  concurred.  Another  rule 
adopted  by  large  conventions,  is  to  permit  those  whose  votes 
are  called  for  at  the  A.  B.  G.  end  of  the  list,  to  change  their 
votes  after  they  have  heard  the  votes  of  those  coming  later,  or 
at  any  time  until  the  result  of  the  ballot  has  been  announced. 
These  changes  usually  demanded  during  the  balloting  very 
often  lead  to  other  changes,  and  finally  bring  the  proceedings 
of  the  convention  to  a  clamorous  end. 

Hence,  it  has  been  shown  that  this  method  of  attempting  to 
find  the  candidate  upon  whom  a  majority  will  first  concur, 
even  when  the  problem  is  to  be  determined  by  a  convened 
body,  is  at  best  but  illogical  and  uncertain  in  its  results.  But 
delegates,  meeting  in  a  convention,  imply  that  the  voice  of  the 
party  voters  has  been  delegated,  and  often  re-delegated  ;  and 
hereafter,  it  will  not  be  difficult  to  show  that  this  most  illogical 
system  of  delegating  affords  opportunities  for  a  great  series  of 
evils  and  uncertainties,  and  that  it  fosters  a  great  field  for  cor- 
rupt political  practices. 

Again,  an  election  of  delegates  by  party  voters,  and  accept- 
ing the  candidate  determined  upon  by  these  delegates,  as  a 
party  candidate,  to  be  supported  in  opposition  to  another  party 
candidate  at  the  final  election,  implies  that  the  sovereign  citi- 
zens of  the  district  or  country  must  be  divided  into  permanent 
party  organizations.  In  a  succeeding  chapter,  it  will  be  shown 
that  such  permanently  opposing  party  organizations  among  the 
people  of  a  free  country,  are  not  only  illogical,  unnatural, 
and  opposed  to  the  spirit  of  freedom,  but  that  they  have  been 
the  source  and  defense  of  so  much  oppression,  of  such  po- 
litical corruption,  and  have  brought  our  attempt  at  establishing 
a  great  free  government  into  such  question, — yea,  in  the 
minds  of  many  intelligent  thinking  men  into  such  disrepute, 
that  even  the  wisdom  of  freedom  itself  has  been  questioned. 

Hence,  this  great  complicated  method,  made  use  of  in  at- 


17 

tempting  to  find  the  will  of  a  concurring  majority,  in  selecting 
representatives  of  the  people,  by  dividing  the  voters  into  two 
permanently  opposing  party  organizations,  by  submitting  to 
delegating  and  to  re-delegating  the  popular  voice  ;  and  finally, 
having  the  issue  decided  by  the  successive  trial  ballotings  of 
delegate  conventions, — when  compared  to  the  simple  method  of 
solving  the  problem  with  mathematical  exactness,  by  one  direct 
vote  of  the  whole  people,  may  be  shown  to  be  not  only  illogical 
and  uncertain  in  its  results,  but  that  it  has  become  a  great  and 
growing  political  excrescence,  sapping  and  defiling  our  political 
institutions,  so  far  as  to  threaten  the  life  or  continued  existence 
of  political  freedom  among  us. 

In  thus  submitting  an  explanation  of  the  problem  in  its 
simplest  form,  it  has  been  intended  to  avoid  if  possible  all 
seeming  complications  which  its  more  complete  presentation 
might  arouse,  in  the  minds  of  those  to  whom  it  is  for  the  first 
time  submitted.  There  remains  only,  however,  to  continue  the 
same  reasoning  already  made  use  of,  and  applicable  to  all  the 
conditions  of  the  problem,  in  order  to  remove  all  doubt  of  its 
mathematical  correctness  throughout. 

It  will  by  some  be  supposed  that  a  formidable  number  of 
candidates  will  enter  the  field,  and,  that  but  few  of  the  voters 
will  name  a  second  choice  among  this  large  number  of  candi- 
dates, and  hence,  that  the  method  will  fail  to  find  a  candidate 
upon  whom  a  majority  of  the  voters  have  finally  concurred. 

In  answer  to  these  apparent  objections  to  the  method,  it  must 
be  comprehended  at  once,  that  this  is  not  a  political  scheme 
which  admits  in  any  way  of  being  construed  for  the  benefit  of 
a  few,  but,  that  it  is  a  means  of  reaching  concerted  action,  and 
a  method  of  solving  a  problem  belonging  to  the  whole  people, 
which,  when  properly  understood  and  the  force  of  its  simple 
truths  fully  comprehended  by  them,  becomes  their  means  and 
their  method  of  defending  their  sovereign  rights  as  freemen. 

It  is  not  the  candidates  for  office,  who  nominate  themselves, 
but  it  is  the  people,  by  placing  the  names  of  representative  men 
upon  their  tickets,  who  nominate  as  well  as  elect  by  this 
method.  And  as  every  voter  wishing  to  exercise  his  elective 
franchise  with  wisdom,  will  decide  to  cast  his  vote  only  for  a 


18 

candidate  having  some  probability  of  success,  he  will  seldom 
be  foolish  enough  to  waste  his  voice  by  naming  an  unknown 
or  unpopular  candidate  upon  his  ticket.  Hence,  public  favor 
will  soon  crystalize  about  the  few  who  have  proven  them- 
selves most  eminently  fitted  for  the  position  to  be  filled.  And 
it  may  well  be  assumed,  that  when  nominations  shall  be  left 
to  the  people,  nominees  will  not  be  too  numerous. 

That  but  few  of  the  voters  might  name  a  second  choice,  and, 
that  finally  no  concurrence  of  a  majority  upon  any.  one  candi- 
date would  be  found,  is  a  contingency  that  may  truly  occur. 
But  it  must  again  be  remembered,  that  the  purpose  of  this 
method  of  voting,  is  to  provide  a  means  for  reaching  concerted 
action,  and  for  finding  the  candidate  upon  whom  a  majority 
will  first  agree.  The  second  choice  is  made  as  a  provisional 
one,  for  the  purpose  of  concurring  with  other  voters,  if  there 
has  not  been  a  concurrence  of  a  majority  upon  counting  the 
first  or  direct  choice  of  each  voter.  It  has  already  been  shown 
that  by  this  method  of  voting,  the  first  choice  is  not  lost  by 
making  a  second,  but,  that  the  second  choice  is  only  made  to 
equal  the  first,  or  in  effect,  making  no  choice  between  these 
two  candidates  when  the  support  given  to  each  candidate  as 
their  second  choice,  has  need  to  be  added  in  turn  to  this  can- 
didate's primary  support,  in  order  to  find  the  one  upon  whom 
a  majority  of  the  voters  will  first  concur.  When  a  voter's 
second  choice  is  made  use  of,  his  voice  is  thus  placed  in  favor 
of  either  of  these  candidates,  but  in  opposition  to  any  or  all 
other  candidates  who  are  contesting  for  the  place. 

If  a  voter  in  making  up  his  ticket,  has  but  one  choice  among 
the  candidates,  and  does  not  care  who  among  the  remaining 
candidates  may  be  selected,  in  case  Ms  choice  is  not  determined 
upon,  then  he  may  very  properly  make  but  the  one  choice. 
But,  if  a  voter  knowing  that  several  candidates  are  being 
prominently  supported,  has  still  some  doubt  whether  his  first 
choice  among  them  will  be  the  choice  of  a  majority,  and,  has 
a  choice  among  the  remaining  candidates,  then  he  would  be 
wise  to  name  that  second  choice  upon  his  ticket.  If  he  has 
yet  further,  a  choice  among  the  remaining  candidates,  or,  if  some 
prominently  supported  candidate  is  very  objectionable  to  him, 


19 

then  he  would  be  wise  to  name  several  successive  choices 
among  the  others,  so  as  to  put  his  voice  if  possible  in  favor  of 
either  of  these  in  turn,  and  opposed  to  the  objectionable  one. 

In  summing  up  the  returns,  after  adding  the  number  of  vo- 
ters making  a  candidate  their  second  choice  to  those  who  have 
already  made  this  candidate  their  first  choice,  and  so  on  suc- 
cessively with  each  candidate  named ;  if  no  candidate  has  re- 
ceived the  concurrence  of  a  majority  of  all  the  voters,  we  must 
then  proceed  another  stage  in  the  solution  of  the  problem,  and 
in  like  manner  add  to  each  candidate's  now  concurring  support 
the  number  making  him  their  third  choice,  and  again 
compare  their  new  concurring  supports.  If,  because  of  many 
candidates  in  the  field,  and  from  the  voters  being  greatly  di- 
vided among  them,  there  has  yet  been  no  concurrence  of  a 
majority  upon  any  one  candidate,  we  must  add  in  succession 
to  the  support  already  given  to  each  candidate,  those  who  now 
make  him  their  fourth  choice,  and  continue  in  the  same  man- 
ner comparing  their  new  concurring  numbers  at  each  succes- 
sive stage  until  a  majority  of  the  voters  have  concurred  upon 
one. 

If,  however,  after  all  the  support  given  to  each  candidate  in 
turn  has  been  added,  and  the  returns  have  been  exhausted, 
there  is  still  not  a  majority  of  the  voters  concurring  upon  any 
one  candidate,  then  the  candidate  having  the  greatest  concur- 
ring support  must  be  declared  elected,  even  though  it  be  but  a 
plurality  concurrence.  For  the  same  reason,  that  a  final  elec- 
tion must  be  conclusive  or  must  be  submitted  to  in  any 
method  of  voting,  even  though  it  has  been  determined  by  but 
a  plurality  concurrence.  And,  although  the  proposed  method 
affords  the  opportunity  to  always  secure  a  majority  concurrence, 
if  the  choice  between  one  candidate  and  another  does  not 
arouse  sufficient  interest  among  the  voters  to  have  them  pro- 
vide for  a  majority  concurrence,  then  it  is  no  fault  of  the 
method  at  hand. 

It  may  happen,  when  but  few  candidates  are  in  the  field,  and 
many  of  the  voters  make  a  second  choice,  that  upon  adding 
the  number  making  each  candidate  their  second  choice  to  those 
who  have  made  him  their  first  choice,  more  than  one  candi- 


20 

date  may  thus  receive  the  support  of  a  concurring  majority. 
When  this  occurs,  the  one  having  the  greater  number  must  be 
declared  elected ;  for  mathematically  speaking,  if  the  concur- 
ring support  of  each  candidate  could  be  found  at  any  point 
between  the  successive  stages  of  adding,  then  the  one  having 
the  greater  number  over  a  majority  could  be  said  to  have 
reached  the  support  of  a  concurring  majority  first.  But  more 
practically,  it  will  be  found,  that  if  two  candidates  have  each 
received  the  support  of  more  than  one  half  of  the  whole 
number  of  voters,  it  must  be  evident  that  a  certain  number  of 
voters  are  common  to  each  of  these  candidates.  In  other 
words,  that  a  certain  number  of  voters  have  made  one  of  these 
candidates  their  first  choice,  and  the  other  their  second  choice, 
and,  vice  versa;  and  hence,  now  make  no  choice  between  the 
two.  If  these  voters  common  to  each,  be  now  taken  from 
each  candidate's  support,  and  stand  aside,  the  one  having  the 
greater  number  will  still  have  the  greater  remainder,  and  hence, 
has  the  stronger  support  and  must  be  acknowledged  as  being 
elected. 

Other  apparent  objections  may  arise  from  a  superficial  ex- 
amination of  this  method  of  direct  voting,  but  each  in  turn 
must  yield  to  the  simple  truths  it  sets  forth,  in  affording  the  only 
practical  and  correct  solution  of  the  problem  of  .finding  the 
candidate  upon  whom  a  majority  of  the  whole  number  of 
voters  will  first  concur. 

It  may  serve  to  further  illustrate  the  practical  working  of  this 
method  of  direct  voting,  to  introduce  here  the  actual  examples 
afforded  by  a  few  instances  in  which  it  has  been  publicly  ex- 
hibited. At  a  village*  meeting  it  was  decided  to  select  a  chair- 
man by  the  proposed  method  of  voting.  There  were  42  per- 
sons present,  and  the  names  of  Messrs.  March,  Keenan,  Maxton, 
and  Embree  were  submitted  in  nomination.  Blank  slips  of 
paper  were  handed  to  the  voters,  and  upon  these  each  voter 
named  his  first  choice  and  as  far  as  he  saw  fit  named  succeed- 
ing provisional  choices.  These  tickets  were  then  collected, 
and  following  are  samples  of  the  tickets  voted : 

*  Marshalton,  Pa.,  Nov.  25,  1881. 


21 


March  1st. 
Keenan  2d. 


Keenan  1st. 
Maxton  2d. 
Embree  3d. 


Maxton  1st. 
Keenan  2d. 


Embree  1st. 


Upon  counting  up  each  candidate's  primary  or  first  support, 
the  tally  sheet  exhibited  upon  the  black-board  showed  the 
following  result : 


As 

1st  choice, 


March, 

13 


Keenan,    I    Maxton, 


Embree, 

12 


Whole  No.  of  Voters, 

42 


Majority, 

22 


As  no  candidate  had  thus  received  a  concurring  majority, 
by  counting  again  from  the  tickets,  the  number  making  each 
candidate  their  second  choice  was  found,  and  this  number  was 
added  in  turn  to  each  candidate's  primary  support.  The  tally 
sheet  now  presented  a  new  result,  as  follows : 


March, 

As  1st  choice,    |      13 
As  2d  choice, 
New  concur- 


ring support, 


19 


Keenan, 

8 
15 

23 


Maxton, 


18 


Embree, 

12 
5 

17 

Whole  No.  of  Voters, 
42 

Majority, 

22 

For  the  reason,  that  six  voters  who  had  primarily  made 
other  candidates  their  first  choice,  have  now  made  Mr.  March 
their  provisional  or  second  choice,  they  have  thus  signified 
their  willingness  to  concur  with  the  thirteen  other  voters  who 
had  before  made  him  their  first  choice.  Hence,  together  they 
make  his  new  concurring  support  number  nineteen.  At  the 
same  time  fifteen  voters  who  had  primarily  made  other  candi- 
dates their  first  choice,  have  now  made  Mr.  Keenan  their  pro- 
visional or  second  choice,  and  hence  are  willing  to  concur  with 
the  eight  who  had  before  made  him  their  first  choice,  and  so 
make  his  new  concurring  support  number  twenty-three.  For 
the  same  reasons  and  at  the  same  time,  the  new  relative  sup- 
port of  Mr.  Maxton  was  found  to  number  eighteen,  and  that  of 
Mr.  Embree  to  number  seventeen. 

As  Mr.  Keenan  alone,  had  thus  received  the  support  of  a 
majority  he  was  declared  elected  chairman  of  the  meeting. 

Another  exhibition  of  the  proposed  method  of  voting  was 
made  before  a  school  literary  society.*  The  voters  taking  part 
here  numbered  one  hundred  and  eighty-two,  and  the  names 


*  West  Chester  State  Normal  School,  Dec.  17,  1881. 


22 

of  Curtis,  Holmes,  Longfellow,  and  Whittier  were  voted  upon 
with  the  following  tabulated  result : 


As  1st  choice, 
As  2d  choice, 
New  concur- 
ring support, 

Curtis, 

48 
22 

70 

Holmes, 

33 

22 

55 

Longfellow, 

49 

88 

137 

Whittier, 

52 

28 

80 

Total  No.  Voters, 

182 

Majority, 
92 

When  the  primary  support  given  to  each  candidate  was  put 
upon  the  black-board,  there  was  quite  an  applause  from  the 
Whittier  supporters,  they  thinking  that  as  he  had  a  plurality 
over  each  of  the  other  candidates,  he  was  elected.  One 
hundred  and  eighty-two  votes  had  been  cast,  hence,  as  yet  no 
one  had  received  the  support  of  a  majority.  Upon  adding  the 
number  who  had  made  each  candidate  their  provisional  or 
second  choice  to  those  who  had  before  made  this  candidate 
their  first  choice,  and  so  with  all  the  candidates  in  turn,  it  was 
found  that  Longfellow  had  received  the  support  of  one  hundred 
and  thirty-seven  voters ;  and,  when  compared  with  the  new 
concurring  support  of  each  of  the  other  candidates,  was  the 
first  and  only  one  to  receive  the  support  of  a  concurring  ma- 
jority. Hence  Longfellow  was  declared  elected. 

Still  another  exhibition  of  the  method  was  made  before  the 
pupils  of  an  academy*  and  the  neighboring  citizens.  Here, 
forty-nine  voters  took  part  in  the  election,  and  the  names  of 
Longfellow,  Curtis,  Whittier,  and  Phillips  were  voted  upon. 
The  tabulated  result  of  this  election  was  expressed,  as  fol- 
lows : 


As  1st  choice, 
As  2d  choice, 
New   relative 
support, 

Longfellow, 
12 
23 

35 

Curtis, 

12 
4 

16 

Whittier, 

13 

7 

20 

Phillips, 
12 

5 
17 

Total  No.  Voters, 

49 

Majority, 

25 

Here,  again,  Longfellow  was  the  first  to  receive  the  support 
of  a  concurring  majority,  which  was  reached  by  adding  those 
who  had  made  him  their  second  choice  to  those  others  who 
had  before  made  him  their  first  choice.  At  the  same  time, 
and  in  the  same  manner,  finding  the  new  relative  or  concur- 


*Maplewood  Institute,  Delaware  County,  Pa.,  Feb.  3d,  1882. 


23 


ring  support  of  each  of  the  other  candidates  for  the  purpose 
of  comparing  each  with  the  others. 

The  last  two  of  these  examples,  taking  place  under  similar 
circumstances,  and  using  almost  the  same  list  of  candidates,  af- 
ford an  opportunity  to  exhibit  the  tabulated  result  of  an  elec- 
tion conducted  in  separate  voting  districts,  quite  as  well  as  if 
they  had  both  been  a  part  of  the  same  contest  and  had  oc- 
cured  at  the  same  time. 

The  returns  from  the  two  districts  may  thus  be  summed 
up: 


I 

°       I       - 

8 

J 

B 

£ 

i*1      >> 

&$     i 

« 

3 

f 

§ 

!> 

j 

0 

id 

J 

£ 

S 

H 

•sg  §  (1st  District,     .     .      |  48 

33 

49 

52 

182 

*3:I  i 

^1s  I2d  District,     .     .        12 

12 

13 

12 

49 

Primary  support  of  each,            60 

33 

61 

65 

12 

231 

116 

^  §  f  1st  District,     .     .     |  22 

22 

88 

28 

... 

^  1  2d  District,     .     .          4 

... 

23 

7 

5 

26 

22 

111 

35 

5 

New   relative  support  of 
each, 

86 

55 

172 

100 

17 

The  supporting  of  Holmes  in  one  district,  and  of  Phillips  in 
the  other,  may  be  used  to  represent  the  fact,  that  for  many 
reasons  a  local  candidate  may  be  supported  in  one  district  and 
not  in  another  ;  or  for  some  other  reason  a  district  may  sup- 
port a  different  one.  At  the  same  time,  however,  with  the 
purpose  of  harmonizing  upon  one  of  the  more  popular  candi- 
dates, the  actual  contest  would  be  most  frequently  made 
between  a  few  of  these  candidates  ;  and  the  direction  of  a 
large  number  of  the  provisional  or  second  choices  made, 
would  often  determine  the  one  upon  whom  a  majority  would 
first  willingly  concur. 

These  practical  examples,  however  modest  in  their  significance, 
amply  exhibit  the  true  problem  which  is  presented  to  every 
organization  of  men,  when  that  organization  is  called  upon  to 


24 

select  one  from  among  a  number  of  candidates  to  represent  it 
in  any  official  capacity  whatsoever.  And  the  solution  of,this 
problem,  whatever  its  significance,  may  be  effected  by  the  pro- 
posed method  of  conducting  a  single  direct  election  with  as 
much  certainty  in  any  other  example  as  in  these  which  have 
been  thus  exhibited.  It  is  applicable  to  the  election  of  any  po- 
litical officer  from  a  town  constable  to  the  highest  officer  of  the 
United  States.  It  is  equally  applicable  to  an  election  by  any 
organization  where  a  choice  of  one  is  to  be  made  from  among 
any  number  of  candidates  that  may  be  offered.  It  is  also  ap- 
plicable where  a  choice  of  one  is  to  be  made  from  any 
number  of  propositions,  from  among  any  number  of  places,  of 
numbers,  or  of  dates. 

Being  a  vote  by  ballot,  it  is  equally  applicable  for  the  use  of  a 
convened  body,  or,  for  the  use  of  an  organization  whose  voters 
are  scattered  however  remotely  from  each  other.  In  a  convened 
body  it  avoids  the  dangers  arising  from  factional  delays  and 
from  repeated  ballotings  ;  from  attempts  to  deceive  and  to 
barter  or  trade,  after  the  probable  purpose  of  the  convention 
has  been  disclosed.  It  avoids  the  uncertainty  of  successive 
trials  or  ballotings,  and  solves  the  problem  at  once  and  with 
mathematical  fairness  and  precision. 

To  the  scattered  voters  it  affords  tbe  opportunity  to  give  a 
nominal  support  to  their  favorite,  or  to  a  local  candidate,  and, 
at  the  same  time  to  provisionally  name  as  a  second  choice, 
one  whom  they  have  reason  to  believe  will  be  more  popular, 
and  hence  more  likely  to  receive  the  support  of  a  majority.  It 
gives  every  voter  an  opportunity  to  name  and  support  any 
number  of  successive  choices  in  opposition  to  an  objectionable 
candidate  who  he  has  reason  to  believe  has  a  large  or  danger- 
ous plurality  following. 

It  has  its  greatest  significance  in  solving  political  issues.  In 
short,  this  method  of  direct  voting,  by  avoiding  the  supposed 
necessity  of  delegating,  avoids  the  great  series  of  evils  which 
have  been  developed  and  practiced  in  conducting  the  delegate 
system.  It  affords  the  great  mass  of  honest  and  patriotic  vo- 
ters an  opportunity  to  harmonize  and  act  concertedly,  and  it 
further  affords  them  a  means  of  defense  against  the  concerted 


25 

manipulations  of  a  few  who  have  heretofore  so  often  suc- 
ceeded in  perverting  the  popular  will,  and  in  placing  them- 
selves in  offices  of  trust  and  political  power.  And  again,  by 
avoiding  the  supposed  necessity  of  permanent  party  organiza- 
tions, it  will  free  an  enslaved  people  from  the  fallacies  and 
dangers  which  permanent  party  organizations  have  aroused 
and  developed. 

It  is  in  brief,  the  true  and  universal  weapon  with  which 
honest  and  patriotic  freemen  may  hereafter  successfully  blot 
out  and  abolish  the  trickery,  the  corruption,  and  the  success- 
ful perversion  of  the  authority  of  the  people's  will ;  by  which 
means,  a  few  selfish  men  have  long  been  enabled  to  rule  and  rob 
their  fellows.  It  is  the  weapon  which  will  hereafter  make 
patriotism  mean  a  philanthropic  love  of  country,  and  which 
will  keep  constantly  emblazoned  upon  the  people's  banner, 
that  sacred  truth  which  declares  that  all  men  are  endowed  by 
their  creator  with  equal  and  with  unalienable  rights. 


CHAPTER  III. 


THE     ILLOGICAL    NATURE,     AND    THE     EVILS     ATTENDING    THE    PRESENT 

METHOD     OF     REACHING    CONCERTED    ACTION     AND     OF 

FINDING   THE    WILL    OF    A    MAJORITY. 


"  A  long  habit  of  not  thinking  a  thing  wrong,  gives  it  a  superficial  appear- 
ance of  being  right,  and  raises  at  first  a  formidable  outcry  in  defense  of  custom." 

— The  Author  of  "  Common  Sense,"  1776. 

In  the  preceding  chapter,  the  proposed  method  of  reaching 
concerted  action  and  of  finding  the  will  of  a  concurring 
majority  in  the  election  of  representatives  of  the  people,  at  one 
direct  election  by  the  ivhole  body  of  voters,  has  been  compared 
with  the  present  complex  method  ;  requiring — that  the  voters  of 
the  country  or  district  to  be  represented,  shall  be  divided  into 
two  permanently  opposing  party  organizations  ;  that  the  voters 
of  each  of  these  two  permanent  parties  shall  lessen  their  num- 
bers to  delegates,  and  that  these  delegates  shall  meet  in  con- 
ventions, and  there,  by  repeated  or  trial  ballotings  shall  deter- 
mine upon  a  party  candidate.  Requiring  further, — that  the 
voters  of  each  party  shall  accept  and  support  these  party 
candidates,  and  that  the  final  election  shall  be  a  contest  between 
these  two  permanently  opposing  party  organizations.  Novel 
as  the  proposition  may  seem,  it  will  here  be  shown,  that  per- 
manently opposing  party  organizations,  limited  to  two,  dividing 
the  people  of  a  free  government,  can  have  no  natural  or  just  ex- 
istence, and  would  not  be  found  among  us,  except,  that  they 
have  been  developed  as  a  part  of  the  present  method,  made 
use  of  in  attempting  to  reach  concerted  action,  and  in  attempt- 
ing to  find  the  will  of  a  concurring  majority. 


27 

At  the  birth  of  a  free  nation  of  people,  there  will  be  as 
many  parties  or  combinations  of  men  acting  together,  as  there 
are  varied  interests  to  defend,  or,  as  there  are  shades  of  po- 
litical opinion  upon  the  questions  which  become  an  issue  before 
them.  That  these  numerous  parties  or  combinations  of  men 
representing  special  interests,  must  harmonize,  and  that  a 
certain  number  of  them  will  eventually  be  found  acting  together 
in  opposition  to  the  remainder, — whether  this  remainder  shall 
act  in  concert  or  dividedly, — is  a  true  principle  in  reaching  the 
will  of  a  concurring  majority.  But  that  a  large  body,  com- 
prising one-half  of  the  whole  number  of  voters  of  a  great  free 
country, — even  though  they  have  harmonized  upon  a  question 
at  issue, — should  continue  to  act  together  after  this  issue  has 
been  decided,  in  a  permanent  party  organization  and  in  oppo- 
sition to  another  permanent  organization,  is  both  unnatural  and 
dangerously  opposed  to  their  original  compact  of  national  unity. 

That  there  have  been  great  issues  before  the  American 
people,  defended  by  one  party  and  opposed  by  the  other,  is  not 
to  be  denied.  But,  that  these  issues  have  found  the  two 
parties  divided  and  organized,  quite  as  often  as  they  were  the 
cause  of  division,  is  equally  true.  Hence  it  is  true,  that  party 
organizations  have  continued  to  exist  long  after  they  have  ac- 
complished the  original  purpose  of  their  harmonizing,  and  it  is 
equally  true  that  party  organizations  have  permanently  existed, 
even  after  the  voters  comprising  the  party  have  widely  dis- 
sented from  each  other.  With  but  a  choice  between  the  can- 
didates presented  by  two  permanently  organized  parties,  a  voter 
in  order  to  have  any  voice  in  the  final  contest  must  cast  his 
lot  with  the  one  or  the  other,  and  yet  he  may  have  but  little 
in  sympathy  with  the  controlling  forces  within  either  of  these 
permanent  party  organizations. 

Since  it  has  been  shown  that  it  is  not  only  possible,  but  in 
every  way  practicable,  for  the  whole  body  of  voters  of  any  district, 
without  any  previous  party  division  or  organization  whatsoever, 
to  so  vote  at  a  final  election  as  to  provide  for  the  harmonizing 
of  a  majority  of  their  number  upon  any  question  or  issue,  or  upon 
a  candidate  for  office  representing  that  issue,  and  thus  select 
this  candidate  from  among  any  number  of  candidates  pro- 


28 

posed ;  and,  as  it  is  both  possible  and  probable  that  the  voters 
who  concur  upon  this  issue,  will  be  divided  upon  the  next  is- 
sue, and  that  now,  new  combinations  of  voters  will  harmonize 
and  a  new  majority  decide  the  new  question  at  issue, — it  is 
very  evident  that  the  voters  of  the  country  have  been  per- 
manently divided  into  two  opposing  party  organizations,  not 
because  these  organizations  truly  represent  a  series  of  per- 
manently opposing  principles,  but,  because  the  division  into 
two  permanent  parties  is  one  of  the  means  or  steps  made 
necessary  in  the  present  method  of  finding  the  will  of  a  ma- 
jority. 

The  present  method  of  solving  the  problem  of  finding  the 
will  of  a  majority  in  the  election  of  representatives,  requires 
at  the  very  outset,  that  the  great  body  of  voters  shall  be  di- 
vided into  two  permanent  party  organizations,  before  the  final 
vote  shall  be  taken.  Because  a  final  vote  which  limits  the  vo- 
ters to  but  one  choice,  gives  them  no  further  opportunity  to 
concur  with  each  other  at  this  election,  and  because  such  an 
election  would  not  with  any  certainty  determine  the  will  of  a 
concurring  majority  if  several  candidates  were  being  sup- 
ported, it  is  made  necessary  that  all  the  harmonizing  or  con- 
curring must  be  accomplished  before  this  final  vote  is  taken. 
But  in  order  for  a  party  or  any  great  body  of  men  to  harmo- 
nize and  act  concertedly  by  means  of  the  delegate  system,  it 
is  necessary  for  them  to  join  in  permanent  party  organization. 
And  it  is  permanency  of  organization  which  is  here  declared  to 
be  a  great  evil,  because  it  is  both  unnatural  and  illogical. 

Permanency  of  party  organization  has  been  made  necessary 
in  order  to  conduct  the  primary  or  party  election,  or  to  determine 
upon  a  party  candidate  by  the  method  of  the  delegate  system 
and  the  trial  ballotings  of  successive  conventions,  for  the  fol- 
lowing reasons  :  To  vote  for  a  party  delegate  implies  the 
promise  to  vote  finally  for  the  party  candidate  or  nominee ; 
and  having  voted  for  the  party  candidate  at  a  final  election, 
usually  affords  the  only  qualification  admitting  a  voter  into  the 
councils  of  the  party  organization.  Hence,  it  is  not  only  ne- 
cessary for  the  voters  to  be  thoroughly  organized,  but  be- 
cause the  voters  who  have  accepted  the  party  candidate 


29 

and  acted  together  at  the  final  election  upon  one  issue,  are 
the  only  ones  who  are  permitted  to  take  part  in  the  elec- 
tion of  delegates  in  a  succeeding  issue,  the  party  organization 
is  held  together  from  one  issue  to  another  and  thus  becomes 
permanently  established.  Still  further,  because  a  party  organi- 
zation in  order  to  conduct  a  delegate  election,  and  direct  its 
caucuses,  conventions,  conferences  and  so  on,  must  have  a  se- 
ries of  officers,  the  election  of  these  officers  by  a  certain  body 
of  voters,  implies  the  permanent  continuance  of  concerted  ac- 
tion between  these  voters  throughout.  And,  hereafter,  it  will 
be  shown  that  the  opportunities  for  evil  and  corrupt  practices 
afforded  by  permanent  party  organization  and  the  delegate  sys- 
tem of  conducting  party  primary  elections,  are  in  themselves 
strong  factors  in  making  a  party  organization  permanent ;  and 
moreover,  permanent  in  the  interest  of  the  few  who  become 
its  officers  and  managers. 

Having  thus  far  shown  that  permanent  party  organization, 
and  the  delegate  system,  and  the  trial  ballotings  of  conven- 
tions are  respective  factors  in  the  present  method  of  attempt- 
ing to  find  the  will  of  a  majority  in  electing  our  representatives, 
whatever  evils  may  hereafter  be  shown  to  belong  to  these 
several  factors  of  this  most  complex  and  illogical  method,  must 
be  recognized  as  belonging  to  the  method  or  system  through- 
out. In  accordance  with  the  purpose  of  this  work,  however, 
aiming  to  show  by  logical  analysis  the  evils  in  the  existing 
methods  made  use  of  in  conducting  our  government,  and  the 
true  remedy  therefor ;  the  inherent  evils  of  each  factor  will 
be  analyzed  separately,  and  the  force  of  the  proposed  remedy 
applied  to  each  in  turn. 

The  Evils  of  the  Delegate  System. 

The  delegate  system  has  been  adopted  by  party  organiza- 
tions as  a  means  of  determining  upon  a  party  candidate,  in 
order : — 

1st.  That  by  lessening  the  number  of  voters  by  an  accepted 
ratio,  to  delegates,  these  delegates  may  practically  meet  in  a 
convention. 

2d.  That  these  delegates  when  assembled  in  convention,— 


30 

and  either  instructed  or  uninstructed — may,  by  yielding  one  to 
another  after  repeated  trial  ballotings,  reach  a  concurring 
majority  and  thus  determine  upon  a  party  candidate  or 
nominee. 

That  this  method  of  finding  the  will  of  a  majority  of  the 
whole  number  of  party  voters,  is  both  illogical  and  uncertain 
in  its  results,  may  be  readily  shown. 

At  the  outset,  delegates  are  elected  in  the  primary  election 
districts, — townships  or  voting  precincts, — by  a  simple  direct 
vote.  Hence,  when  several  candidates  for  any  one  office,  or 
different  delegates  representing  these  candidates  are  voted  for, 
there  may  be  but  a  small  number  of  voters  concurring  upon 
any  one  delegate.  Very  often  indeed,  but  a  mere  plurality, 
and  at  best,  but  a  majority  of  the  voters  are  needed  to  deter- 
mine the  delegate  and  to  instruct  him.  It  also  occurs  that 
some  voting  districts  are  entitled  to  more  than  one  delegate,  so 
that  here,  often,  a  majority  or  even  a  plurality  of  the  voters 
are  permitted  to  elect  all  of  these  delegates,  thus  exercising  a 
sort  of  miniature  "  unit  rule"  over  their  fellows. 

When  these  delegates,  elected  by  local  majorities,  or,  as  often 
happens  by  mere  pluralities,  meet  in  county  or  ward  conven- 
tions to  determine  upon  the  party  candidates,  or  else  upon 
secondary  delegates  to  a  State  or  National  convention,  they 
cannot  be  said  to  fully  represent  the  whole  body  of  party  vo- 
ters, for  they  truly  represent  only  those  pluralities  or  majori- 
ties who  have  supported  or  elected  them.  Hence,  because 
added  majorities  are  yet  only  a  majority  of  the  whole  number, 
while  added  pluralities  are  but  a  minority  of  the  whole  number 
of  individual  voters,  when  these  delegates  determine  upon  a 
candidate  by  the  concurrence  of  a  mere  majority  of  their  num- 
ber, the  number  concurring  are  the  delegates  actually  repre- 
senting but  a  trifle  over  one-half  of  the  majorities  or  of  the 
pluralities  of  voters  represented  in  the  convention.  Or,  in 
other  words,  a  majority  of  a  majority  need  be  but  a  trifle  over 
one-half  of  one-half,  or  one-fourth  ;  while  a  majority  of  a  plu- 
rality may  be  a  number  much  less  than  one-fourth  of  the  in- 
dividual voters.  And  thus  it  occurs,  that  the  concerted  action 
of  even  these  smaller  fractions  of  the  whole  number  of  party 


31 

voters,  may  be  sufficient  to  determine  the  nomination  of  a 
party  candidate. 

Again,  it  will  be  readily  seen,  that  when  the  primary  dele- 
gates meet  in  a  convention  to  elect  by  the  concurrence  of  a 
majority,  one  or  more  secondary  delegates  to  a  State  or  Na- 
tional convention,  and  these  secondary  delegates  meeting  in 
convention  nominate  State  or  National  candidates  by  the  con- 
currence of  a  majority  of  their  number,  then  it  may  be  possi- 
ble for  a  State  or  National  candidate  to  need  only  be  the  rep- 
resentative of  a  majority,  of  a  majority,  of  a  majority.  Or,  in 
truth  the  concerted  action  of  but  a  trifle  over  one-eighth  of  the 
party  voters  may  be  sufficient  to  determine  a  State  or  National 
party  nomination.  Thus  the  system  of  delegating  and  re- 
delegating  diminishes  the  necessary  concurrence  of  the  party 
voters  at  each  new  delegating,  by  a  constant  geometrical  ratio. 

In  presenting  these  possibilities  for  the  purpose  of  showing 
the  illogical  nature  of  the  delegate  system,  it  is  not  claimed 
that  from  these  reasons  alone,  such  extremes  may  often  truly 
occur.  But,  that  a  number  of  voters  much  less  than  a  con- 
curring majority,  may,  by  secret  and  concerted  action,  take 
advantage  of  these  possibilities,  and  secure  control  of  the  party 
nominations,  is  unquestionably  true.  To  afford  a  conception  of 
what  may  be  actually  accomplished  by  secretly  taking  advan- 
tage of  this  illogical  system,  it  would  be  enough  to  simply  refer 
intelligent  observers  to  the  political  successes  secured  to  cor- 
rupt office-seekers  by  secretly  manipulating  the  numerous  cau- 
cuses, the  conventions  and  conferences,  the  unit  rules  and  so  on, 
and  to  the  apathy  and  distrust  which  this  complex  method  en- 
forces upon  the  great  mass  of  party  voters,  in  order  to  complete 
the  story  of  political  corruption  which  this  system  has  de- 
veloped. Because  such  possibilities  can  only  be  reached  by 
successively  deceiving  friends  as  well  as  foes,  has  proven  to  be 
no  reason  why  it  may  not  be  acceptably  practiced  in  personal 
contests  for  office. 

It  may  be  supposed,  in  defense  of  the  delegate  system,  that 
the  principle  of  acceding  to  the  will  of  a  majority  in  delegating, 
is  but  the  same  as  that  made  use  of  in  electing  representatives 
and  in  deciding  all  other  issues  in  a  representative  form  of 


32 

government ;  and,  that  this  delegating  and  re-delegating  is  but 
a  continuation  of  a  representative  system.  To  this  it  may  be 
answered,  that  a  people  in  resorting  to  a  representative  form 
of  government  must  in  truth  submit  to  the  fact,  that  they  may 
possibly  find  themselves  governed  by  less  than  a  concurring 
majority  of  the  individual  voters.  But  this  is  no  reason  why 
the  process  of  lessening  the  necessary  primary  concurrence, 
should  be  continued  by  repetitions  of  this  delegating,  while 
each  new  delegating  may  diminish  the  necessary  number  of 
voters  acting  in  secret  concert  in  order  to  control,  by  a  con- 
stant geometrical  ratio. 

There  is  practically,  however,  a  still  wider  difference  between 
entrusting  to  representatives  as  law-makers  and  as  executive 
officers,  and,  entrusting  delegates  with  the  power  of  making 
party  nominations.  The  work  of  representatives  as  legisla- 
tors is  the  open  proposition  and  support  of  a  law,  or  as  execu- 
tive officers,  that  of  enforcing  the  laws.  While  the  work  of 
delegates  entrusted  with  the  authority  of  placing  men  in  party 
nomination,  which  in  a  strong  party  may  be  equivalent  to  an 
election  to  office,  is  surrounded  by  all  the  secret  influences, 
and  with  an  opportunity  to  accept  all  the  promises  of  perso- 
nal favor,  or  of  official  patronage,  that  an  office-seeker  in  return 
for  favors,  may  have  to  bestow,  after  his  election  to  office. 

If  it  has  been  thus  sufficiently  shown,  that  the  system  of 
delegating  and  re-delegating  is  illogical  and  fallacious,  and  that 
the  trial  ballotings  of  a  convention  are  at  best  but  uncertain  as 
a  method  of  finding  the  will  of  a  concurring  majority  ;  then  it 
will  not  be  difficult  to  point  out  how  the  employment  of  this 
method  in  making  party  nominations,  has  been  attended  with 
a  corresponding  series  of  evil  and  corrupt  practices.  Not  more 
because  a  method  which  is  illogical  leads  to  evil,  than  because 
the  management  of  this  system  of  delegating,  with  its  caucusses, 
its  conventions,  its  conferences  and  so  on,  is  necessarily  so  ex- 
ceedingly complex,  has  the  use  of  the  method  afforded  oppor- 
tunities for  the  practice  of  a  series  of  political  evils  and  party 
corruption,  such  as  have  been  quite  sufficient  to  completely 
pervert  and  defeat  every  true  expression  of  the  popular  will. 

At  the  very  outset  and  throughout,  the  use  of  the  system  of 


33 

delegating  affords  opportunities  for  evil  and  corrupt  political 
practices.  It  requires  for  its  management  the  establishing  of 
permanent  party  organizations,  and  thus  sets  up  within  a  party 
an  organized  body  of  party  managers,  under  the  plea  of  being 
the  party  officers.  These  party  officers  or  managers  are  en- 
trusted with  the  duty  of  directing  the  party  primary  or  delegate 
elections,  with  the  calling  of  caucuses,  of  conventions,  of  con- 
ferences and  so  on,  and  being  in  a  position  where  they  may 
readily  arrange  with  selfish  and  corrupt  office-seekers  for  secret 
and  concerted  action,  they  too  often,  by  the  aid  of  these  office- 
seekers  and  their  followers,  are  enabled  to  control  primary 
caucuses,  and  thus  uset  up"  the  delegates,  to  barter  for  and 
bribe,  and  thus  secure  the  election  of  these  delegates  in  the 
interest  of  their  patrons.  When  these  delegates  meet  in  a  con- 
vention, they  are  thus  placed  under  the  direction  of  a  cabal  of 
office-seekers,  each  in  turn  seeking  his  own  advancement  by 
means  of  promises,  by  purchase,  or  by  trading  or  exchanging 
with  his  fellows.  Much  of  this  corrupt  bartering  is  necessarily 
done  in  secret,  but  so  notorious  has  it  become,  that  it  has 
virtually  been  accepted  and  acceded  to  as  a  part  of  customary 
political  methods.  It  occurs,  that  even  otherwise  intelligent 
citizens  submit  to  a  rule  which  permits  an  office-seeker  who 
happens  to  be  of  the  same  township,  county,  ward,  or  other 
district  with  themselves,  to  become  the  absolute  possessor  of 
their  delegate  or  delegates  to  use  his  or  their  voices  in  the  con- 
vention, in  whatever  manner  that  may  best  accrue  to  this  can- 
didate's personal  interests. 

Because,  in  the  election  of  delegates  by  a  simple  direct  vote, 
a  delegate  may  often  be  determined  upon  by  the  concurrence 
of  a  mere  plurality  of  the  party  voters,  there  has  been  de- 
veloped a  practice,  by  which  a  junta  of  political  bosses  and 
office-seekers  set  up  a  number  of  delegates  or  candidates  of 
good  repute,  and  by  means  of  cunningly  directed  advice  among 
the  more  respectable  voters,  secure  for  each  of  these  candi- 
dates a  nearly  equal  following  ;  while  at  the  same  time  they 
secure  for  a  favorite  office-seeker  the  concerted  support  of  all 
the  purchasable  or  controllable  voters  in  the  district,  and  thus 
determine  his  election  by  securing  for  him  a  plurality  over  each 


34 

of  the  other  candidates.  The  success  of  this  most  ingenious 
and  corrupt  enterprise,  is  determined  by  their  ability  to  place 
a  sufficient  number  of  reputable  candidates  or  their  delegates 
in  the  field,  so  that  the  quotient  of  respectable  voters  support- 
ing each  of  these  candidates,  shall  be  less  than  the  purchasa- 
ble or  controllable  voters  who  may  be  concerted  upon  the  one 
candidate  in  whose  interest  the  work  is  done. 

At  the  coming  together  of  these  delegates,  the  management 
of  the  temporary  organization,  and  then  in  succession,  the  con- 
trol of  the  more  complete  organization  of  the  convention,  af- 
fords the  party  managers  or  u  bosses  "  still  other  opportuni- 
ties to  distort  and  thwart  the  people's  will.  The  tricks  of 
caucuses,  and  the  arbitrary  rulings  of  irresponsible  com- 
mittees are  here  given  their  fullest  significance.  These,  to  be 
followed  by  the  successive  ballotings  of  the  convention,  where 
the  basest  forms  of  trickery  and  of  corrupt  bargaining  are  but 
too  often  practiced. 

The  first  ballot  of  a  convention  may  fairly  record  the  first 
instructions  given  to  each  delegate,  but  if  there  be  no  concur- 
rence of  a  majority  at  this  ballot,  then  some  delegate  or  dele- 
gates must  yield  up  their  first  choice  and  adopt  a  second,  be- 
fore the  concurrence  of  a  majority  can  be  reached.  As  a 
rule,  an  instructed  delegate,  finding  his  first  choice  of  candi- 
dates supported  by  a  large  concurrence,  or  by  a  plurality  over 
each  of  the  others,  would  not  be  inclined  to  yield  up  such  a 
choice ;  while  another  delegate  concurred  with  by  but  a  few, 
would  be  expected  to  yield,  and  adopt  a  second  choice  among 
the  apparently  stronger  candidates.  But  such  a  rule  cannot 
be  enforced,  nor  is  it  right,  for  it  may  happen  that  a  strong 
plurality  have  with  concerted  purpose,  concurred  upon  a  can- 
didate who  is  highly  objectionable  to  the  majority  ;  and  it  may 
be  that  this  majority,  although  ultimately  wishing  to  concur, 
now  find  themselves  divided  among  several  candidates  ;  and 
still  further,  it  may  happen  that  the  one  candidate  representing 
that  happy  medium  of  opinion  or  purpose,  and  upon  whom 
this  majority  would  finally  concur,  has  received  at  first  but  a 
meager  or  small  support.  If  the  supporters  of  this  candidate 
were  to  withdraw  early,  and  adopt  a  second  choice,  their  first 


35 

choice  would  thus  be  so  prejudiced  at  once,  as  very  often  to  be 
retired  from  the  contest.  Hence  it  occurs,  that  delegates  in  a 
convention  are  often  led  to  make  repeated  ballotings  without 
making  any  changes,  until  these  senseless  repetitions  become 
much  like  the  rehearsal  of  a  farce.  The  delegates  supporting 
candidates  having  a  strong  following,  are  stimulated  by  their 
apparent  vantage  ground  to  hold  on ;  while  those  supporting 
candidates  who  have  but  a  small  following  are  each  in  turn 
stimulated  by  the  hope,  that  an  enmity  between  the  stronger 
candidates  or  their  supporters,  will  prevent  their  ever  yielding 
one  to  the  other,  and  that  finally,  the  now  poorly  supported 
candidate  may  loom  up  as  a  "dark  horse" 

It  is  from  the  fact,  that  each  new  balloting  of  the  convention 
is  a  new  and  distinct  trial,  and  also  from  the  fact,  that  when  a 
delegate  persistently  holds  on  to  his  first  choice  he  may  be 
prejudicing  the  future  prospects  of  his  second  choice,  or,  by 
giving  up  his  first  choice  too  soon,  and  placing  a  second  choice 
in  full  opposition  to  his  first,  he  may  thus  early  prejudice  the 
future  prospects  of  this  first  choice, — the  successive  ballotings 
of  a  convention  have  the  character  of  a  game  of  chance.  Were 
it  not  that  this  game  is  too  often  played  by  party  managers 
and  selfish  office-seekers  with  loaded  dice,  the  merit  of  the  suc- 
cessive ballotings  of  a  convention  might  well  be  left  to  the 
rulings  of  chance.  But,  such  is  the,  fact,  that  a  few  concerted 
managers  in  league  with  favored  office-seekers, — and  knowing 
well  of  the  possible  combinations  that  may  be  had  from  the 
delegates'  votes  before  them, — may  so  manipulate  and  play  the 
game  that  it  shall  with  certainty  win  for  them  the  prize. 

Even  the  honest  delegates  in  a  convention  are  often  at  a  loss 
how  to  best  secure  their  constituents'  will.  Supposing  them 
uninstructed  and  free  to  use  their  best  judgment,  the  questions 
come,  who  must  yield  ?  And  when  to  yield  ?  These  are  often, 
indeed,  very  difficult  and  tedious  questions  to  decide.  In  illus- 
tration of  this,  it  may  be  readily  recalled,  how  many  recent 
State  and  National  conventions,  and,  to  the  same  point,  how 
many  recent  elections  of  United  States'  Senators,— which  ex- 
hibit the  same  voting  of  a  convened  body,— have  afforded  ex- 
amples of  repeated  ballotings  sufficient  to  disgust  all  intelligent 


36 

and  patriotic  thinkers  with  such  a  method  of  reaching  an  ex- 
pression of  "  the  people's  will."  Thus  the  repeated  ballotings 
of  a  convention  may  become  such  a  farce,  that  even  the  actors 
themselves  would  often  willingly  retire  from  it  in  disgust. 
Finally,  when  the  yielding  begins  new  combinations  arise,  and 
the  changing  from  one  candidate  to  another  spreads  as  an  in- 
fection, and  the  delegates  on  the  A.,  B.,  G.  end  of  the  list, 
finding  themselves  outwitted  by  the  X.,  Y.,  Z.  delegates,  seek 
to  avert  this  strategy  by  changing  their  votes  before  the  result 
of  the  ballot  has  been  announced.  This  in  turn  provokes 
other  clamorous  changes  until  the  farce  seems  to  have  ended 
in  an  inglorious  riot. 

To  recapitulate: — the  Delegate  System  as  a  method  of  find- 
ing the  candidate  upon  whom  a  majority  of  the  individual  vo- 
ters will  first  concur,  is  illogical  and  fallacious  for  the  reasons : 

First.  Because  primary  delegates  are  elected  by  a  simple  di- 
rect vote,  they  need  only  be  the  representatives  of  local  ma- 
jorities, or,  quite  often  of  mere  pluralities  of  the  whole  body 
of  party  voters.  And  when  a  district  is  accorded  two  or  more 
delegates,  all  of  these  delegates  may  be  determined  by  a  mere 
majority,  or  even  by  a  small  plurality  of  the  voters  of  the  dis- 
trict. 

Secondly.  Because  a  convention  of  these  delegates  repre- 
sents but  added  majorities,  or  often,  but  added  pluralities 
among  the  whole  number  of  party  voters,  and,  as  added  ma- 
jorities still  make  but  a  majority  of  the  whole  number,  while 
added  pluralities  may  be  but  a  small  minority  of  the  whole 
number  of  voters,  a  majority  of  this  body  of  delegates  acting 
in  secret  concert,  in  making  a  party  nomination  or  in  selecting 
secondary  delegates,  need  but  represent  a  trifle  over  one-half 
of  a  majority,  or  often,  but  one-half  of  a  minority  of  the  party 
voters. 

Thirdly.  Because  the  whole  body  of  these  secondary,  that 
is, — State  or  National  delegates,  selected  by  secretly  concerted 
action,  may  thus  together  represent  but  one-fourth  of  the  in- 
dividual party  voters,  or  even  less  when  primary  delegates 
have  been  elected  by  pluralities,  a  majority  of  their  number 


37 

in  making  State  or  National  nominations,  need  only  be  the 
representatives  of  one-eighth,  or,  even  less  of  the  party  voters. 

Fourthly.  As  the  only  true  significance  of  a  convention  is 
that  it  affords  the  opportunity  to  make  repeated  ballotings,and 
because  there  can  be  no  fixed  rule  to  decide  when  a  delegate 
in  voting  should  adopt  a  second  choice,  as  the  adoption  of  a 
second  choice  by  a  delegate  is  to  vote  against  his  first  choice 
with  as  much  force  as  against  the  most  objectionable  candidate 
on  the  list, — the  repeated  ballotings  of  a  convention  are  but 
repeated  trials,  each  independent  of  the  other,  and  conse- 
quently give  the  whole  method  of  solving  the  problem  the 
character  of  a  game  of  chance. 

Again,  this  most  complex  method  besides  being  illogical  and 
fallacious,  has  afforded  opportunities  for  a  series  of  evil  and 
corrupt  practices.  Of  these  we  may  recount : 

That  the  delegate  system  requires  for  its  management  the 
erection  of  a  permanent  party  organization. 

That  permanent  party  organization  establishes  a  body  of 
party  officers  or  party  managers  who  become  great  political 
"  bosses11  and  their  servile  "  henchmen.11 

That  the  management  of  the  permanent  party  organization 
and  control  of  the  delegate  system,  affords  these  "  bosses11  and 
their  assistants  an  opportunity  to  aid  selfish  and  corrupt  office- 
seekers  in  securing  the  party  nomination. 

That  corrupt  office-seekers  and  party  "  bosses11  and  party 
workers  in  their  employ  meet  in  caucuses  and  "  set  up11  the 
primary  delegates. 

That  they  secure  the  election  of  these  delegates  by  making 
promises  of  favors,  by  purchase,  and  by  using  if  necessary 
all  the  tricks  which  go  to  make  the  voice  of  small  pluralities 
effective  through  delegating. 

That  these  office-seekers  barter  for  with  promises,  purchase 
and  own,  or  otherwise  corruptly  secure  a  sufficient  number 
of  delegates  to  determine  their  own  nomination  ;  or,  by  cau- 
cuses and  secret  conferences  and  bargainings  "  set  up11  and 
secure  the  election  of  such  secondary  delegates  as  are  under 
their  control. 

That  office-seekers  are   aided  further  by  party  officers  or 


38 

managers,  through  their  control  of  the  temporary  and  more 
complete  organization  of  the  convention  of  delegates,  and  by 
the  arbitrary  rulings  of  its  committees  appointed  by  these 
officers. 

That  office-seekers  promise  to  repay  delegates,  and  party 
managers,  and  party  workers  throughout,  with  appoint- 
ments to  office  in  the  government  employ,  with  favorable  or 
special  legislation,  with  executive  clemency  or  favor,  or  with 
some  form  of  government  patronage  or  benefit. 

That  by  the  secret  and  concerted  bargainings  of  office- 
seekers  with  great  party  bosses,  committee-men,  and  party 
workers,  so  much  is  known  in  advance  of  the  probable  work- 
ings of  a  State  or  National  convention,  that  nominations  to 
come  from  these  conventions  are  often  "slated"1  and  popular- 
ized through  a  subsidiary  public  press,  long  before  the  formal 
convention  has  met  arid  ratified  them.  Finally, — that  the  suc- 
cess of  these  evil  practices  intended  to  pervert  the  popular 
will,  is  greatly  favored  by  the  complete  disgust,  distrust  and 
"  apathy"  of  a  large  proportion  of  the  most  intelligent  and  pa- 
triotic voters,  who  neglect  and  wholly  decline  to  take  any  part 
in  this  system,  which  they  recognize  as  in  some  way  con- 
tinually affording  great  odds  against  honesty  and  patriotic 
intent. 

These  recountings  are  indeed  but  a  faint  outline  of  the  ac- 
tual practices  connected  with  this  most  complex  system  of 
delegating  and  re-delegating,  for  the  system  includes  a  con- 
tinual resort  to  caucuses,  and  conferences,  and  unit  rules,  and 
recognizes  the  demand  for  rotation  in  office,  all  of  which  com- 
bine to  defeat  and  completely  subvert  the  people's  will. 

There  yet  remains  to  discuss  the  peculiarly  existing  relation- 
ship between  the  people,  and  this  delegate  system.  The  fact 
is  notorious  and  seemingly  paradoxical,  that  a  large  proportion 
of  the  most  intelligent  and  patriotic  citizens,  entrusted  with  the 
sovereignty  of  this  free  government,  accede  to  the  use  of  this 
delegate  system  in  making  party  nominations,  and  yet  for 
themselves  take  no  part  in  it.  Superficial  political  philoso- 
phers make  of  this  fact  a  periodical  duty  to  rebuke  these  or- 
der loving  citizens  for  their  "  apathy,"  and  persistent  refusal  to 


39 

take  any  part  in  the  party  primary  or  delegate  elections.  These 
philosophers  urge  with  well  fortified  arguments,  that  "  this 
country  is  governed  at  the  party  primaries,5'  and  that,  "  who- 
ever controls  the  primaries  of  the  dominant  party  governs  the 
country."  Intelligent  citizens  are  forced  to  accede  to  these  as- 
sertions, being  well  aware  that  selfish  office-seekers  and  cor- 
rupt party  managers  control  the  party  primaries,  and  thus  con- 
trol the  government  of  the  country.  Yet  these  honest  citizens 
accede  to  the  use  of  this  delegate  system  because  they  have 
known  of  no  other  method  of  reaching  concerted  action  ; 
while  at  the  same  time  they  are  forced  from  disgust  and  dis- 
trust to  take  no  part  in  this  system,  knowing  from  experience, 
that  it  continually  affords  the  greatest  odds  in  favor  of  a  few 
corrupt  office-seekers  and  party  managers  acting  in  secret  con- 
cert. 

Verily,  has  the  long  habit  of  not  thinking  this  system  of 
delegating  to  be  wrong,  given  to  it  the  superficial  appearance 
of  being  right.  And  because  honest  and  patriotic  citizens 
have  not  known  that  it  is  possible  to  avoid  it,  and  have  not 
known  of  the  true  method  of  solving  the  problem  before  them, 
they  have  acceded  to  the  delegate  system  and  from  its  appa- 
rent necessity  have  defended  it. 

In  further  evidence  of  the  people's  actual  distrust  and  con- 
demnation, it  is  safe  to  say  that  a  large  majority  of  the  most 
patriotic  and  intelligent  of  the  sovereign  voters,  have  long  since 
ceased  to  take  any  active  part  in  the  delegate  or  party  primary 
elections.  In  some  districts  they  allow  the  election  of  delegates 
to  go  by  default.  In  others,  they  submit  at  once  to  the  ap- 
pointment of  delegates  by  the  party  officers  or  managers. 
Added  to  these  facts  as  if  to  increase  the  seeming  paradox, 
there  has  recently  developed  the  organizing  of  vigilant  com- 
mittees^— made  up  of  honest  citizens — who  go  a  step  further  in 
practically  condemning  that  which  they  also  accede  to.  These 
honest  voters  satisfy  themselves  by  organizing  and  condemn- 
ing or  renouncing  the  party  nominations,  when  they  are  found 
to  be  too  evidently  corrupt,  after  they  have  been  made  by  the 
party  managers  or  "bosses"  by  means  of  this  delegate  system. 

Of  these,  the  "  Committee  of  100,"  organized  in  the  city  of 


40 

Philadelphia,  and  intended  for  the  purpose  of  reforming  its 
municipal  politics,  furnishes  a  conspicuous  example.  This 
body  of  men,  made  up  of  voters  originally  identified  with  one 
of  the  two  great  political  parties,  found  from  long  experience 
that  no  effort  of  theirs,  however  large  their  numbers,  could 
succeed  against  the  secret  and  concerted  action  of  a  corrupt 
few  engaged  in  the  management  of  the  system  of  delegating  in 
making  party  nominations. 

Knowing  of  no  method  whereby  large  numbers  could  reach 
concerted  action  except  by  delegating,  and  knowing  from  ex- 
perience that  to  resort  to  delegating  they  must  submit  to  a 
corruption  and  perversion  of  their  purpose  ;  they  have  sought, 
by  arbitrarily  limiting  their  number  so  that  they  may  practi- 
cally convene,  and  so  that  each  may  have  a  direct  voice,  first, 
to  publicly  rebuke  the  evidently  corrupt  nominations  of  their 
own  political  party  ;  next,  to  give  a  preference  to,  and  pub- 
licly urge  the  support  of  the  candidate  of  the  opposing  party, 
when  this  party's  candidate  is  much  the  preferable  of  the  two 
nominations  ;  and  finally,  to  condemn  both  party  nominations 
and  urge  a  candidate  of  their  own  naming,  and  upon  "  the  peo- 
ple's recommendation"  when  both  the  party  candidates  are  evi- 
dently too  corrupt  to  be  safely  entrusted  with  the  official 
place. 

This  Committee  of  citizens  by  the  force  of  their  good  name, 
— being  recognized  as  among  the  foremost  in  patriotism,  in  in- 
telligence, and  in  honesty  of  purpose, — have  largely  succeeded, 
not  in  directing  or  influencing  the  successive  steps  in  the  man- 
agement of  the  delegate  system  in  making  party  nominations, 
buf^ — when  they  have  been  supported  by  the  authority  and 
following  of  the  honest  masses, — they  have  held  a  scepter 
over,  and  have  been  ready  to  strike  down  these  party  nomina- 
tions, the  product  of  the  corrupt  management  of  this  delegate 
system,  whenever  and  wherever  it  seemed  in  their  judgment 
to  be  too  great  a  perversion  of  the  people's  will. 

Thus  has  it  been,  that  this  u  Committee"  although  acceding 
to  the  apparent  necessity  of  making  use  of  this  delegate  sys- 
tem in  making  party  nominations,  have  for  themselves  denied 
its  use  or  safety.  And,  because  they  have  not  known  of  the 


41 

true  method  of  finding  the  will  of  a  concurring  majority,  and 
of  thus  avoiding  this  delegate  system  and  its  evils,  they  have 
satisfied  themselves  with  the  duty  of  guarding  against  wholly 
corrupt  and  bad  nominations  being  forced  upon  them.  They 
accede  to  a  system  which  permits  a  few  men,  having  much 
less  intelligence  and  honesty,  and  hence,  whose  patriotic  im- 
pulses and  political  responsibilities  are  much  inferior,  to  their 
own,  to  make  the  party  nominations  ;  and  are  satisfied  to 
come  after  these  party  "  bosses,"  and  managers  of  the  dele- 
gate system,  and  rebuke  these  nominations  and  substitute 
others,  when  the  popular  conviction  makes  it  possible  for  them 
to  do  so. 

The  same  questions,  concerning  the  need  for  "  political  re- 
form" have  largely  reached  the  people  in  their  state  capacities  ; 
and  very  recently  great  revolts  have  developed  against  the 
control  of  a  corrupt  few  who  have  long  usurped  the  manage- 
ment of  the  dominant  party  in  making  its  nominations.  Igno- 
rant that  the  true  source  of  the  evil  was  because  the  delegate 
system  is  illogical  and  fallacious,  and  hence  must  always  af- 
ford an  opportunity  for  the  corrupt  control  of  a  few,  this  ques- 
tion took  the  nature  of  an  unintelligible  dispute,  whether  "  Re- 
form" should  be  secured  from  "  within  the  party,"  or,  whether 
it  must  come  from  "without  the  party."  As  true  reform  could 
only  come  from  blotting  out  the  use,  and  with  it  the  abuse  of 
this  delegate  system,  and,  as  neither  the  defenders  from  within, 
nor  the  arraigners  from  without  knew  how  to  avoid  its  use ; 
and  as  both  factions  still  acceded  to  it,  those  from  within  ac- 
cepting its  usual  corrupt  fruit,  and  those  from  without  resorting 
to  a  similar  method  sure  to  bring  an  uncertain  or  corrupt  re- 
sult,— the  dispute  convinced  none,  but  succeeded  in  dividing  the 
ranks  of  the  dominant  party,  and  thus,  in  several  instances  per- 
mitted the  concerted  efforts  of  the  opposing  party  to  defeat 
them. 

Great  and  growing,  has  been  the  demand  for  some  method 
of  securing  political  reform,  and  innumerable  schemes  have 
been  devised  to  achieve  it.  New  parties  have  been  proposed 
to  supercede  old  ones.  A  change  from  one  old  party  to  the 
other  has  been  suggested.  A  general  outcry  against  political 


42 

"  Bossism"  has  been  indulged  in.  Numerous  rules  to  regulate 
and  conduct  the  delegate  system  have  been  devised  and 
adopted ;  and  legislative  enactments  have  been  sought  to  en- 
force, and  to  punish  the  breaking  of  these  rules.  Numerous 
schemes  and  laws  have  been  devised  to  remedy  the  great  list 
of  evils  resulting  from  this  system  of  delegating  in  making  party 
nominations.  Of  these,  laws  to  prevent  corrupt  influences 
being  used  in  primary  as  well  as  in  general  elections.  Laws  to 
prevent  corrupt  influences  from  being  used  to  determine  legis- 
lation. Laws  to  prevent  corrupt  influences  from  being  used 
to  secure  executive  and  judicial  favors.  Laws  to  reform  or 
improve  the  management  of  the  civil  service  appointments, 
and  to  prevent  the  assessment  of  civil  service  office  holders  for 
partisan  political  purposes  ;  and  yet,  not  one  or  all  of  these 
together  have  made  the  first  step  toward  securing  political  re- 
form. And  why? 

Simply  because  the  people  have  not  known  where  the 
source  of  the  evil  existed,  and  remedies  have  not  been  di- 
rected against  the  true  source  or  cause  of  these  evils.  And, 
because  all  these  schemes  have  been  attempts  to  reform  the 
motives  and  acts  of  men,  already  enjoying  high  political  posi- 
tions, and  who  have  been  purposely  engaged  in  corrupt  and 
selfish  designs.  And  still  further,  because  the  opportunities 
remain  open,  and  constantly  afford  such  men  a  greatly  favored 
chance  to  reap  a  rich  harvest  from  their  selfish  and  corrupt 
practices. 

Political  reform  can  never  come  from  "  reform  legislation  " 
by  such  men.  True  reform  must  come  from  a  more  intelli- 
gent and  honest  selection  of  truly  representative  officials  by 
the  people.  True  political  reform  can  only  come  when  the 
people  of  this  government  have  learned  the  true  method  of 
solving  the  problem  presented  at  the  very  foundation  of  its 
structure.  When  they  have  learned  that  the  problem  of  find- 
ing a  candidate  for  office  upon  whom  a  majority  of  the  whole 
body  of  voters  will  first  concur,  can  only  be  truthfully  solved 
by  the  proposed  method  of  direct  voting,  by  the  whole  people. 

Surely  the  time  is  at  hand,  when  patriotism  should  demand 
a  more  honest  and  economical  management  of  our  govern- 


43 

mental  affairs.  The  time  is  at  hand,  when  intelligence  should 
demand  a  more  careful  and  philosophical  inquiry  into  the 
causes  of  our  rapidly  increasing  political  corruption.  And,  is 
not  the  time  at  hand  when  intelligent  citizens,  acknowledging 
themselves  the  responsible  sovereigns  of  a  free  government, 
should  at  once  inquire,  why  they  are  submitting  to  a  method 
of  procedure  at  the  very  foundation  of  their  governmental 
structure,  which  they  themselves  distrust  and  avoid,  and  which 
they  well  know,  that  by  avoiding,  places  the  power  of  governing 
in  the  hands  of  selfish  and  designing  men? 


CHAPTER  IV. 


THE  EVILS  OF  PERMANENT  PARTY  ORGANIZATION. 

To  arraign  the  practice  of  permanently  organizing  into  oppo- 
sing political  parties,  as  being  unnatural,  needless,  and  harmful; 
as  being  dangerously  opposed  to  the  very  principles  underlying 
our  unity  and  harmony,  and,  as  being  a  practice  which  is  con- 
tinually threatening  to  destroy  our  patriotism  and  love  of  true 
political  freedom, — will  at  once  set  up  a  formidable  outcry  in 
defence  of  custom  ;  for  a  long  habit  of  not  thinking  the  per- 
manently organizing  of  political  parties  among  us  to  be  wrong, 
has  given  it  the  superficial  appearance  of  being  right. 

Logically,  party  organizations  permanently  dividing  the  people 
of  a  free  government  have  no  natural  or  rightful  existence.  Nor 
would  permanent  parties  limited  to  two,  be  found  dividing  the 
people  of  this  country,  were  they  not  a  necessary  means 
for  the  management  of  the  delegate  system. 

It  is  indeed  true  that  great  political  principles  and  public 
causes  are  only  advanced  by  the  concerted  action  of  those  who 
seek  the  same  great  end  ;  and,  it  is  also  true  that  this  may  be 
well  effected  by  organized  party  action.  Great  schemes  of  ad- 
vancement and  of  general  good,  may  often  only  be  successfully 
achieved,  by  being  persistently  presented  to  a  large  number  of 
people.  Even  the  organizing  of  a  great  party  may  be  the  best 
and  most  effectual  method  of  reaching  successful  concerted 
action.  But  a  party  organization,  after  having  achieved  success 
in  the  cause  which  brought  it  into  existence,  may,  by  perma- 
nently organizing  and  falling  into  the  hands  of  a  few  party 
managers,  become  as  dangerous  a  power  for  evil  as  it  was  pri- 
marily a  power  for  good.  It  is  indeed  unnatural  that  this 


45 

same  body  of  voters  should  continue  to  act  concertedly  upon  all 
other  issues  or  questions  that  may  thereafter  concern  the  pub- 
lic welfare.  Nay  more,  lo  be  thus  permanently  linked  in  party 
action  must  necessarily  destroy  the  individuality  of  the  voter, 
and,  losing  his  personal  responsibility,  he  soon  finds  himself  a 
mere  puppet  to  be  used  by  scheming  political  leaders  in  selfish 
party  contentions. 

The  spirit  of  compact  entered  into  by  the  whole  people  in 
establishing  our  free  government,  made  no  provision  and 
recognized  no  conceivable  necessity  for  the  development  of 
permanent  party  organizations,  or,  for  permanently  opposing 
divisions  among  the  voting  masses.  The  condition  is  unnatural, 
even  much  more,  is  prejudicial,  and  has  long  proven  itself  a 
corroding  canker,  a  veritable  curse  upon  the  vital  principles 
underlying  our  compact  of  liberty,  equality  and  political  inde- 
pendence. Just  as  a  corporation  of  stock-holders  find  that  a 
permanently  organized  "  ring"  within  their  numbers  becomes 
a  selfish  conclave,  prejudicial  to  the  best  interests  of  the  whole 
body,  so  has  the  usurpation  of  our  government  by  either  per- 
manent party  organization  developed  a  selfish,  extravagant  and 
arrogantly  autocratic  rule,  instead  of  the  economical  republican 
government  vouchsafed  to  us  by  an  honest  obedience  to  the 
popular  will. 

To  those  who  still  seek  a  precedent  for  our  laws  and  methods 
of  governing,  or  find  sufficient  defence  for  a  custom  because 
the  same  exists  in  some. similar  form  in  the  older  and  monar- 
chical governments  of  Europe,  a  very  brief  answer  must  be 
sufficient.  Opposing  political  parties  among  the  people  of  a 
limited  monarchy,  by  whatever  name  they  may  be  known, — 
whether  Whig  or  Radical,  Tory  or  Conservative,— have  but  the 
one  significance,  that  of  a  contest  in  defence  of  popular  rights 
on  the  one  part,  against  the  usurpations  of  a  monarchy  and 
its  aristocracy  on  the  other.  However  modified  by  a  variety 
of  surroundings,  the  issue  there  is  a  permanent  one,  and  will  be 
such,  so  long  as  intelligence  and  the  spirit  of  human  justice 
urges  men  to  oppose,  and  defend  themselves  against  the  op- 
pression of  a  few,  having  the  temporary  power  to  deny  and 


-46 

withhold  from  their  fellows  the  equal  rights  given  to  all  men 
by  their  creator. 

Wherever  there  exists  any  grade  of  monarchy,  or  of  a  pro- 
tected aristocracy,  or  oligarchy,  or  any  form  of  government 
whatsoever,  distinguishing  in  favor  of  one  class  of  its  people 
and  correspondingly  oppressing  another  class,  there  will  be  a 
permanent  contest  on  the  one  hand,  for  the  just  and  equal 
rights  of  man,  and  on  the  other,  for  a  continuation  of  the  op- 
portunity of  those  in  power  to  selfishly  oppress  their  fellows. 
There  can  be  no  such  an  issue  as  this  among  freemen.  Nor 
can  any  other  issue  having  a  permanent  character,  exist  among 
a  people  respecting  the  equal  rights  of  men.  A  free  govern- 
ment is  a  compact,  it  implies  an  agreement  between  the  whole 
mass  of  people,  and  so  long  as  the  compact  exists  the  agree- 
ment to  abide  by  the  will  of  a  concurring  majority  when 
clearly  and  truthfully  expressed,  is  its  fundamental  law.  A 
monarchical  government  on  the  contrary  is  a  perpetual  contest, 
wherein  the  rich  and  powerful  are  continually  aiming  to 
aggrandize  their  wealth  and  power,  and  secure  these  at  the  ex- 
pense of,  and  by  oppressing  the  weaker  and  more  ignorant 
classes.  Intelligence  and  the  desire  for  political  liberty  are  the 
weapons  which  must  sooner  or  later  decide  this  long  and  un- 
equal contest  in  favor  of  universal  freedom  for  all  mankind. 

Permanent  parties,  therefore,  among  the  people  of  a  mon- 
archy are  natural,  and  one  at  least  is  justifiable,  so  long  as  the 
issue  in  defence  of  political  liberty  remains.  Parties  among  a 
free  people  though,  can  have  no  permanent  issue  to  defend, 
and  can  have  no  natural  or  just  cause  for  permanent  existence  ; 
but  on  the  contrary,  permanent  party  organizations  dividing 
the  people  of  this  government  have  proven  to  be  the  source  of 
great  and  increasing  political  evils  among  us. 

Permanent  party  organizations  among  a  free  people  are  un- 
natural, because  a  permanent  political  division  of  the  people  is 
directly  opposed  to  the  principles  of  unity  and  harmony  under- 
lying their  compact ;  and,  because  permanent  parties  greatly 
destroy  that  loyalty  and  love  which  the  citizens  of  a  free 
country  owe  to  their  government.  Permanent  party  organiza- 
tions have  developed  a  spirit  of  contest,  which  takes  the  place 


47 

of,  and  completely  subverts  the  true  principles  of  unity  and 
fellowship  which  should  bind  us  together  in  one  great  national 
compact,  founded  on  political  freedom  and  political  equality. 

It  has  already  been  shown  that  permanent  party  organiza- 
tions are  needless.  First,  That  the  great  mass  of  voters  have 
been  reduced  to  two  contending  parties,  because  a  simple  direct 
vote  without  the  opportunity  to  make  any  provision  for  further 
concurring  at  our  final  elections,  limits  the  actual  contest  to 
that  between  the  strongest  two  of  the  parties  in  the  field,  and 
hence,  soon  reduces  the  voters  to  two  contending  parties.  And 
further,  that  parlies  have  become  permanently  organized  in 
order  to  conduct  the  delegate  system  with  its  conventions,  con- 
ferences, caucuses  and  so  on,  as  a  method  supposed  to  be 
necessary  in  determining  upon  a  party  candidate.  But  the 
problem  of  finding  the  will  of  a  concurring  majority  has  been 
shown  to  admit  of  but  one  truthful  method  of  solution,  and 
that,  by  a  single  direct  election  by  the  whole  body  of  voters, 
and  by  a  plan  which  gives  each  voter  an  opportunity  to  name 
one  or  more  provisional  choices  in  order  that  a  majority  may 
finally  concur. 

That  permanent  party  organizations  have  been  the  source  of 
much  more  that  is  evil  may  be  as  readily  shown.  They  have 
substituted  a  love  of  party  for  love  of  country ;  have  made  the 
selfish  desire  to  rule,  a  measure  of  patriotism  ;  and,  by  as 
much  as  they  have  debased  the  true  spirit  of  patriotism,  the 
spirit  of  unselfishness,  of  equal  justice  .and  of  honesty,  by  sub- 
stituting party  for  country,  they  have  introduced  the  worst 
forms  of  corruption,  of  dishonesty  and  political  trickery  into 
the  securing  of  political  offices,  by  party  methods,  and  for  per- 
sonal ends.  Permanent  party  organizations  contesting  for 
power,  soon  discovered  "  that  to  the  victors  belong  the  spoils  ;" 
and  making  "spoils"  out  of  the  distribution  of  official  places, 
and  out  of  every  conceivable  form  of  government  patronage 
or  favor,  soon  developed  a  class  of  political  office-seekers, 
party  leaders  and  party  managers,  whose  lives  are  devoted  to 
the  securing  of  public  offices. 

The  greatest  contests  for  place,  are  in  the  primary  or  personal 
contests  for  nomination,  and  here,  in  the  field  of  opportunities 


48 

afforded  for  the  manipulation  of  the  delegate  system,  at  its 
caucuses,  its  delegate  elections,  its  conventions,  its  conferences 
and  so  on,  are  waged  the  personal  conflicts  of  office-seekers, 
with  but  little  respect  for  the  popular  will. 

The  managers  or  leaders  of  each  permanent  party  organiza- 
tion periodically  present  a  party  platform,  "  principles" — so 
called — which  are  to  be  defended  against  those  presented  by 
the  opposing  party.  In  the  absence  of  questions  or  issues 
which  have  an  actual  significance,  and  upon  which  the  people 
are  actually  divided  in  their  opinions,  mere  platitudes,  and 
charges  and  counter-charges  of  former  political  wrongs  are 
spread  forth  upon  the  banner  of  each  party  in  the  contest.  No 
matter  how  little  of  interest  the  mass  of  party  voters  may 
have  in  concert,  nay  more,  no  matter  how  much  the  individual 
voters  of  the  party  may  represent  opposing  interests,  they  are 
expected  to  act  in  harmony  and  accept  the  party  fiat,  as  well 
as  support  the  party  candidate  or  nomination  for  office. 

A  party  organization  may  have  had  its  birth  in  the  concerted 
action  of  a  body  of  voters  aiming  to  secure  a  most  honorable 
and  just  political  principle  or  measure;  but,  after  having 
achieved  its  purpose,  and  having  adopted  a  party  name,  this 
very  name  with  its  augury  of  further  party  success,  at  once 
becomes  the  watchword  and  hope  of  scheming  party  leaders. 
The  history  of  our  government  has  been  the  alternate  succes- 
sion in  power  of  two  great  political  parties.  The  success  and 
continuance  of  a  party  in  power  has  not  been  limited  by  the 
achievement  of  the  purpose  which  called  it  into  existence,  but, 
by  reason  of  the  necessity  for  its  permanent  organization,  in 
order  to  conduct  the  delegate  method  of  making  party  nomi- 
nations, it  has  continued  in  power  even  though  its  leadership 
has  surrounded  its  once  honored  name  with  the  most  selfish 
and  dishonest  methods  of  political  corruption. 

It  is  true  there  is  no  legal  restraint  commanding  voters  to 
continue  casting  their  ballots  in  the  interest  of  one  political 
party  or  the  other.  But  their  choice  is  limited  to  one  of  the 
two,  and  often  to  a  choice  between  two  evils.  And  there  has 
been  developed,  through  the  ignorance  and  selfishness  perma- 
nent parties  have  encouraged,  such  an  unbending  social  re- 


49 

straint  that  but  few  men  have  been  brave  enough  to  stem  the 
social  and  business  ostracism  that  has  attended  a  change  in 
one's  party,  even  though  a  voter's  most  sincere  political  con- 
victions demanded  such  a  change. 

In  the  nature  of  things,  however,  every  specific  evil  is  self- 
limiting,  and  permanent  party  organizations  because  of  their 
inherent  corruption,  finally  fall  by  revolution.  Intelligent 
voters  at  first  from  distrust  and  disgust  become  apathetic,  and 
finally  revolt  against  the  party  leadership  and  free  themselves 
for  the  time,  from  their  self-imposed  servility  to  a  most  arro- 
gant partisan  "  bossism."  But  the  same  pitfalls  as  before  are 
awaiting  the  organizing  of  a  new  party,  and  with  its  prospects 
of  success  it  is  exposed  to  the  sinister  avowals  of  sympathy, 
from  a  crafty  volunteer  leadership,  whose  selfish  aim  is  an  op- 
portunity to  manipulate  the  delegate  system  in  making  its 
party  nominations,  and  thereby  succeed  to  the  prizes  of  po- 
litical office-holding. 

The  conflicts  between  permanent  political  parties  have  been 
incessant  throughout  our  history,  and  the  evils  of  the  one  have 
been  the  principal  weapons  of  the  other,  even  when  these  evils 
were  common  to  both.  Patriotic  citizens  have  been  entertain- 
ed, aye,  too  often  have  been  drawn  into  these  contests,  which 
have  proven  to  be  only  the  personal  contests  of  selfish  office- 
seekers  striving  for  places  of  official  power  and  for  the  spoils 
of  office.  Partisan  leaders  have  so  successfully  entertained 
the  unwary  with  their  harranguings  and  charges  of  evil  against 
their  opponents, — each  party  thus  contending  against  the  other, 
— that  honest  and  patriotic,  and  otherwise  intelligent  citizens 
have  long  been  misled,  and  have  too  often  joined  in  a  contest 
where  they  had  nothing  to  gain,  and  as  surely  nothing  to  lose. 
Party  leaders  have  not  hesitated  to  misrepresent  the  opinions 
and  aims  of  others,  and  have  sought  to  arouse  the  most  bitter 
jealousies  by  the  constant  revival  of  the  traditional  errors  of 
their  opponents.  To  offset  these  charges,  the  party  out  of 
power, — being  on  its  good  behavior  from  having  no  oppor- 
tunities at  hand  for  evil, — is  well  prepared  to  point  out  and  de- 
fine the  evils  being  practiced  by  the  party  in  power,  now 
flushed  with  its  spoils  and  successes.  It  is  at  such  times, 


50 

when  the  corrupt  practices  of  a  party  flushed  with  the  spoils 
and  favors  of  long  continued  office-holding,  become  so  promi- 
nent, and  may  be  so  well  pointed  out  by  their  opponents,  that 
the  mass  of  honest  voters  become  thus  periodically  aware  of 
their  unnatural  association  with  such  corrupt  and  unprincipled 
leadership.  Honest  citizens  attempt  in  vain  to  unseat  these 
party  leaders,  hence,  in  searching  for  lesser  evils  are  often  led 
to  join  the  opposing  party,  or  else  to  form  a  new  party  organi- 
zation for  the  sake  of  having  new  leaders.  But  the  history  of 
permanent  parties  has  been  the  same  throughout.  Only  two 
such  opposing  organizations  can  successfully  endure,  and  of 
these  the  one  in  power  is  necessarily  for  the  time,  the  one  en- 
joying the  corrupt  fruit  resulting  from  a  mere  contest  for  spoils. 

Submission  to  party  government,  instead  of  a  government 
emanating  from  the  whole  body  of  citizens,  is  at  best  but  a 
government  by  a  majority  of  the  office-holders  of  the  domi- 
nant party  ;  and  the  evils  of  the  system  is  shown  conclusively 
in  every  legislative  hall  throughout  the  land.  Not  a  law  can 
be  passed,  not  a  measure  adopted,  not  an  order  granted,  not 
even  can  the  legislative  body  be  organized,  without  submitting 
each  and  every  question  to  a  party  caucus.  The  decision  of  a 
party  caucus  is  final.  To  oppose  the  caucus  decision  is  treason 
to  party,  a  crime  which,  if  not  directly  punishable  by  a  written 
law,  may  be  made  more  offensive  than  treason  to  one's 
country.  For  in  truth,  an  oath  of  office  violated  would  be 
much  less  certain  to  be  punished,  than  would  such  treason  to 
a  party  be  finally  followed  by  an  ejectment  from  the  party 
favor. 

Our  National  House  of  Representatives  cannot  select  its 
speaker  by  a  direct  vote  of  the  whole  body,  but  must  first  sub- 
mit to  the  caucus  determination  arrived  at  by  a  majority  of 
the  dominant  party,  even  though  a  majority  of  the  whole  body 
of  representatives  would  most  certainly  have  preferred  quite 
an  opposite  candidate.  So  it  is  throughout  with  all  legislation, 
for  party  lines  must  be  kept  distinct,  and  submission  to  the 
caucus  of  the  dominant  party  becomes  the  law  of  the  land. 
The  same  contest  between  the  two  parties  is  found  in  all  our 
legislative  bodies,  National,  State,  and  Municipal,  and  as  the 


51 

two  bodies  comprising  our  legislative  assemblies  may  often  be 
found  with  one  party  dominant  in  one  branch,  and  the  other 
party  dominant  in  the  other,  each  and  every  question  having 
the  least  general  significance,  may  be  lost  from  an  inability  to 
agree.  When  State  legislatures  thus  composed,  are  called 
upon  to  elect  a  United  States  Senator,  or  apportion  the  State 
into  representative  or  other  districts  ;  or  decide  upon  any  ques- 
tion indeed,  where  the  vantage  ground  of  parties  is  in  the  is- 
sue, a  "  dead  lock  "  ensues  ;  which  no  amount  of  reasoning, 
or  warning  of  popular  disgust  or  shame  may  be  able  to  un- 
loose. 

All  legislation  is  made  to  take  a  partisan  course,  as  if  a  per- 
manent autocracy  was  vested  in  the  dominant  party  then  in 
power. 

The  rule  of  party  reaches  as'  well  to  municipal  affairs,  and 
here  not  less  than  in  State  and  National  issues,  is  the  will  of 
the  party  caucus  the  fiat  of  authority.  Throughout  National, 
State,  Municipal,  and  even  to  the  most  subordinate  of  our  lo- 
cal organizations,  the  rule  of  party  is  the  power  in  making  all 
appointments  to  office  in  the  civil  service  of  the  country. 
The  power  of  appointing  men  to  office,  the  opportunity  to  fa- 
vor men  by  partisan  legislation,  besides  the  innumerable  ad- 
vantages with  which  a  partisan  administration  may  in  one  way 
or  another  favor  its  party  workers,  are  among  the  spoils  and 
plunder  made  use  of  in  rewarding  the  victors  in  every  party 
strife. 

Not  an  issue  relating  to  our  government,  extending  through 
its  National,  State,  Municipal  and  local  sub-divisions,  affecting 
alike  its  legislative,  executive  and  judicial  departments,  but  that 
is  influenced  and  affected  to  at  least  some  extent  by  the  sel- 
fish spirit  of  party.  The  election  of  a  President  of  the 
nation  is  a  party  contest,  and  the  election  of  every  officer  from 
the  President  to  a  town  constable  inclusive,  is  a  similar  party 
contest.  Every  legislative  act  is  forced  to  accept  a  partisan 
signification.  Executive  officers  favor  party  workers  and  dis- 
tribute to  them  the  spoils  of  office  ;  while  even  judges  and  ju- 
ries have  not  always  measured  justice  uninfluenced  by  parti- 


52 

san  surroundings.  What,  though  the  shame  has  been  about 
us,  we  have  not  been  entirely  unconscious  of  our  guilt ! 

If  one  permanent  party  contending  against  another  perma- 
nent party  has  debased  our  patriotism,  has  made  the  ends  of 
government  a  selfish  scheme  for  plunder,  with  spoils  as  rich 
as  the  most  covetous  grasp  could  desire  them,  then,  has  the 
contests  for  office  and  favor  within  the  party  lines  been  a  still 
greater  scene  of  political  strife  and  of  personal  selfishness  and 
its  corruption. 

It  has  already  been  defined  how  the  personal  contests  for 
the  party  nominations  have  been  conducted  by  the  delegate 
system  and  its  series  of  caucuses,  conventions,  conferences  and 
so  on.  It  would  be  impossible  here  to  more  than  outline  the 
personal  strivings,  the  selfish  schemings,  the  corrupt  bar- 
gainings, and  the  deceptive  and  debasing  methods  made  use 
of  to  secure  the  coveted  prizes  of  office.  And  surely,  the  duty 
of  reviewing  them  is  a  most  distasteful  one. 

The  organizing  into  permanent  parties,  at  once  places  the 
party  voters  under  the  management  or  direction  of  a  series  of 
party  officers  and  office-seekers.  The  securing  of  a  party 
office,  as  a  committee-man,  and  each  step  higher  in  the  service 
of  the  party  management,  becomes  a  stepping-stone  and  an 
advancement  from  which  may  be  demanded  future  political 
preferment.  The  party  officers  are  not  alone  its  managers, 
for  successful  political  schemers  and  workers,  office-seekers 
with  money  to  bestow,  and  not  least,  an  office  holding  com- 
munity already  in  power  and  having  many  favors  to  distribute, 
are  reckoned  high  among  the  managers  of  a  political  party. 
Standing  highest  in  the  order  of  political  authority  and  power 
as  a  party  manager  in  his  State,  is  very  often  the  person  hold- 
ing the  position  of  United  States  Senator.  A  number  of  these 
United  States  Senators  representing  a  few  of  the  most  popu- 
lous States,  may  be  regarded  as  an  oligarchy  of  power  in  the 
management  of  the  party  plans.  From  these  high  in  power  a 
series  representing  office-holders  and  office-seekers  of  every 
grade,  party  officers,  and  party-workers,  and  finally  la- 
borers and  employes  receiving  some  grade  of  partisan  favor  or 
promises  of  favor, — are  all  expected  to  work  and  vote  in  the 


53 

interest  of  those  whom  the  party  designates  as  its  candidates 
for  official  recognition. 

The  claims  for  party  recognition  arouses  often  the  most  bit- 
ter personal  contests,  and  it  is  here  the  ambitious  office- 
seeker,  anxious  to  manipulate  and  control  all  the  opportuni- 
ties for  favor  or  vantage  ground  afforded  by  the  delegate  sys- 
tem of  reaching  a  party  nomination,  may  find  his  best  laid 
schemes  thwarted  in  a  moment,  by  the  decree  of  some  office- 
holder or  office-seeker  high  in  the  councils  of  the  party  man- 
agement. 

A  United  States  Senator,  directed  by  the  Constitution  as  one 
of  the  counsellors  in  confirming  the  highest  appointments  to 
office  made  by  the  President  of  the  United  States,  becomes  a 
controlling  power  in  directing  the  party  nominations  through- 
out. Becomes  in  fact,  the  recognized  great  party  "  boss,"  to 
whom  minor  bosses,  and  party  workers,  and  party  followers 
acknowledge  the  most  servile  allegiance. 

A  United  States  Senator  may,  by  directing  through  his  mi- 
nor "  bosses,"  the  party  officers  and  party  workers  throughout 
his  State,  "  set  up  "  and  secure  the  election  of  such  delegates 
to  primary  conventions,  or  so  manipulate  the  caucuses  and 
conferences  and  conventions  as  to  secure  the  nomination  and 
election  of  such  State  Assemblymen  and  State  Senators,  as 
will  in  return  secure  for  him  a  re-election  to  the  United  States 
Senate.  The  position  of  United  States  Senator  is  thus  made 
nearer  one  of  autocratic  power,  and  he  is  better  enabled  to 
provide  for  his  own  re-election  than  any  other  officer  in  our 
government.  Hence  he  is  well  recognized  as  the  great  party 
"boss." 

A  few  of  these  United  States  Senators  from  the  more  popu- 
lous States,  acting  in  concert,  through  their  great  influence 
and  the  opportunities  for  official  favor  under  their  control,  are 
enabled  further,  each  to  so  order  the  selection  of  primary  dele- 
gates, and  through  them  the  selection  of  secondary  delegates, 
and  finally,  each  senator  may  so  control  the  delegation  from 
his  State  sent  to  the  party  National  Nominating  Convention, 
that,  by  means  of  the  u  unit  rule,"  and  his  acknowledged  great 
influence,  he  becomes  the  sole  possessor  of  the  voice  of  his 


54 

State  in  making  the  party  presidential  nomination.  A  presi- 
dential candidate  thus  placed  before  the  people  by  a  few  of 
these  United  States  Senators  so  acting  in  concert,  and  stand- 
ing for  the  support  of  the  dominant  party,  becomes  when 
elected  to  office  the  pliant  servant  of  these  few  men,  to  do 
their  bidding,  and  is  forced  by  what  is  known  as  "  senatorial 
courtesy,"  to  accept  their  disposal  of  the  appointments  to  the 
high  offices,  and  their  disposal  of  the  vast  political  spoils  and 
favors  of  government  patronage. 

The  system  of  party  management  reaches  every  grade  of 
official  position,  and  the  offices  which  are  filled  by  appoint- 
ment are  made  to  purchase  a  control  of  those  which  are  in- 
tended to  be  elective,  by  using  these  appointments  with  other 
spoils  to  repay  the  efforts  of  party  managers,  party  delegates, 
and  party  workers.  Hence  not  only  the  offices  of  the  State 
and  Nation,  but  including  those  of  purely  municipal  and  local 
concern  are  made  to  contribute  to  one  vast  and  complex  sys- 
tem of  selfish  partisan  and  personal  aggrandizement.  Each  local 
"  boss  "  secures  his  share  in  the  spoils  of  public  office  and  pub- 
lic plunder  by  servile  obedience  to  his  superiors,  and  by  vigor- 
ously managing  the  party  affairs  within  his  allotted  realm. 
Each  in  turn  to  have  success  must  act  harmoniously,  and 
together  by  manipulating  that  great  engine  of  political  evil — 
the  delegate  system,  or  party  "machine" — they  have  most  suc- 
cessfully defied  and  debarred  the  honest  masses  of  citizens 
from  having  any  just  part  in  their  governmental  affairs. 

There  is  not  only  a  common  interest  existing  between  office- 
holders and  office-seekers  and  party  officers  and  party  mana- 
gers throughout,  but  they  become  a  closely  organized  ring 
within  the  party,  distinct  from  the  great  mass  of  party  followers. 
This  ring  of  office-seekers  are  in  truth  a  secret  conclave,  in- 
triguing to  control  the  party  nominations,  and  are  stimulated 
to  the  greatest  activity  where  the  party  following  is  strong 
enough  to  secure  for  them  a  final  election  to  office.  They  work 
together  in  the  closest  harmony  in  order  to  contribute  to  each 
other's  success,  and  are  firmly  united  in  their  one  purpose  by 
the  "  cohesive  power  of  public  plunder." 

It  has  already  been  shown,  how  this  ring  of  office-seekers 


55 

and  their  partisan  workers  secure  the  strategic  positions  in  the 
management  of  the  delegate  system,  and  how  they  are  aided 
by  the  illogical  nature  and  fallaciousness  of  this  complex 
system  of  delegating,  with  its  caucuses,  its  conventions,  its  con- 
ferences, its  unit  rules  and  so  on,  in  deceiving  the  party  follow- 
ing and  in  securing  the  party  nominations.  Their  next  aim  is 
to  masquerade  as  party  leaders,  where  they  loudly  proclaim 
that  "  fealty  to  party"  is  love  of  country,  that  the  acceptation 
of  the  party  candidate  is  true  loyalty  and  patriotism,  and  that 
to  "  kick"  against  the  party  nomination  is  the  worst  form  of 
treason  and  revolution.  This  ring  of  office-seekers  make  the 
party  "  platform,"  and  knowing  well  that  new  issues  disinte- 
grate a  party,  they  build  a  platform  mainly  upon  the  traditions 
of  the  party  they  seek  to  save  and  permanently  control ;  and 
appeal  to  all  the  former  prejudices  against  the  opposing  party 
in  order  to  keep  the  party  lines  intact.  Having  gained  the 
party  nominations,  "  fealty  to  party"  is  their  watchword,  and 
party  glamour  and  party  excitement  their  best  hope  for  party, 
or,  more  truthfully,  for  personal  success. 

All  office  holding  is  afforded  by  these  methods  and  these 
practices  an  autocratic  significance,  and  office-seeking  becomes 
a  life-long  profession.  Buying  and  trading  or  exchanging  fa- 
vors to  secure  the  support  of  the  few  men  entrusted  as  dele- 
gates, is  continually  practiced  by  corrupt  men  seeking  for  of- 
fice. While  if  such  men  were  forced  to  seek  office  directly 
from  the  hands  of  an  intelligent  community  of  voters,  having 
their  sovereign  rights  to  defend,  they  would  most  certainly 
and  justly  be  denied  and  rebuked.  So  long,  however,  as  of- 
fice-seekers may  gain  the  nomination  of  a  permanent  party 
from  the  hands  of  a  few  men  entrusted  as  delegates,  or,  what 
is  virtually  the  same  thing,  gain  an  election  from  the  hands  of 
a  few  men  entrusted  as  State  legislators  with  the  election  of 
United  States  Senators ;  and  so  long  as  a  nomination  by  a 
dominant  party  is  equivalent  to  an  election,  just  so  long  will 
selfish  and  scheming  men  strive  for  the  spoils  of  office  by 
promising  and  purchasing  these  few  men,  and  then,  after  gain- 
ing office  will  use  a  part  of  these  spoils  to  repay  these  dele- 


56 

gates  and  legislators  and  party  workers  for  the  aid  and  sup- 
port given  them. 

Instead  of  our  having  built  up  a  political  structure  in  de- 
fence of  political  freedom,  such  as  promised  our  fathers  the 
largest  share  of  success  in  reward  for  their  long  struggle  for 
liberty,  we  have  developed  a  method  in  the  management  of 
our  government  by  submitting  to  permanent  party  control,  or 
virtually,  to  a  series  of  party  "  bosses  "  who  manipulate  the 
delegate  system,  or  party  "  machine''  and,  thus  gaining  office, 
make  u  spoils  "  and  plunder  out  of  the  power  given  them  to 
make  appointments  to  office,  out  of  special  legislation,  and  out 
of  executive  as  well  as  judicial  favors,  until  this  method  and 
this  management  has  developed  the  most  autocratic  and  sel- 
fish schemes  for  the  encouragement  of  public  plundering  and 
for  securing  personal  power.  From  a  theory  of  self-govern- 
ment which  promises  to  mankind  the  best  results  that  intelli- 
gence and  patriotism  can  devise,  we  have  arrived  at  a  practice 
which,  were  it  not  for  popular  sentiment  holding  it  in  check, 
would  prove  itself  the  most  autocratic  and  oppressive  that  the 
selfishness  of  men  could  conceive  of.  For,  instead  of  the  peo- 
ple having  an  opportunity  to  select  for  themselves  true  repre- 
sentatives, it  has  come  to  be  their  whole  duty  to  defend  the 
offices  of  the  government  from  the  rapaciousness  and  usurpa- 
tions of  an  organized  ring  of  scheming  and  professional  of- 
fice-seekers. 

Surely,  indeed,  the  people  of  this  country  must  soon  learn 
that  allegiance  to  party  is  not  love  of  country ;  that  partisan 
"  stalwartism"  is  not  patriotism  ;  that  political  scheming  and 
political  trickery  is  not  statesmanship  ;  and  that  party  supre- 
macy is  not  the  highest  aim  for  our  country's  good.  That  the 
claim  to  all  the  good  that  pertains  to  our  government,  and 
which  really  originates  from  honest  patriots  among  the  people, 
belongs  to  the  party  credit,  is  of  the  boldest  form  of  effrontery 
and  of  demagogism. 

These  recountings  of  the  evils  of  permanent  party  organiza- 
tion, and  of  the  evils  of  the  delegate  system  made  use  of  in 
making  party  nominations,  yet  meagre  when  compared  to  the 
great  mass  of  evil  resulting  from  this  most  unnatural  and 


57 

illogical  method  of  conducting  our  government,  would  not, 
even  if  all  were  told,  bring  any  new  intelligence  to  the  people, 
were  they  not  accompanied  by,  and  merely  offered  to  make 
plain  the  great  significance  of  the  only  true  method  of  remov- 
ing them.  The  remedy  for  all  these  evils  at  once,  has  already 
been  pointed  out  and  shown  to  exist  in  the  simple  plan  of  so 
conducting  our  elections  by  one  direct  vote  of  the  whole  body  of 
voters,  that  truly  representative  men  shall  be  determined  upon 
to  fill  the  offices  of  the  government  by  the  will  of  a  concurring 
majority  of  these  voters.  So  that,  instead  of  being  governed 
by  mere  political  schemers  and  office-seekers,  we  may  have 
true  statesmen  to  act  as  wise  servants  of  the  people.  So  that 
indeed,  we  may  have  an  honest  government  economically  ad- 
ministered, a  true  "  government  of  the  people,  by  the  people, 
and  for  the  people." 

I  cannot  refrain  from  presenting  here  some  of  the  most 
prophetic  utterances,  made  use  of  by  the  great  Father  of  his 
country,  as  showing  how  early  the  evils  of  permanent  party 
organizations  were  recognized  in  the  history  of  our  govern- 
ment. To  quote  somewhat  at  length  from  Gen.  Washington's 
farewell  address,  will  afford  an  opportunity  to  compare  the 
wisdom  of  his  language  with  the  realizations  of  less  than  a 
century  which  has  since  elapsed. 

Gen.  Washington  said : 

"  In  contemplating  the  causes  which  may  disturb  our  Union, 
it  occurs  as  a  matter  of  serious  concern,  that  any  ground 
should  have  been  furnished  for  characterizing  parties  by  geo- 
graphical discriminations — Northern  and  Southern — Atlantic 
and  Western  ;  whence  designing  men  may  endeavor  to  excite 
a  belief  that  there  is  a  real  difference  of  local  interests  and 
views.  One  of  the  expedients  of  party  to  acquire  influence 
within  particular  districts,  is  to  misrepresent  the  opinions  and 
aims  of  other  districts.  You  cannot  shield  yourselves  too  much 
against  the  jealousies  and  heart-burnings  which  spring  from 
these  misrepresentations  ;  they  tend  to  render  alien  to  each 
other  those  who  ought  to  be  bound  together  by  paternal  affec- 
tion. .  . 

"  To  the  efficacy  and  permanancy  of  your  Union  a  govern- 


58 

ment  of  the  whole  is  indispensible.  No  alliance,  however 
strict  between  the  parties,  can  be  an  adequate  substitute  ;  they 
must  inevitably  experience  the  infractions  and  interruptions 
which  all  alliances,  in  all  time,  have  experienced.  Sensible  of 
this  momentous  truth,  you  have  improved  upon  your  first 
essay,  by  the  adoption  of  a  Constitution  of  government,  better 
calculated  than  your  former  for  an  intimate  union,  and  for  the 
efficacious  management  of  your  common  concerns.  This  gov- 
ernment, the  offspring  of  our  own  choice,  uninfluenced  and 
unawed — adopted  upon  full  investigation  and  mature  de- 
liberation, completely  free  in  its  principles,  in  the  distri- 
bution of  its  powers — uniting  security  with  energy,  and 
containing  within  itself  a  provision  for  its  own  amendment, 
has  a  just  claim  to  your  confidence  and  your  support.  Re- 
spect for  its  authority,  compliance  with  its  laws,  acquiescence 
in  its  measures,  are  duties  enjoined  by  the  fundamental  maxims 
of  true  liberty.  The  basis  of  our  political  system  is  the  right 
of  the  people  to  make  and  to  alter  their  Constitutions  of  gov- 
ernment;  but  the  Constitution  which  at  any  time  exists,  till 
changed  by  an  explicit  and  authentic  act  of  the  whole  people, 
is  sacredly  obligatory  upon  all.  The  very  idea  of  the  power  and 
right  of  the  people  to  establish  government,  presupposes  the 
duty  of  every  individual  to  obey  the  established  government. 

"  All  obstruction  to  the  execution  of  laws,  all  combinations 
and  associations  under  whatever  plausible  character,  with  the 
real  design  to  direct,  control,  counteract,  or  awe  the  regular 
deliberation  and  action  of  the  constituted  authorities,  are  de- 
structive to  this  fundamental  principle,  and  of  fatal  tendency. 
They  serve  to  organize  faction,  to  give  it  an  artificial  and 
extraordinary  force,  to  put  in  the  place  of  the  delegated  will 
of  the  nation,  the  will  of  a  party,  often  a  small  but  artful  and 
enterprising  minority  of  the  community ;  and,  according  to  the 
alternate  triumphs  of  different  parties,  to  make  the  public  ad- 
ministration the  mirror  of  the  ill-concerted  and  incongruous 
projects  of  fashion,  rather  than  the  organ  of  consistent  and 
wholesome  plans,  digested  by  common  counsels  and  modified 
by  mutual  interests. 

"  However  combinations   or  associations  of  the  above  de- 


59 

scription  may  now  and  then  answer  popular  ends,  they  are 
likely,  in  the  course  of  time  and  things,  to  become  potent  en- 
gines, by  which  cunning,  ambitious,  and  unprincipled  men  will 
be  enabled  to  subvert  the  power  of  the  people,  and  to  usurp 
for  themselves  the  reins  of  government ;  destroying,  afterwards, 
the  very  engines  which  had  lifted  them  to  unjust  dominion." 

Since  these  words  were  uttered,  our  country  has  experienced 
a  government  largely  administered  by  one  or  the  other  of  two 
contending  parties.  That  we  have  had  bitter  factional  strifes 
and  have  experienced  the  evils  of  geographically  divided  parties, 
the  history  we  have  made  more  than  fully  attests.  And,  it  yet 
remains  for  future  historians  to  unravel,  how  much  of  the  bit- 
terness and  animosity — the  crimination  and  recrimination, — 
which  finally  led  to  our  recent  terrible  and  prolonged  civil  war, 
should  be  traced  to  the  ambition  and  designs  of  unprincipled 
men  willing  to  lead  in  party  organization,  and  not  unwilling,  for 
the  sake  of  acquiring  power  and  influence,  to  misrepresent  the 
opinions  and  aims  of  others,  or,  to  use  any  and  all  the  means 
at  their  command,  to  engender  jealousies  and  even  to  create 
open  and  bloody  strife.  The  true  historian  inquiring  into  the 
subtle  influences  and  causes  of  that  prolonged  and  bloody  war 
between  the  people  of  a  common  country,  will  find  much  less 
of  a  field  of  inquiry,  in  determining  which  of  the  two  great 
geographically  divided  parties  opposing  each  other,  was  the 
greater  in  the  wrong,  than  he  will  find  awaiting  him,  a  field  of 
inquiry  into  how  much  that  war  was  engendered  and  prolonged, 
by  animosities  and  by  selfishness  developed  and  stimulated 
into  a  persistent  existence  by  the  ambition  and  schemings  of 
unprincipled  leaders.  And  still  further,  as  the  history  of  party 
organizations  since  the  great  war,  is  written  on,  will  the  future 
reader  be  enabled  to  recognize  how  well  the  true  Father  of  his 
country  prophesied,  when  he  warned  us,  that,  "  party  organiza- 
tions are  likely  in  the  course  of  time  and  things  to  become 
potent  engines  by  which  cunning,  ambitious,  and  unprincipled 
men  will  be  enabled  to  subvert  the  power  of  the  people,  and 
to  usurp  for  themselves  the  reins  of  government." 

Continuing  with  his  solicitude  for  the  future   welfare  of  his 
countrymen,  General  Washington  said : 


60 

" 1  have  already  intimated  to  you  the  danger  of  parties  in 
the  state  with  particular  reference  to  the  founding  of  them  on 
geographical  discriminations.  Let  me  now  take  a  more  com- 
prehensive view,  and  warn  you,  in  the  most  solemn  manner, 
against  the  baneful  effects  of  the  spirit  of  party  generally. 

"  This  spirit,  unfortunately,  is  inseparable  from  our  nature, 
having  its  root  in  the  strongest  passions  of  the  human  mind. 
It  exists  under  different  shapes  in  all  governments,  more  or  less 
stifled,  controlled,  or  repressed  ;  but  in  those  of  the  popular 
form  it  is  seen  in  its  greatest  rankness,  and  is  truly  their  worst 
enemy. 

uThe  alternate  domination  of  one  faction  over  another, 
sharpened  by  the  spirit  of  revenge,  natural  to  party  dissensions, 
which,  in  different  ages  and  countries,  has  perpetrated  the 
most  horrid  enormities,  is  itself  a  frightful  despotism.  But 
this  leads,  at  length,  to  a  more  formal  and  permanent  despotism. 
The  disorders  and  miseries  which  result,  gradually  incline  the 
minds  of  men  to  seek  security  and  repose  in  the  absolute 
power  of  an  individual ;  and  sooner  or  later,  the  chief  of  some 
prevailing  faction,  more  able  or  more  fortunate  than  his  com- 
petitors, turns  this  disposition  to  the  purposes  of  his  own  ele- 
vation on  the  ruins  of  public  liberty. 

"  Without  looking  forward  to  an  extremity  of  this  kind 
(which,  nevertheless,  ought  not  to  be  entirely  out  of  sight),  the 
common  and  continual  mischiefs  of  the  spirit  of  party  are 
sufficient  to  make  it  the  interest  and  duty  of  a  wise  people  to 
discourage  and  restrain  it. 

"It  serves  always  to  distract  the  public  councils,  and  en- 
feeble the  public  administration.  It  agitates  the  community 
with  ill-founded  jealousies  and  false  alarms  ;  kindles  the  ani- 
mosity of  one  part  against  another  ;  foments,  occasionally,  riot 
and  insurrection.  It  opens  the  door  to  foreign  influence  and 
corruption,  which  find  a  facilitated  access  to  the  government 
itself,  through  the  channels  of  party  passions.  Thus  the  policy 
and  the  will  of  one  country  are  subjected  to  the  policy  and 
will  of  another. 

"There  is  an  opinion  that  parties,  in  free  countries,  are 
useful  checks  upon  the  administration  of  the  government,  and 


61 

serve  to  keep  alive  the  spirit  of  liberty.  This,  within  certain 
limits,  is  probably  true ;  and  in  governments  of  a  monarchical 
cast,  patriotism  may  look  with  indulgence,  if  not  with  favor, 
upon  the  spirit  of  party.  But  in  those  of  the  popular  character, 
in  governments  purely  elective,  it  is  a  spirit  not  to  be  en- 
couraged. From  their  natural  tendency,  it  is  certain  there  will 
always  be  enough  of  that  spirit  for  every  salutory  purpose. 
And  there  being  constant  danger  of  excess,  the  effort  ought  to 
be,  by  force  of  public  opinion,  to  mitigate  and  assuage  it.  A 
fire  not  to  be  quenched,  it  demands  a  uniform  vigilance  to  pre- 
vent its  bursting  into  a  flame,  lest,  instead  of  warming,  it 
should  consume." 

I  have  quoted  so  much  and  at  length  of  this  great  man's 
wise  and  prophetic  words,  not  more  for  the  purpose  of  analyz- 
ing their  significance  and  their  application  to  the  history  we 
have  made  since  they  were  uttered,  than  to  present  them  as  a 
most  logical  and  forcible  warning,  which  may  yet  be  applied  to 
the  dangers  from  permanent  party  organizations  continuing 
among  us. 

Had  the  framers  of  our  National  Constitution  known  how  to 
reach  the  will  of  a  majority  of  the  whole  people  by  a  single 
direct  election,  and  without  resorting  to  the  delegate  system,  it 
is  possible  that  many  of  the  evils  and  corrupt  practices  which 
have  so  often  thwarted  the  success  of  that  great  national  idea, 
of  a  government  by  a  majority  of  the  whole  people,  would 
have  been  averted.  Without  a  knowledge  of  the  true  solution 
of  this  problem  of  finding  the  will  of  a  concurring  majority  of 
the  whole  body  of  voters,  there  has  been  a  recourse  to  the 
complex  system  of  delegating,  and  as  a  necessary  part  of  the 
machinery  in  order  to  conduct  this  system,  there  have  been  de- 
veloped, permanent  party  organizations  ;  while  the  evils  of  per- 
manent party  organizations  in  turn,  have  developed  their 
rankest  growth  in  our  midst. 

Since  the  beginning,  party  conflicts  have  been  unceasing ;  a 
great  civil  war  has  been  waged  and  ended ;  and  men  are  still 
contesting  for  power  and  place  and  for  the  opportunity  to  con- 
trol the  patronage  of  the  government  of  this  vast  and  rapidly 
growing  nation  of  people.  As  a  people,  we  have  been  favored 


62 

by  resources  and  opportunities  beyond  all  comparison.  We 
have  grown  wealthy  and  intelligent  and  have  advanced  in  most 
everything  that  compares  the  greatness  of  one  nation  of  people 
with  another.  In  all,  save  in  the  science  of  government  and 
in  the  defence  of  our  political  freedom,  have  we  advanced 
more  rapidly  than  has  any  other  nation  upon  the  earth.  In 
the  management  of  our  free  inheritance,  however,  what  have 
we  added?  Surely  but  little,  except  at  a  cost  which  would  be 
fabulous  indeed,  were  it  the  result  of  a  monarchy.  We  have 
developed  and  conducted  a  method  of  government,  of  which 
we  may  claim  that  it  has  grown  great  and  cumbersome,  and 
not  a  little  oppressive,  and  which  has  succeeded  in  keeping  an 
economical  and  industrious  people  constantly  agitated  and  an- 
noyed, with  the  ill-founded  jealousies  and  conflicts  of  partisan 
leaders  and  office-seekers.  We  have,  not  added  in  the  least  to 
the  patriotism  and  honesty  of  our  fathers,  and,  if  we  have  suc- 
ceeded in  maintaining  our  right  to  civil  and  political  liberty,  we 
have  developed  a  method  in  our  efforts  at  conducting  a  govern- 
ment, which  should  protect  and  defend  these  rights,  but, 
which  has  indeed,  thus  far  debased  the  high  hopes  and  proud 
inspirations,  always  so  fondly  promised  to  a  true  government 
by  popular  rule.  We  have,  indeed,  so  far  failed  in  establishing 
a  truly  representative  government  wherein  the  rights  of  all  are 
equally  protected,  that  ours  now  stands  before  the  world  to  be 
judged  by  the  side  of  monarchies  and  aristocracies  and  other 
autocratic  governments  wherein  the  masses  are  in  constant 
conflict  with  the  usurpations  and  oppressions  of  the  governing 
powers. 

That  the  people  are  awakening  to  these  truths,  the  writings 
and  warnings  of  honest  and  intelligent  thinkers  among  our 
citizens  are  daily  bearing  more  and  more  evidence.  It  would 
be  impossible  here,  to  trace  from  the  beginning  the  public  ex- 
pressions of  leading  men  who  have  pointed  out  the  defects  and 
evils  of  the  successive  dynasties  of  permanent  party  organiza- 
tions, which  have  held  sway  almost  continuously  since  our 
government  has  existed.  Nor  is  it  necessary,  for  all  that  has  been 
said,  and  all  that  has  been  done,  either  in  the  defence  of  parties, 
or  in  an  arraignment  of  them,  has  been  in  ignorance  that  it 


63 

was  possible  to  solve  the  first  problem  which  arises  in  con- 
ducting a  free  government,  without  resorting  to,  or  submitting 
to  permanently  opposing  party  organizations.  Hence  to  point 
out  the  true  intent  and  signification  of  a  truly  representative 
government,  such  as  was  proposed  and  defended  at  the  begin- 
ing  by  Washington  and  other  unselfish  patriots ;  and  then  to 
show,  that  the  election  of  such  men  as  truly  represent  a  ma- 
jority of  the  whole  people  may  be  with  certainty  effected, 
without  resorting  to  the  delegate  system,  and  without  resorting 
to  permanent  party  organizations  ;  and  hence,  without  submit- 
ting to  the  evils  and  corrupt  practices  belonging  to  these 
methods,  has  been  the  aim,  and  has  afforded  the  sufficient  pur- 
pose for  the  presentation  of  this  work. 


CHAPTER  V. 

THE  PRESIDENT  AND    VICE-PRESIDENT    OF   THE   UNITED    STATES    SHOULD 
BE  ELECTED  AT  ONE    DIRECT    ELECTION    BY    THE 
WHOLE    PEOPLE. 

AND, 

UNITED  STATES  SENATORS    SHOULD    BE    ELECTED   AT    ONE    DIRECT    ELEC- 
TION BY  THE  PEOPLE  OF  THE  STATE. 

In  presenting  a  proposition  which  contemplates  a  change  or 
an  amendment  of  our  National  Constitution,  it  is  well  to  con- 
sider : — 

First,  The  exact  intent  and  purpose  of  the  clause  or  parts 
of  the  instrument  to  which  the  proposed  change  applies. 

Secondly,  To  make  sure  that  the  existing  language,  or,  that 
the  methods  which  the  Constitution  directs,  fail  to  secure  that 
intent. 

And  finally,  To  be  equally  certain,  that  the  proposed  change 
will  better  secure  the  ends  aimed  at,  or  else  secure  an  end, 
still  more  in  harmony  with  the  great  purpose  of  establishing 
a  truly  representative  government  emanating  from  the  peo- 
ple's will. 

To  discover  the  true  intent  of  the  founders  of  our  Constitu- 
tion, no  better  means  is  afforded  than  to  analyze  carefully  the 
language  used  by  them  during  its  consideration,  and  leading  to 
its  adoption. 

That  the  authors  and  framers  of  the  Constitution  were 
divided  in  sentiment,  and,  that  the  language  of  the  instrument 
shows  the  evidence  of  its  being  a  compromise  upon  questions 
establishing  the  source  of  governmental  authority,  or,  upon 
the  methods  it  directs  for  electing  the  superior  officers  of  the 
government,  has  afforded  constitutional  reviewers  and  ex- 


65 

pounders,  opportunities  to  give  it  varied  interpretations,  ac- 
cording as  they  have  sympathized  with  the  sentiments  of  one 
or  another  of  the  convention  that  framed  it.  But  it  must  be 
remembered  that  it  was  the  people  who  ordained  the  Constitu- 
tion, and,  whether  or  not,  we  accede  to  the  literal  language  of 
its  text,  the  true  signification  of  its  spirit  and  purpose  is  that 
which  is  given  it  at  any  time  by  the  people  of  the  nation. 

The  spirit  or  intent  of  the  Constitution  as  embodied  in  its 
preamble,  undoubtedly  makes  the  people  the  source  of  all 
governmental  authority,  for  it  says,  that,  "  We  the  people  of 
the  United  States" — for  certain  purposes  named — "  do  ordain 
and  establish  this  Constitution  for  the  United  States  of  America." 
As  the  people  through  their  representatives,  were  thus  ac- 
knowledged to  have  ordained  and  established  the  Constitution, 
and,  as  they  have  also  the  power  to  amend  it,  and  still  further, 
since  the  spirit  of  popular  rule  has  been  so  fully  aroused,  it  is 
indeed  safe  at  this  time  to  assume,  that  this  nation  of  people 
recognize  in  themselves  the  only  true  source  of  all  govern- 
mental authority.  And  to  assume  further,  that,  whatever 
duties  the  people  may  delegate  to  others,  it  is  because  the 
method  is  supposed  to  be  a  necessity,  or  else  a  matter  of  ex- 
pediency. 

*  At  the  Convention  which  met  to  frame  a  Constitution  for 
the  United  States,  the  delegates  from  Virginia  under  the 
guidance  of  Madison  had  prepared  "a  plan  for  a  national 
government."  This  plan  formed  the  basis  or  a  starting  point 
for  the  erection  of  the  new  Constitution.  It  contained  among 
other  propositions,  one,  that — " '  The  national  legislature 
ought  to  consist  of  two  branches,  of  which  the  members  of 
the  first  or  democratic  house  ought  to  be  elected  by  the  peo- 
ple of  the  several  states  ;  of  the  second,  by  those  of  the  first, 
out  of  persons  nominated  by  the  individual  legislatures.1 " 
And  another  proposition  that  there  should  be, — u  '  A  national 
executive,  chosen  by  the  national  legislature,  etc.' " 

On  the  question  of  a  method  of  electing  the  two  branches 
of  the  legislature  coming  before  the  convention,  a  variety  of 

*  Notes  fram  Bancroft's  History  of  the  Constitution. 


66 

opinions  were  expressed  ;— "  '  Without  the  confidence  of  the 
people,'  said  James  Wilson  of  Pennsylvania,  ;  no  government, 
least  of  all  a  republican  government,  can  long  subsist ;  nor 
ought  the  weight  of  the  state  legislatures  to  be  increased  by 
making  them  the  electors  of  the  national  legislature.'  Madi- 
son, though  for  the  senate,  the  executive,  and  the  judiciary 
he  approved  of  refining  popular  appointments  by  successive 
4  filtrations,' " — THAT  is,  BY  DELEGATED  AUTHORITY, — "held  the 
popular  election  of  one  branch  of  the  national  legislature  in- 
dispensable to  every  plan  of  free  government." 

In  the  debates  of  the  convention  upon  the  question  of  how 
the  executive  of  the  United  States  should  be  chosen,  a  variety 
of  methods  were  proposed.  The  historian  recounts  these,  to 
wit : — "  Should  it  be  chosen  directly  by  the  people  ?  or  by 
electors  ?  or  by  state  legislatures  ?  or  by  the  executives  of  the 
states  ?  or  by  one  branch  of  the  national  legislature  ?  or  by 
both  branches  ?  And,  if  by  both,  by  joint  or  concurrent  bal- 
lot ?  or  by  lot  ?  

"Here  the  convention  marched  and  countermarched  for  want 
of  guides,"  says  Bancroft.  "Sherman,  controlled  by  the 
precedents  of  the  confederacy,  suggested  that : — '  the  legisla- 
ture are  the  best  judges  of  the  business  to  be  done  by  the 
executive,  and  should  be  at  liberty  from  time  to  time  to  ap- 
point one  or  more,  as  experience  may  dictate.' ' 

After  "  the  convention  had  agreed  to  clothe  the  executive 
'  with  power  to  carry  into  effect  the  national  laws  and  to  ap- 
point to  offices  in  cases  not  otherwise  provided  for,'  Wilson 
said :  '  Chimerical  as  it  may  appear  in  theory,  I  am  for  an 
election  by  the  people.  Experience  in  New  York  and  Massa- 
chusetts shows  that  an  election  of  the  first  magistrate  by  the 
people  at  large  is  both  a  convenient  and  a  successful  mode. 
The  objects  of  choice  in  such  cases  must  be  persons  whose 
merits  have  general  notoriety.'  '  I,'  replied  Sherman,  l  am  for 
its  appointment  by  the  national  legislature,  and  for  making  it 
absolutely  dependent  on  that  body  whose  will  it  is  to  execute. 
An  independence  of  the  executive  on  the  supreme  legislature 
is  the  very  essence  of  tyranny.' 

"How  to  choose  the  executive,"  continues  the  historian, 


67 

"  remained  the  perplexing  problem.  Wilson,  borrowing  an 
idea  from  the  constitution  of  Maryland,  proposed  that  electors 
chosen  in  districts  of  the  several  states  should  meet  and  elect 
the  executive  by  ballot,  but  not  from  their  own  body.  He 
deprecated  the  intervention  of  the  states  in  its  choice.  Mason 
favored  the  idea  of  choosing  the  executive  by  the  people ; 
Rutledge,  by  the  national  senate.  Gerry  set  in  a  clear  light  that 
the  election  by  the  national  legislature  would  keep  up  a  con- 
stant intrigue  between  that  legislature  and  the  candidates  ; 
nevertheless,  Wilson's  motion  was  at  that  time  supported  only 
by  Pennsylvania  and  Maryland  ;  and,  from  sheer  uncertainty 
what  else  to  do,  the  convention  left  the  choice  of  the  execu- 
tive to  the  national  legislature." 

On  the  question  whether  the  power  of  removal  of  the  exe- 
cutive should  be  given  to  the  national  legislature,  "  '  The  mak- 
ing the  executive  the  mere  creature  of  the  legislature,'  replied 
Mason,  '  is  a  violation  of  the  fundamental  principle  of  good 
government.' '' 

On  the  question  "  of  electing  the  first  branch  of  the  legisla- 
ture by  the  legislatures  of  the  states,  and  not  by  the  people," 
being  revived,  "  'Vigorous  authority,'  insisted  Wilson,  '  should 
flow  immediately  from  the  legitimate  source  of  all  authority, 
the  people.  Representation  ought  to  be  the  exact  transcript 
of  the  whole  society  ;  it  is  made  necessary  only  because  it  is 
impossible  for  the  people  to  act  collectively.'  .... 

"'Under  the  existing  confederacy,'  said  Mason,  '  congress 
represent  the  states,  and  not  the  people  of  the  states;  their 
acts  operate  on  the  states,  not  on  individuals.  In  the  new 
plan  of  government  the  people  will  be  represented  ;  they 
ought,  therefore,  to  choose  the  representatives.  Improper 
elections  in  many  cases  are  inseparable  from  republican 
governments.  But  compare,  these  with  the  advantage  of  this 
form,  in  favor  of  the  rights  of  the  people,  in  favor  of  human 
nature !'  .......... 

"  '  It  is  essential  to  the  democratic  rights  of  the  community,' 
said  Hamilton,  enouncing  a  principle  which  he  upheld  with 
unswerving  consistency,  '  that  the  first  branch  be  directly 
elected  by  the  people.'  '  The  democratic  principle,'  Mason  re- 


68 

peated,  l  must  actuate  one  part  of  the  government.  It  is  the 
only  security  for  the  rights  of  the  people.'  '  An  election  by 
the  legislature,' pleaded  Rutledge,  'would  be  a  more  refining 
process.'  '  The  election  of  the  first  branch  by  the  people,' 
said  Wilson,  '  is  not  the  corner-stone  only,  but  the  foundation 
of  the  fabric.' " 

On  recurring  to  the  subject,  the  historian  further  recounts, 
that: — "The  mode  of  electing  the  president  long  baffled  the 
convention  ;  and  was  reached  only  just  before  its  close.  .  . 

"  The  Virginia  plan  confided  the  choice  of  the  executive  to 
the  national  legislature.  '  An  election  by  the  national  legisla- 
ture,' objected  Gouverneur  Morris,  'will  be  the  work  of  intrigue, 
of  cabal,  of  corruption,  and  of  faction  ;  it  will  be  like  the  elec- 
tion of  a  pope  by  a  conclave  of  cardinals  ;  of  a  king  by  the 
diet  of  Poland  ;  real  merit  will  rarely  be  the  title  to  the  ap- 
pointment.' He  moved  for  an  election  by  the  '  citizens  of  the 
United  States.'  Wilson  insisted  on  an  election  by  the  people ; 
should  no  one  have  a  majority,  then,  and  then  only,  the  legis- 
lature might  decide  between  the  candidates.  On  a  vote  being 
taken  by  the  convention,  Pennsylvania  stood  alone  against 
nine  states."  ........ 

A  variety  of  objections  were  offered,  and  other  methods 
were  proposed.  Madison,  McGlurg  and  others  pointed  out, 
"  that  a  president  elected  by  the  national  legislature,  and  looking 

to  that  body  for  re-election,  would  be  its  dependent 

The  discussion  brought  the  convention  unanimously  to  the 
opinion  that  if  the  executive  was  to  be  chosen  by  the  national 
legislature,  he  ought  not  to  be  re-eligible." 

Madison  opposed  an  immediate  choice  by  the  people,  because, 
— "'the  right  of  suffrage  was  much  more  diffusive  in  the 
northern  states  than  in  the  southern  ;  and  that  the  latter 
would  have  no  influence  in  the  election  on  the  score  of 
negroes.'  To  meet  this  difficulty,  King  revived  Wilson's  propo- 
sition for  the  appointment  of  the  executive  by  electors  chosen 
by  the  people  expressly  for  the  purpose  ;  and  Madison  prompt- 
ly accepted  it  a's,  '  on  the  whole,  liable  to  fewest  objections.' ' 
But  the  convention  decided  for  the  time,  that — "the  national 
executive  should  be  appointed  by  electors,  proportionately  dis- 


69 

tributed  among  the  states  ;  and  that  the  electors  should  be 
chosen  by  the  state  legislatures So  the  conven- 
tion,"— continues  the  historian, — "  hoped  to  escape  from  the 
danger  of  a  corrupt  traffic  between  the  national  legislature  and 
candidates  for  the  executive  by  assemblying  in  one  place  one 
grand  electoral  college,  chosen  by  the  legislatures  of  the  several 
states  at  the  moment  for  the  sole  purpose  of  electing  that 
officer." 

To  this  plan  there  at  once  arose  the  objection  that  it  would 
be  impracticable  to  have  electors  come  together,  or,  that — 
"  *  the  first  characters  in  the  state  would  not  feel  sufficient 
motives  to  undertake  the  office.'  v  In  the  language  of  another 
member, — u  '  that  men  would  not  go  to  the  expense  and  extreme 
inconvenience  of  drawing  together  from  all  the  states  for  the 
single  purpose  of  electing  the  chief  magistrate.'  So  the  conven- 
tion in  the  weariness  of  vacillation,  returned  to  the  plan  of 
electing  the  national  executive  by  the  national  legislature.  .  . 

"  The  convention" — says  Bancroft, — "  was  now  like  a  pack 
of  hounds  in  full  chase,  suddenly  losing  the  trail.  It  fell  into 
an  anarchy  of  opinion,  and  one  crude  scheme  trod  on  the  heels 
of  another.  ......... 

"  Wilson,  seeing  no  way  of  introducing  a  direct  election  by 
the  people,  made  the  motion,  that  the  executive  should  be 
chosen  by  electors  to  be  taken  from  the  national  legislature  by 
lot.  Ellsworth  pointed  out  that  to  secure  a  candidate  for  re- 
election against  an  improper  dependence  on  the  legislature,  the 
choice  should  be  made  by  electors.  Madison  liked  best  an 
election  of  the  executive  by  the  qualified  part  of  the  people  at 
large.  '  Local  considerations,'  he  said,  '  must  give  way  to  the 
general  interest.  As  an  individual  from  the  southern  states,  I 
am  willing  to  make  the  sacrifice.' 

"  Dickinson  said :  '  Insuperable  objections  lie  against  an 
election  of  the  executive  by  the  national  legislature,  or  by  the 
legislatures  or  executives  of  the  states.  I  have  long  leaned 
toward  an  election  by  the  people,  which  I  regard  as  the 
best  and  the  purest  source.  Let  the  people  of  each 
state  choose  its  best  citizen,  and  out  of  the  thirteen  names 


70 

thus  selected  an  executive  magistrate  may  be  chosen,  either 
by  the  national  legislature  or  by  electors.1  .... 

"Mason  recapitulated  the  seven  different  ways  that  had 
been  proposed  of  electing  the  chief  magistrate.  And,  concluded 
that  an  election  by  the  national  legislature,  as  originally  pro- 
posed, was  the  best. 

"  Foremost  in  undiminished  disapproval  of  the  choice  of  the 
executive  by  the  legislature  were  Washington,  Madison,  Wilson, 

Gouverneur  Morris,  and  Gerry During  the  debate 

Gouverneur  Morris  had  declared :  '  Of  all  possible  modes  of 
appointing  the  executive,  an  election  by  the  people  is  the  best ; 
an  election  by  the  legislature  is  the  worst.'  ....  Daniel 
Carroll,  of  Maryland,  seconded  by  Wilson,  renewed  the  motion, 

that  he  should  be  elected  by  the  people Gouverneur 

Morris  set  forth  the  danger  of  legislative  tyranny  that  would 
follow  from  leaving  the  executive  dependent  on  the  legislature 
for  his  election  ;  he  dwelt  once  more  on  the  '  cabal  and  corrup- 
tion' which  would  attach  to  that  method  of  choice." 

The  subject  was  finally  "  referred  to  a  grand  committee  of 
one  from  each  state."  In  this  committee  it  was  "insisted 
that  the  eventual  election — in  case  a  majority  of  the  electors 
did  not  concur — should  be  made  by  the  senate  ;  and  this  was 
carried  by  a  coalition  of  aristocratic  tendencies  in  Gouverneur 
Morris  and  others  from  the  large  states  with  the  passion  of 
the  small  states  for  disproportionate  chances  for  power." 

In  the  report  of  this  committee  "  the  election  was  confided 
to  electors  to  be  appointed  in  each  state  as  its  legislature  might 
direct ;  and  to  be  equal  to  the  whole  number  of  its  senators 

and  representatives  in  congress The  electors  of 

each  state  were  to  meet  in  their  respective  states,  and  vote  by 
ballot  for  two  persons,  of  whom  one,  at  least,  should  not  be  an 
inhabitant  of  the  same  state  with  themselves.  The  results  of 
these  votes  were  to  be  sent  to  the  senate,  and  there  counted. 
1  The  person  having  the  greatest  number  of  these  shall  be  the 
president,  if  such  number  be  a  majority  of  that  of  the 
electors ;  and  if  there  be  more  than  one  who  has  such  a  ma- 
jority and  an  equal  number  of  votes,  then,  that  the  senate 
shall  choose  by  ballot  one  of  them  for  president ;  but  if  no 


71 

person  has  a  majority,  then,  from  the  five  highest  on  the  list, 
"  the  senate,"  shall  choose  by  ballot  the  president.'  .... 

"  Mason,  who  thought  the  insulated  electoral  colleges  would 
almost  never  unite  their  votes  on  one  man,  spoke  earnestly : 
1  The  plan  is  liable  to  this  strong  objection,  that  nineteen  times 
in  twenty  the  president  will  be  chosen  by  the  senate,  an  im- 
proper body  for  the  purpose.'  .  .  .  .  4  This  subject,'  said 
Wilson,  4  has  greatly  divided  the  house,  and  will  divide  the 
people.  It  is,  in  truth,  the  most  difficult  of  all  on  which  we 
have  had  to  decide.  I  have  never  made  up  an  opinion  on  it 
entirely  to  my  own  satisfaction.'  The  choice  by  electors  4  is, 
on  the  whole,  a  valuable  improvement  on  the  former  plan.  It 
gets  rid  of  cabal  and  corruption ;  and  continental  characters 
will  multiply  as  we  more  and  more  coalesce,  so  as  to  enable 
the  electors  in  every  part  of  the  union  to  know  and  judge  of 
them.  It  clears  the  way  for  a  discussion  of  the  question  of  the 
re-eligibility  of  the  president  on  its  own  merits,  which  the 
former  mode  of  election  seemed  to  forbid.  It  may,  however,  be 
better  to  refer  the  eventual  appointment  to  the  legislature  than 
to  the  senate,  and  to  confine  it  to  a  smaller  number  than  five 
of  the  candidates.' 

"  Sherman," — who  had  been  one  of  the  grand  committee, 
and  was  still  "  sedulously  supporting  the  chances  of  the  small 
states,  remarked,  that  if  the  legislature,  instead  of  the  senate, 
were  to  have  the  eventual  appointment  of  the  president,  it 
ought  to  vote  by  states. 

"  Wilson  spoke  with  singular  energy,  disapproving  alike  the 
eventual  choice  of  the  president  by  the  equal  vote  of  the 
states,  and  the  tendency  to  clothe  the  senate  with  special 
powers.  He  said,  *  I  am  obliged  to  consider  the  whole  as  hav- 
ing a  dangerous  tendency  to  aristocracy,  as  throwing  a  dan- 
gerous power  into  the  hands  of  the  senate.'  .... 

" '  The  mutual  connection  of  the  president  and  senate,'  said 
Hamilton,  'will  perpetuate  the  one  and  aggrandize  both.  I 
see  no  better  remedy  than  to  let  the  highest  number  of  ballots, 
whether  a  majority  or  not,  appoint  the  president.'  " 

The  convention  finally  decided,   "  to  transfer  the  eventual 


72 

choice   to  the  house  of  representatives  voting  by  states,  the 
representation  from  each  state  having  one  vote." 

From  this  very  brief  review  of  the  language  made  use  of  by 
those  whose  purposes  were  by  far  the  most  patriotic,  and  who 
were  foremost  in  the  work  of  framing  the  Constitution,  it  can- 
not be  doubted  but  that  they  hoped  to  establish  a  true  na- 
tional government  receiving  its  just  authority  from  the  whole 
people.  And,  that  while  its  measures  and  purposes  should 
apply  to  all  the  people  equally  in  their  National  relationships, 
it  should  not,  and  would  not  interfere  with  their  local  self- 
government,  either  as  states,  counties,  or  municipalities.  Time 
has  indeed  shown  that  these  sentiments  and  these  purposes 
have  persistently  prevailed,  and  at  this  time,  it  maybe  asserted 
that  "we,  the  people"  are  demanding  a  true  republican  gov- 
ernment, which  shall  be  conducted  by  honestly  selected  repre- 
sentatives of  the  people,  and,  in  the  interests  of  the  people  in 
its  every  part. 

Because  the  true  patriots  of  the  Convention  knew  of  no 
method  by  which  a  President  could  be  elected  by  a  "  direct 
vote  of  the  citizens  of  the  United  States,"  with  any  certainty  of 
reaching  concerted  action,  or  of  having  a  majority  concur 
upon  one  candidate,  they  were  forced  to  seek  some  body  of 
men  who  could  be  convened,  and  to  whom  this  duty  could  be 
delegated.  In  their  search  for  such  a  body,  they  were  met  by 
numerous  reasons  why  it  would  not  be  safe  to  entrust  the  elec- 
tion of  a  President  to  any  existing  legislative  body,  or  to  either 
of  those  they  were  about  to  create.  With  the  hope  of  evading 
these  dangers,  they  finally  proposed  to  submit  the  election  to 
an  independent  body  of  electors  chosen  expressly  for  the  pur- 
pose. It  was  then  believed  that  these  electors  or  delegates 
could  not  conveniently  meet  in  one  grand  convention  where 
they  might,  by  repeated  ballotings,  finally  reach  a  concurring 
majority ;  hence  the  framers  of  the  Constitution  were  forced  to 
arrange  for  the  meeting  of  these  electors  in  the  separate  states, 
and  then,  to  still  farther  provide  a  final  means  of  election,  by 
submitting  the  choices  made  by  these  separate  bodies  of  elec- 
tors, to  some  convened  body.  Of  these,  the  House  of  Repre- 
sentatives seemed  to  offer  the  fewest  of  evils. 


73 

It  must  be  admitted,  that  there  were  among  the  members  of 
the  Convention  that  met  to  frame  the  Constitution,  those  who 
were  less  patriotic  and  who  were  not  willing  to  entrust  the 
election  of  the  President  and  Vice-President,  and  the  election  of 
United  States  Senators  to  a  direct  vote  of  the  people.  There 
were  those,  indeed,  whose  persistent  and  selfish  demands, — 
that  an  equal  representation  should  be  given  to  the  smaller 
states,  and,  that  the  legislative  bodies  should  elect  the  Presi- 
dent,— showed  that  they  had  but  little  respect  for  a  government 
emanating  fairly  and  truly  from  the  popular  will. 

From  a  careful  analysis,  however,  it  is  not  more  evident 
that  the  final  methods  directed  by  the  Constitution,  for  the  elec- 
tion of  a  President  and  Vice-President,  and  for  the  election  of 
United  States  Senators,  were  the  result  of  a  willing  compromise 
on  the  part  of  those  who  held  to  the  democratic  plan  of  direct 
elections,  than,  that  these  members  were  forced  to  submit  to 
some  method  by  which  they  could  delegate  the  election  of 
these  high  officers  to  some  convened  body,  in  order  to  provide 
a  means  for  reaching  concerted  action.  Whatever  the  intent 
or  purpose  which  prevailed  then,  it  may  be  asserted  without 
fear  of  question,  that  the  idea  of  a  government  emanating  from 
the  direct  authority  of  the  people,  has  been  the  only  one  which 
has  survived  throughout ;  and  which  now,  furnishes  the  basis 
of  the  problem  in  conducting  our  republican  institutions. 

In  analyzing  still  further  the  use  or  purpose  of  electors,  and 
the  method  directed  by  the  Constitution  which  submits  the 
election  of  United  States  Senators  to  the  legislatures  of  the 
several  states,  we  are  forced  to  recognize  that  these  electors 
and  legislators  have  long  been  regarded  as  having  nothing 
more  than  the  significance  of  being  delegates  of  the  people. 
And,  that  like  delegates  they  may  be  either  instructed  or  left 
uninstructed. 

The  supposition  that  electors  would  be  appointed  or  elected, 
in  some  manner  as  the  "  legislature  of  a  state  might  direct," 
and  that  these  electors  uninstructed  would  be  permitted  to  de- 
termine upon  candidates  of  their  own  choice,  and  ballot  for  a 
President  and  Vice-President  at  their  own  pleasure,  has  long 
since  proven  to  have  been  unfounded.  Permanent  party  or- 


76 

dated  vote,  composed  of  all  its  electoral  suffrages,  clearly  in- 
tended that  each  mass  of  persons  entitled  to  one  elector, 
should  have  the  right  of  giving  one  vote,  according  to  their 
own  sense  of  their  own  interest. 

"  The  general  ticket  system  now  existing  in  ten  states,  was 
the  offspring  of  policy,  and  not  of  any  disposition  to  give  fair 
play  to  the  will  of  the  people.  It  was  adopted  by  the  leading 
men  of  those  states,  to  enable  them  to  consolidate  the  vote  of 
the  state.  It  would  be  easy  to  prove  this  by  referring  to  facts 
of  historical  notoriety.  It  contributes  to  give  power  and  con- 
sequence to  the  leaders  who  manage  the  elections,  but  it  is  a 
departure  from  the  intention  of  the  Constitution  ;  violates  the 
rights  of  the  minorities,  and  is  attended  with  many  other  evils. 

"The  intention  of  the  Constitution  is  violated  because  it 
was  the  intention  of  that  instrument  to  give  to  each  mass  of 
persons,  entitled  to  one  elector,  the  power  of  giving  an  elec- 
toral vote  to  any  candidate  they  preferred.  The  rights  of  mi- 
norities are  violated,  because  a  majority  of  one  will  carry  the 
vote  of  the  whole  state.  The  principle  is  the  same,  whether 
the  elector  is  chosen  by  general  ticket,  or  by  legislative  ballot ; 
a  majority  of  one,  in  either  case,  carries  the  vote  of  the  whole 
state.  ....  To  lose  their  votes  is  the  fate  of  all  minori- 
ties, and  it  is  theirs  only  to  submit ;  but  this  is  not  a  case  of 
votes  lost,  but  of  votes  taken  away,  added  to  those  of  the  ma- 
jority, and  given  to  a  person  to  whom  the  minority  was  op- 
posed." 

It  is  very  evident  that  the  evils  enumerated  here  are  but  the 
evils  of  the  odious  unit  rule,  so  closely  associated  with  the 
management  of  delegates  in  caucuses,  in  conventions  and  in 
conferences  and  so  on,  by  scheming  party  leaders. 

Senator  Benton,  in  defending  a  proposed  plan  of  electing  the 
President  and  Vice-President,  by  a  direct  vote  of  the  people, 
voting  by  districts,  said  further  :  "  TIME  and  EXPERIENCE  have  so 
decided.  Yes,  time  and  experience,  the  only  infallible  tests  of 
good  or  bad  institutions,  have  now  shown  that  the  continuance 
of  the  electoral  system  will  be  both  useless  and  dangerous  to 
the  liberties  of  the  people,  and  that  the  only  effectual  mode  of 
preserving  our  government  from  the  corruptions  which  have 


77 

undermined  the  liberties  of  so  many  nations,  is,  to  confide  the 
election  of  our  chief  magistrates  to  those  who  are  farthest  re- 
moved from  the  influence  of  his  patronage  ;  that  is  to  say,  to 
the  whole  body  of  American  citizens. 

" The  electors  are  not  independent;  they  have  no  superior 
intelligence  ;  they  are  not  left  to  their  own  judgment  in  the 
choice  of  a  President  ;  they  are  not  above  the  control  of  the 
people  ;  on  the  contrary,  every  elector  is  pledged,  before  he  is 
chosen,  to  give  his  vote  according  to  the  will  of  those  who 
choose  him. 

"  Every  reason  for  instituting  electors  has  failed,  and  every 
consideration  of  prudence  requires  them  to  be  discontinued. 
They  are  nothing  but  agents,  in  a  case  which  requires  no  agent ; 
and  no  prudent  man  would,  or  ought,  to  employ  an  agent  to 
take  care  of  his  money,  his  property,  or  his  liberty,  when  he 
is  equally  capable  to  take  care  of  them  himself. 

"  But,  if  the  plan  of  the  Constitution  had  not  failed — if  we 
were  now  deriving  from  electors  all  the  advantages  expected 
from  their  institution — I,  for  one,  would  still  be  in  favor  of 
getting  rid  of  them. 

"  I  should  esteem  the  incorruptibility  of  the  people,  their 
disinterested  desire  to  get  the  best  man  for  President,  to  be 
more  than  a  counterpoise  to  all  the  advantages  which  might  be 
derived  from  the  superior  intelligence  of  a  more  enlightened, 
but  smaller,  and  therefore,  more  corruptible  body.  I  should 
be  opposed  to  the  intervention  of  electors,  because  the  double 
process  of  electing  a  man  to  elect  a  man,  would  paralyze  the  spirit 
of  the  people,  and  destroy  the  life  of  the  election  itself.  Doubt- 
less this  machinery  was  introduced  into  our  Constitution  for  the 
purpose  of  softening  the  action  of  the  democratic  element ; 
but  it  also  softens  the  interest  of  the  people  in  the  result  of  the 
election  itself.  It  places  them  at  too  great  a  distance  from  their 
first  servant.  It  interposes  a  body  of  men  between  the  people 
and  the  object  of  their  choice,  and  gives  a  false  direction  to  the 
gratitude  of  the  President  elected.  He  feels  himself  indebted 
to  the  electors  who  collected  the  votes  of  the  people,  and  not 
to  the  people,  who  gave  their  votes  to  the  electors. 


78 

"It  enables  a  few  men  to  govern  many,  and,  in  time,  it  will 
transfer  the  whole  power  of  the  election  into  the  hands  of  a 
few,  leaving  to  the  people  the  humble  occupation  of  confirm- 
ing what  has  been  done  by  superior  authority." 

The  plan  of  direct  voting,  then  defended  by  Senator  Ben- 
ton  and  others,  proposed,  simply,  to  avoid  the  use  of  electors, 
and  vote  directly  for  a  President  and  Vice-President ;  still  vot- 
ing, however,  by  districts.  The  candidate  receiving  the  greatest 
number  of  votes  in  the  district  to  be  counted  one  vote, — repre- 
senting the  district.  The  plan  still  made  a  unit  of  the  vote 
from  each  sub-district,  instead  of  a  single  unit  of  the  vote  from 
each  state  ;  and  it  afforded  no  further  means  for  the  individual 
voters  to  reach  concerted  action  beyond  the  naming  of  one 
candidate  upon  a  direct  ballot.  Its  merit  was  to  be  found  in 
that  it  evaded  entrusting  the  popular  voice  to  electors  or 
delegates,  and,  that  it  would  make  it  more  difficult  for  a  few 
scheming  leaders  to  thwart  the  will  of  the  people  at  their  final 
election. 

The  force  and  application  of  the  truthful  and  most  earnest 
observations  then  presented  by  Senator  Benton,  when  analyzed 
by  the  experience  of  to-day,  show  conclusively :  That  the 
method  directed  by  the  Constitution  for  the  selection  of  elec- 
tors,— and  having  them  meet  in  separate  state  colleges  or  con- 
ventions, and  hence,  without  the  opportunity  for  the  whole 
body  to  make  repeated  ballotings  so  that  they  might  reach  con- 
certed action, — rendered  the  plan  at  once  null,  and  void  of  its 
intended  significance ;  that  the  perversion  of  the  intent  of  the 
Constitution,  so  far  as  to  allow  the  whole  number  of  electors 
to  which  a  state  was  entitled,  to  be  voted  for  upon  one  general 
ticket,  gave  scheming  political  leaders  an  opportunity  to  make 
a  unit  of  the  voice  of  the  state  in  the  interest  of  a  favored 
candidate. 

But  the  voice  of  a  party  in  making  the  party  nomination  is 
submitted  to  party  delegates  meeting  in  conventions  ;  hence,  it 
is  at  a  caucus  of  these  delegates  acting  for  the  party  voters  of 
the  state,  that  scheming  party  managers  now  aim  to  make  a 
unit  of  the  party  voice,  and  then  wield  this  voice  in  the  interest 
of  their  personal  choice  of  candidates.  It  is  not  difficult,  there- 


79 

fore,  to  see  that  the  whole  list  of  dangers  and  of  evil  political 
practices,  so  plainly  pointed  out  by  Senator  Benton  as  be- 
longing to  the  plan  of  submitting  to  electors,  have, — since 
electors  have  lost  all  active  significance, — been  transferred  to 
delegates  meeting  in  party  nominating  conventions.  It  has 
indeed,  been  very  thoroughly  shown  how  scheming  political 
leaders  not  only  manage  party  primary  elections,  determine 
the  delegates  and  control  these  delegates  in  caucuses,  in  con- 
ventions, and  in  conferences  and  so  on,  but,  that  they  thus 
betray  the  liberties  of  the  people,  and  corrupt  and  pervert  the 
popular  will  in  the  election  of  all  public  officers.  And  because 
the  double  process  of  electing  delegates,  to  elect  or  nominate  a 
party  candidate  paralyzes  the  spirit  of  the  people,  perverts  the 
democratic  principle,  makes  the  masses  apathetic  and  negligent 
of  the  primary  elections,  and  lessens  their  interest  in  the  final 
election,  it  adds  to  the  opportunities  of  these  scheming  office- 
seekers  to  thwart  the  will  of  the  people.  And  finally,  because 
a  few  party  leaders  and  their  servile  delegates  may  thus  de- 
termine the  party  nominee,  his  gratitude  will  be  given  to  these 
few  men  instead  of  to  the  whole  body  of  people  when  he  is 
elevated  to  any  high  office  having  the  disposal  of  governmental 
patronage  or  favors. 

Hence  it  is  now,  the  delegate  system  submitted  to  in  making 
party  nominations  which  enables  a  few  men  to  govern  the 
many,  and  which  transfers  the  whole  power  of  nominating 
into  the  hands  of  a  few,  leaving  to  the  great  mass  of  party 
voters  the  humble  occupation  of  confirming  what  has  been 
done  by  superior  authority. 

Thus  it  has  been  shown,  that  the  dangers  pointed  out  by  the 
most  patriotic  members  of  the  convention  that  framed  the  Con- 
stitution, which  would  most  certainly  ensue  were  the  election 
of  a  President  to  be  entrusted  to  the  state  or  national  legisla- 
tures, to  the  national  senate,  or  to  the  governors  of  the  states  ; 
the  cabal  and  corruption,  and  the  intriguing  between  the  can- 
didates and  these  small  bodies  entrusted  with  their  election, 
resulting  in  real  merit  being  rarely  the  title  to  the  appoint- 
ment ;  and  since  then,  the  evils  and  dangers  pointed  out  by 
Benton  and  others  as  belonging  to  the  electoral  system, — are 


80 

all  to  be  found  practically  illustrated  in  the  present  method  of 
submitting  to  party  nominations,  made  by  the  system  of  dele- 
gating and  having  these  delegates  meet  in  caucuses,  and  in 
great  national  nominating  conventions. 

To  sum  up  ;  the  whole  story  when  tersely  told  amount  to 
this  :  The  sovereignty  of  this  country  since  our  Fathers  estab- 
lished its  liberty,  has  ever  been,  and  continues  to  be  vested  in 
the  will  of  a  majority  of  the  whole  people. 

The  people  have  thus  far  yielded  to  methods  in  the  election 
of  their  President — and  other  officers  as  well, — which  delegate 
and  re-delegate  their  voices  to  a  few  men,  because  they  have 
believed  this  delegating  to  be  a  necessity  in  order  to  reach 
concerted  action. 

The  plan  directed  by  the  Constitution  submitted  the  election 
of  a  President  to  a  few  electors  or  delegates,  but,  because  these 
electors  were  directed  to  meet  separately  in  state  colleges  or 
conventions,  no  opportunity  was  afforded  for  the  whole  body 
to  reach  concerted  action  by  repeated  ballotings,  and  the 
method  was  at  once  made  void  of  any  active  significance. 

Permanent  party  organizations,  then  took  up  the  work  of 
harmonizing  upon  a  candidate  prior  to  the  general  or  final  elec- 
tion. And  the  work  intended  for  electors  was  thus  transferred 
to  party  delegates,  meeting  in  great  party  nominating  conven- 
tions. 

And  now,  the  endless  intriguings  and  bargainings  for  place, 
the  corrupt  scheming  to  thwart  the  people's  will,  so  well  an- 
ticipated by  the  framers  of  the  Constitution,  had  the  power  of 
electing  a  President  been  delegated  to  any  convened  body, 
they  were  then  familiar  with  ;  and  since  then,  the  evils  and 
dangers, — so  well  pointed  out  by  Benton  and  others,  as  be- 
longing to  electors, — have  found  the  opportunity  for  their 
fullest  development,  and  are  to-day  bearing  their  richest 
harvest  in  political  corruption, — though  a  little  more  obscured, 
— in  the  great  complex  system  by  which  the  people  submit  to 
party  candidates  being  determined  upon  by  successive  conven- 
tions of  delegates. 

In  short,  whenever  and  wherever  the  masses  delegate  or  en- 
trust to  a  few  men  the  power  to  nominate  or  to  elect  men  to 


81 

high  office  ;  the  opportunity  is  afforded,  and  the  temptation  for 
these  few  electors  or  delegates  to  bargain  away  the  offices  of 
the  people  on  the  one  part, — and,  for  the  candidates  to  promise 
appointments  to  place,  or  other  government  favor  in  return,  on 
the  other,  has  proven  to  be  so  great  as  to  be  irresistible.  Or 
in  other  words,  an  autocratic  method  of  holding  power  in 
spite  of  the  people's  will,  is  favored  by  this  system  of  delega- 
ting. 

The  illogical  nature  and  the  evils  attending  the  method 
directed  by  the  Constitution  for  the  election  of  United  States 
Senators  by  the  state  legislative  bodies,  illustrate  the  results 
of  intriguing  and  of  corrupt  office-seeking,  even  more  fully 
than  any  other  part  of  our  governmental  system. 

The  Constitution  directs  that  the  Senators  from  each  state 
shall  be  chosen  by  the  legislature  thereof.  That  the  conven- 
tion yielded  to  this  method  of  choice,  seems  to  have  been 
wholly  the  result  of  a  compromise  with  those  who  claimed 
that  they  "feared  "  the  state  governments  would  be  prejudiced 
by  the  supremacy  of  a  national  government. 

Why  the  patriotic  members  of  the  convention  should  have 
yielded  to  such  a  method  for  electing  United  States  Senators, 
by  the  state  legislatures — while  they  at  the  same  time  con- 
demned the  election  of  a  President  by  the  national  legislature, 
as  being  the  worst  possible  plan  that  had  been  proposed  to 
them,  is  quite  irreconcilable.  If  they  could  then  foresee  that 
an  election  of  a  President  by  the  national  legislature,  "would 
be  the  work  of  intrigue,  of  cabal,  of  corruption,  and  of  faction," 
and  that  "  real  merit  would  rarely  be  the  title  to  the  appoint- 
ment ;"  what  has  experience  shown  us,  but  that  they  should 
have  seen  further,  that  the  same  series  of  evils  would  result 
from  submitting  to  such  a  similar  method  of  electing  United 
States  Senators,  by  the  state  legislatures.  What,  indeed,  has 
experience  taught  us,  with  United  States  Senators  looking  to  a 
state  legislature  for  their  re-election,  but,  in  too  many  instances 
of  one  continuous  series  of  intriguing,  and  of  political  corrup- 
tion. 

Let  us  analyze  this   method  of  entrusting  the  election  of 


82 

United  States  Senators  to  the  few  men  constituting  the  state 
legislative  bodies  still  further : 

The  method  really  found  its  excuse  in  the  selfishness  and 
jealousies  of  those  who  had  a  personal  interest  in  controlling 
the  offices  of  the  state  governments.  And,  it  was  this  personal 
interest  of  a  few  men,  and  not  the  interest  of  the  mass  of 
citizens  of  any  state,  that  gave  birth  to  the  doctrine  of  "  State 
Sovereignty"  and  "  States'  Rights/' 

It  was  argued  at  the  framing  of  the  Constitution,  by  those 
who  were  opposed  to  the  democratic  principle  of  popular  rule, 
— that  senators  elected  by  the  state  legislatures  would  better 
represent,  or  better  defend  the  interests  of  an  individual  state, 
than  they  would  if  elected  by  the  people  of  the  state.  And, 
that  the  "aristocratic  interests"  would  find  therein  a  better 
means  of  self-defence.  But  what  argument,  indeed,  could 
have  possibly  been  offered  toward  establishing,  that  any  just 
cause  would  not  be  as  well  defended  by  senators  elected  di- 
rectly by  the  people  of  the  state,  as  they  would  by  senators 
elected  by  legislators  who  had  themselves  been  elected  by  the 
people  ? 

James  Wilson  offered  the  best  and  most  patriotic  reasons 
against  this  doctrine.  " '  The  states,'  he  said,  i  are  in  no  danger 
of  being  devoured  by  the  national  government ;  I  wish  to  keep 
them  from  devouring  the  national  government.  Their  exis- 
tence is  made  essential  by  the  great  extent  of  our  country.  I 
am  for  an  election  of  the  second  branch  by  the  people  in  large 
districts,  subdividing  the  districts  only  for  the  accommodation 
of  voters.' " 

Mason  urged,  that,  "  <  The  state  legislatures  ought  to  have 
some  means  of  defending  themselves  against  encroachments 
of  the  national  government,'  "  and  by  way  of  compromise,  pro- 
posed that  the  state  legislatures  should  be  permitted  to  elect 
the  United  States  Senators,  and  thus  "  'make  these  legislatures 
a  constituent  part  of  the  national  establishment.' '  Later  on, 
"  Wilson  said :  '  When  I  consider  the  amazing  extent  of  country, 
the  immense  population  which  is  to  fill  it,  the  influence  which 
the  government  we  are  to  form  will  have,  not  only  on  the 
present  generation  of  our  people  and  their  multiplied  posterity, 


83 

but  on  the  whole  globe,  I  am  lost  in  the  magnitude  of  the  object. 
We  are  laying  the  foundation  of  a  building  in  which  millions 
are  interested,  and  which  is  to  last  for  ages.  In  laying 
one  stone  amiss  we  may  injure  the  superstructure  ;  and  what 
will  be  the  consequence  if  the  corner-stone  should  be  loosely 
placed  ?  A  citizen  of  America  is  a  citizen  of  the  general  gov- 
ernment, and  is  a  citizen  of  the  particular  state  in  which  he  may 
reside.  The  general  government  is  meant  for  them  in  the  first 
capacity  ;  the  state  governments  in  the  second.  Both  govern- 
ments are  derived  from  the  people,  both  meant  for  the  people  ; 
both,  therefore,  ought  to  be  regulated  on  the  same  principles.  In 
forming  the  general  government  we  must  forget  our  local  habits 
and  attachments,  lay  aside  our  state  connections,  and  act  for 
the  general  good  of  the  whole.  The  general  government  is 
not  an  assemblage  of  states,  but  of  individuals,  for  certain  po- 
litical purposes  ;  it  is  not  meant  for  the  states,  but  for  the  in- 
dividuals composing  them  ;  the  individuals,  therefore,  not  the 
states,  ought  to  be  represented  in  it.'  He  persisted  to  the 
last  in  demanding  that  the  senate  should  be  elected  by  electors 
chosen  by  the  people." 

Against  these  pure  and  profoundly  patriotic  sentiments  there 
were  opposed,  those  who  from  a  personal  interest  desired  to 
maintain  and  enlarge  the  powers  of  state  legislators ;  those, 
with  aristocratic  associations  and  hopes  for  official  power,  who 
feared  to  trust  the  democratic  masses  ;  and  still  further,  those, 
coming  from  the  smaller  states  who  sought, — by  having  United 
States  Senators  elected  by  the  state  legislatures,  and  then,  by 
having  each  state  equally  represented  in  the  National  Senate, 
to  gain  a  selfish  advantage  for  the  smaller  states. 

As  the  purposes  of  these  less  patriotic  members  of  the  con- 
vention prevailed,  or,  whatever  the  reason  of  its  adoption, — 
because  the  language  of  the  Constitution  directs  that  United 
States  Senators  shall  be  chosen  by  the  few  men  constituting 
the  state  legislatures,  it  not  only  gives  to  these  few  men  the 
power  to  wield  a  great  sovereign  authority,  actually  belonging 
to  the  whole  people,  but,  it  has  thus  afforded  scheming  po- 
litical leaders  an  opportunity  to  intrigue  and  bargain  with  these 
men  for  the  great  offices  submitted  to  their  gift. 


84 

That  the  language  of  the  Constitution,  directing  that  United 
States  Senators  shall  be  chosen  by  the  state  legislatures  has 
been  interpreted  to  mean,  that  these  few  men  shall  exercise  a 
sovereign  right  to  determine  upon  a  National  Senator,  respect- 
ing only  their  own  personal  choice,  or  their  own  personal 
interests,  has  been  abundantly  proven  to  be  true. 

That,  by  thus  elevating  a  body  of  state  legislators  to  an  oli- 
garchy exercising  original  sovereign  powers, — it  has  afforded 
the  opportunity  for  these  few  men  to  autocratically  continue 
themselves  in.  power,  and,  thus  to  succeed  in  building  up  an 
aristocracy  of  office-holders  in  defiance  of  the  people's  will, 
has  also  proven  to  be  true. 

And  still  further, — because  this  method  directed  by  the  Con- 
stitution, places  within  the  power  of  these  few  men  the  oppor- 
tunity to  bargain  for  and  dispose  of  the  places  of  United  States 
Senators,  it  affords  a  United  States  Senator  seeking  a  re-elec- 
tion, an  opportunity  to  intrigue  and  bargain  in  turn  with  these 
few  men,  and  thus  autocratically  secure  his  own  re-election. 

But  the  people  are  denying  the  right  of  legislators  to  exercise 
their  individual  authority  in  the  selection  of  United  States 
Senators,  and  now,  not  infrequently  the  voters  attempt  to  in- 
struct these  legislators  at  the  time  of  their  election,  who  to 
support  for  the  United  States  Senatorship.  Hence  it  may  be 
asserted,  that  the  literal  interpretation  of  the  language  of  the 
Constitution  is  no  longer  accepted  by  the  people.  That  they 
construe  the  authority  given  to  state'  legislators  to  be  but  that 
accorded  to  delegates  of  the  people,  whom  they  may  instruct 
with  a  more  or  less  precise  trust  at  the  time  of  their  election. 

The  evils,  therefore,  in  the  method  of  electing  United  States 
Senators  by  state  legislators,  are  but  an  exaggeration  of  the 
evils  of  the  delegate  system.  And,  so  long  as  the  language  of 
the  Constitution  remains,  it  stands  not  only  as  a  menace  to 
popular  rule,  but  as  an  excuse  for  Legislators  to  authoritatively 
usurp  the  sovereign  power  of  the  people.  But  the  evils  of 
this  method  are  still  greater  than  the  evils  of  delegating  in 
making  party  nominations,  because  here,  the  delegated  author- 
ity has  the  final  voice  in  electing  to  office,  and  hence  no  oppor- 


85 

tunity  is  afforded  the  people  to  change  or  avoid  even  the  most 
evident  disregard  of  their  expressed  will. 

To  sum  up,  it  has  been  shown,  that  the  language  of  the  Con- 
stitution directing  that  United  States  Senators  shall  be  chosen 
by  the  state  legislatures  was  an  attempt  to  engraft  an  aristo- 
cratic scheme  or  purpose,  with  its  autocratic  methods  of  de- 
fence, upon  a  government  belonging  to  the  whole  people. 
That  the  people  have  since  interpreted  the  method  directed  by 
the  Constitution,  as  permitting  them  to  consider  their  state 
legislators, — when  exercising  the  trust  of  electing  United  States 
Senators — to  be  but  delegates  whom  they  may  instruct  with  a 
definite  duty.  But,  because  the  people  must  conform  to  the 
method  directed  by  the  Constitution,  they  are  forced  to  submit 
to  delegates  exercising  a  final  and  deciding  vote  in  the  choice 
of  these  officers.  Hence,  just  as  it  has  been  shown,  that  the 
plan  of  the  Constitution  directing  that  we  shall  submit  to 
electors  in  the  election  of  a  President,  has  become  a  submis- 
sion to  delegates  meeting  in  national  nominating  conventions, 
— so  have  state  legislators  entrusted  with  the  election  of  United 
States  Senators  come  to  be  recognized,  as  but  another  series  of 
delegates,  exercising  a  sovereign  duty  belonging  to  the  whole 
people. 

It  has  already  been  pointed  out  in  a  former  chapter,  how 
these  various  series  of  delegates  have  been  joined  together  by 
party  managers,  in  one  great  complex  structure,  making  to- 
gether a  vast  political  machine.  And  it  has  been  shown,  how  this 
vast  and  intricate  political  machinery  in  the  hands  of  the  party 
leaders  or  partisan  office-seekers,  has  become  a  great  engine 
for  the  securing  of  public  offices,  by  perverting  and  defying  the 
people's  will. 

Among  the  graver  evils  of  this  great  complex  system  of  dele- 
gating it  has  still  further  been  shown,  how  a  person  holding 
the  office  of  United  States  Senator  becomes  the  favored  politi- 
cal leader.  That  from  his  autocratic  powers,  and  ability  to 
provide  for  his  own  re-election,  he  becomes  the  acknowledged 
great  party  "  boss"  directing  through  his  well-trained  assistants 
or  minor  party  bosses,  and  their  co-workers,  the  great  distri- 


86 

bution  of  political  favors  among  his  subservient  following  of 
office-seekers  with  but  little  respect  for  the  people's  will. 

In  conclusion,  it  may  be  summed  up, — that  the  method  di- 
rected by  the  language  of  the  Constitution  for  the  election  of 
the  President  and  Vice-President  has  long  since  ceased  to  be 
respected.  That  a  perverted  compliance  with  the  electoral 
system,  by  having  the  vote  of  each  state  cast  as  a  unit  for  can- 
didates for  President  and  Vice-President,  may  readily  serve  to 
elect  a  candidate  who  has  received  but  a  minority  of  the  votes 
of  the  people  of  the  nation.  And,  that  submission  to  the 
election  of  United  States  Senators  by  the  state  legislatures, 
simply  serves  to  entrust  their  final  election  to  delegates  of  the 
people,  giving  the  masses  no  means  of  redress  against  a  corrupt 
use  of  this  delegated  authority.  And  it  now  remains  but  to 
urge,  that  the  whole  series  of  evils  resulting  from  the  present 
methods  of  electing  these  and  all  other  officers,  are  but  the 
evils  of  this  great  complex  system  of  delegating.  And,  that 
the  whole  mass  of  political  corruption,  permeating  and  befoul- 
ing our  government  in  its  every  part,  has  resulted  because  the 
people  have  thus  far  supposed  that  it  was  necessary  to  yield  to 
this  system  of  delegating  in  order  to  reach  concerted  action. 
And  then,  because  by  entrusting  the  election  of  men  to  high 
office,  to  a  few  men  acting  with  delegated  authority,  these  men 
have  found  the  opportunity,  and  have  too  often  yielded  to  the 
great  temptation  to  barter  and  bargain  away  for  personal  ends, 
the  great  sovereign  responsibilities  entrusted  to  them. 

The  remedy  for  these  evils,  great  and  growing  and  extending 
to  every  political  question  throughout  our  land ;  and  the  remedy 
for  the  vast  evils  belonging  to  our  system  of  submitting  to 
permanent  party  organizations,  has  been  shown  to  be  in  the 
method  of  solving  the  simple  problem  which  teaches  the  peo- 
ple of  every  free  government,  that  they  may  reach  concerted 
action  in  selecting  their  representatives,  without  delegating  and 
re-delegating  their  sovereignty  to  a  few  men,  in  order  that  these 
few  may  meet  in  conventions  and  there  by  repeated  ballotings 
reach  a  concurrence. 

The  REMEDY,  and  the  only  true  solution  of  the  problem  of 
finding  the  will  of  a  majority  of  the  people  of  the  whole 


87 

country,  or  of  the  district  to  be  represented,  has  been  shown 
to  be,  the  proposed  method  of  direct  voting,  completing  the  work 
at  one  election,  at  which  each  individual  voter  simply  names 
succeeding  choices  among  the  candidates  upon  his  ticket,  and 
thereby  provides  a  true  means  of  reaching  the  final  concur- 
rence of  a  majority  of  his  fellows. 

Let  an  amendment  of  the  Constitution  direct : — That  the 
President  and  Vice-President  of  the  United  States  shall  be 
elected  by  a  direct  vote  of  the  qualified  voters  of  the  whole 
country.  That  each  voter  shall  be  permitted  to  name  a  first 
choice,  and  such  succeeding  provisional  choices  upon  his  ballot 
as  he  may  see  fit,  or  deem  necessary  in  order  to  provide  for  the 
final  concurrence  of  a  majority  of  the  voters  upon  one  candidate. 
And,  that  the  candidate  upon  whom  a  majority  of  the  whole 
number  of  voters  have  first  agreed,  shall  be  elected.  Or,  in 
case  there  has  not  been  a  majority  concurrence  after  each 
successive  provisional  support  has  been  exhausted,  then,  that 
the  candidate  receiving  the  greatest  concurring  support  shall  be 
elected. 

Let  another  amendment  of  the  Constitution  direct : — That 
United  States  Senators  shall  be  chosen  by  a  direct  vote  of  the 
qualified  voters  of  the  state,  by  the  same  method  of  direct 
voting.  And  the  people  of  this  country  will  have  made  the 
first  certain  step  toward  establishing  a  truly  representative 
government  emanating  from  the  people's  will. 


CHAPTER  VI. 


THE  CIVIL  SERVICE  EVIL  AND  ITS  REMEDY. 

In  the  executive  branch  of  our  National  government,  through- 
out its  various  departments,  it  is  necessary  to  employ  a  large 
number  of  officers — superior  and  minor  officers — with  nu- 
merous clerks  and  assistants. 

It  is  not  practicable  that  even  the  higher  grades  of  these 
officers  should  be  elected  directly  by  the  people.  Nor,  is  it 
desirable  that  they  should  be.  They  constitute  a  part  of  each 
executive  administration,  and  in  order  that  the  laws  may  be 
vigorously,  justly,  and  equitably  administered  throughout,  every 
department  and  every  division  and  subdivision  of  the  executive 
branch  should  be  accountable  to  the  one  head,  the  chief  execu- 
tive or  President  of  the  nation.  And,  when  the  President  of 
the  United  States  shall  have  been  truthfully  selected  by  the 
whole  body  of  sovereign  people,  and  is  thus  made  directly  ac- 
countable to  them,  it  may  well  be  assumed  that  the  whole 
executive  trust  will  be  made  through  him  accountable  to  the 
people  of  the  country. 

The  Constitution  directs,  that  "  the  President  shall  nominate, 
and  by  and  with  the  advice  and  consent  of  the  Senate,  shall 
appoint  Ambassadors,  other  public  Ministers  and  Consuls, 
Judges  of  the  Supreme  Court,  and  all  other  officers  of  the  United 
States,  whose  appointments  are  not  herein  otherwise  pro- 
vided for,  and  which  shall  be  established  by  law ;  but  the  Con- 
gress may  by  law  vest  the  appointment  of  such  inferior  offi- 
cers, as  they  may  think  proper,  in  the  President  alone,  in  the 
courts  of  law,  or  in  the  heads  of  departments." 


89 

It  is  this  body  of  executive  appointments,  and  by  usage 
especially  referring  to  the  minor  grades  of  these  officers,  who 
are  known  as  constituting  the  civil  service  of  the  country.  And 
it  is  the  significance  attending  the  use  made  of  the  appointing 
power, — vested  so  largely  in  the  President  and  Senate,  in  the 
Heads  of  Departments,  and  entrusted  by  usage  to  the  chief  of- 
ficers of  the  various  divisions  of  each  department, — which 
has  given  rise  to  the  civil  service  question. 

Since  our  government  so  early  became  a  government  by 
parties,  or  a  government  resulting  from  a  contest  between  two 
permanently  organized  political  parties,  the  power  of  appoint- 
ing men  to  office  has  ever  been  regarded  as  one  of  the  prizes 
of  the  conflict. 

The  appointing  power  is  by  no  means  the  whole  extent  of 
patronage  or  "  spoils "  which  thus  falls  to  the  distribution  of 
the  victorious  party.  The  spirit  of  party  government  has  but 
little  respect  for  the  interests  of  the  whole  people,  and  makes 
"  spoils  "  and  patronage  and  favor  out  of  every  political  issue 
with  which  it  is  concerned.  Out  of  legislative  enactments, 
out  of  executive  favors,  and,  even  judicial  bias  may  be  in- 
cluded among  the  "  spoils  "  of  the  party  in  power. 

But  the  power  of  appointing  men  to  office  has  a  direct  personal 
signification.  And  it  has  come  to  be  considered  the  personal 
"spoils"  of  those  having  an  influence  or  a  control  in  making 
the  government  appointments. 

It  places  a  vast  army  of  office-holders,  office-seekers  and 
party  workers,  and  their  families  and  friends  in  secret  concert 
with  the  appointing  power.  Hence  the  power  to  appoint  men 
to  office  has  a  very  significant  value  in  the  securing  of  the  great 
elective  offices  of  the  country. 

The  power  to  appoint  men  to  office,  as  the  perquisite  of  an 
executive  officer,  or,  the  ability  of  a  legislator  to  influence  the 
appointing  power,  has  undoubtedly  been  long  recognized  and 
used  as  an  efficient  agency  in  securing  the  support  of  party 
workers  or  party  managers,  in  determining  party  nominations, 
and  in  controlling  elections. 

On  the  other  hand,  receiving  the  promise  of  an  appointment 
in  the  government  service,  has  ever  been  regarded  by  party 


90 

workers  and  office-seekers,  as  a  sufficient  incentive  to  arouse 
their  most  earnest  and  devoted  political  activity.  And  it  is 
THIS  CORRUPT  TRAFFIC,  between  elective  office-holders  having  the 
power  to  appoint  men  in  the  civil  service  employ  of  the 
government,  on  the  one  part ;  and  party  managers,  party 
workers,  and  office-seekers  having  the  power  to  corruptly  in- 
fluence and  control  party  nominations,  and  thus  determine  the 
election  of  certain  candidates,  on  the  other,  which  constitutes 
the  civil  service  evil. 

But  the  results  of  the  evil  do  not  stop  here.  If  elective 
officers  may  thus  appoint  a  vast  number  of  men  to  office  in 
the  government  employ,  in  consideration  of  these  men  having 
given  their  active  work  at  manipulating  the  primary  and  final 
elections  in  favor  of  the  former,  then,  these  higher  officers  con- 
ceive also  their  right  to  displace  or  remove  these  civil  ser- 
vants, for  any  neglect  or  indifference  to  continue  their  partisan 
or  personal  political  efforts.  And  still  further,  these  elective 
officers  claim  also  the  right, — in  general  as  a  party, — to  impose 
a  tax  upon  the  salaries  of  each  of  these  government  em- 
ployees ;  making  it  a  contribution  to  a  general  fund  to  be  used 
in  advancing  the  interests  of  the  whole  body  of  partisan  can- 
didates. This  levy  is  known  as  "  political "  or  "  partisan  as- 
sessments." 

That  but  little  respect  is  paid  to  the  proper  qualifications  of 
a  candidate  for  an  appointment  in  the  civil  service,  is  not  more 
true,  than  that  quite  as  little  respect  is  paid  to  the  proper 
qualifications  of  a  candidate  for  an  elective  office,  who  is  to  be 
entrusted  thereafter  with  the  making  of  these  appointments. 
Hence,  so  long  as  candidates  for  office  may  with  certainty 
win  an  election,  because  of  their  skill  and  superiority  in  the 
management  of  the  political  machinery  used  in  determining 
party  nominations,~and  because  of  their  powers  at  successful 
electioneering  and  in  the  control  of  partisan  political  methods, 
it  cannot  be  expected  that  candidates  for  the  offices  to  be  filled 
by  appointments  made  by  these  men,  will  be  required  to  have 
other  qualifications  than  that  they _are  efficient  party  workers 
and  party  managers.  And  it  is  evident,  therefore,  that  this 


91 

phase  of  the  civil  service  evil  adds  nothing  new  to  its  general 
character  throughout. 

If  now,  we  analyze  more  carefully  the  specific  nature  of  the 
civil  service  evil,  it  must  at  once  be  accepted  that  the  evil  is 
found  in  the  corrupt  bargaining  and  contracting  going  on 
between  the  seekers  after  the  elective  offices,  and  those  seek- 
ing offices  by  appointment. 

That  this  bargaining  is  corrupt,  is  because  it  is  an  attempt 
by  each  party  to  the  contract  to  deliver  that  which  does  not 
belong  to  them. 

It  is  corrupt  on  the  part  of  a  candidate  seeking  an  elective 
office  to  promise  to  deliver,  or  make  appointments  in  the  civil 
service  of  the  government,  in  consideration  of  active  political 
management  or  work  securing  for  this  candidate  the  party 
nomination,  and  finally  an  election  to  the  office  sought  for. 

It  is  corrupt  on  the  part  of  a  candidate  seeking  an  office  by 
appointment,  in  consideration  of  a  promise  from  a  candidate 
for  election,  to  endeavor  to  control  and  secure  the  nomination 
and  final  election  of  this  candidate  by  all  the  schemes  known 
to  the  political  machinery  of  the  DELEGATE  SYSTEM,  and  to  other 
partisan  methods. 

And  finally,  it  is  corrupt  throughout,  because  this  traffic  in 
the  offices  of  the  government  robs  the  people  of  their  elective 
franchise,  violates  their  right  to  select  their  own  representa- 
tives, and  thus  control  their  own  government.  It  is,  indeed, 
but  an  exhibition  of  the  very  principles  which  form  the  basis 
of  an  autocratic  rule. 

Let  us  make  no  mistake  about  this  being  the  exact  nature  of 
the  civil  service  evil,  so  that  we  may  in  the  end  accept  no  error  in 
discerning  its  proper  remedy. 

So  long  as  professional  office-seekers  and  office-holders  may 
thus  bargain  with  men  who  seek  employment  in  the  govern- 
ment service  ;  with  men  who  seek  special  or  favoring  legisla- 
tive enactments  ;  with  men  who  seek  executive  clemency  or 
favor ;  and  still  further,  with  men  who  would  have  justice  bi- 
ased or  perverted  toward  their  personal  advantage  ;  and  have 
this  list  of  men  aid  them  in  successfully  manipulating  the  ma- 
chinery now  submitted  to  by  the  people  in  making  party  nomi- 


92 

nations  ;  and  then,  by  arousing  all  the  jealousies  and  schem- 
ings  of  partisan  methods,  be  enabled  to  secure  for  themselves 
the  offices  sought  for,  just  so  long  will  office-holding  through- 
out be  in  no  way  accountable  to  the  people  to  whom. this 
government  rightfully  belongs. 

Men  who  hold  the  higher  or  elective  offices  of  the  govern- 
ment because  they  have  received  a  party  nomination  by  man- 
ipulating the  complex  methods  of  the  delegate  system,  and 
then,  have  been  elected  to  office  because  of  our  blind  fealty  to 
permanent  party  organization,  are  in  no  way  accountable  to 
the  people,  and  owe  them  neither  gratitude  nor  respect.  How 
then,  can  it  be  hoped  that  men  appointed  to  office  in  the  civil 
service  of  the  government,  in  consideration  of  their  being  po- 
litical workers  and  wire-pullers  in  the  management  of  this 
delegate  system,  shall  have  either  gratitude  or  respect  for  the 
wishes  of  the  people,  to  whom  they  are  in  no  way  accounta- 
ble for  their  appointment  ? 

For  these  reasons,  and  these  reasons  alone,  our  government 
is  not  a  government  truthfully  emanating  from  the  people's 
will.  And  it  is  not  a  government  economically  administered 
in  the  interests  of  the  people  at  large.  But,  just  so  far  as  such 
office-seekers  may  thus  secure  the  places  of  power  in  the 
management  and  direction  of  the  government,  and  may  thus 
safely  direct  it  in  their  own  personal  interests,  just  this  far  has 
it  become  a  government  by  the  few,  crafty  enough  to  secure 
its  official  places. 

From  these  conclusions  it  is  made  evident,  that  the  civil  ser- 
vice evil  is  but  an  outgrowth  or  part  of  the  great  general  po- 
litical evil  to  which  we  have  so  long  been  submitting.  For,  it 
has  already  been  shown  that  a  great  series  o'f  corrupt  political 
methods  and  evil  practices  have  been  favored  and  developed 
by  our  submitting  to  the  delegate  system  in  making  party 
nominations,  and  by  our  submission  to  permanent  party  or- 
ganizations among  us.  And  it  has  also  been  fully  shown  that 
these  methods  are  responsible  for  so  perverting  and  defacing 
our  government,  as  to  make  it  in  truth  but  the  mockery  of  a 
government  emanating  from  the  people's  will. 

The  specific  evil  which  has  heretofore  been  recognized  in 


93 

our  civil  service  system,  and  which  an  effort  has  been  made  to 
correct  or  evade,  is  the  corrupt  motive  or  consideration  influ- 
encing and  controlling  the  appointing  powers.  Yet  this  is  but 
one  of  the  two  parts  of  the  contract,  made  up  necessarily  of 
two  parties,  with  two  considerations  passing  between  them. 
If  any  distinction  may  be  made  in  the  grade  of  evil  significa- 
tion between  the  one  and  the  other  of  these  two  bargains, 
then  it  must  at  once  be  seen  that  the  work  of  perverting 
party  nominations,  and  thus  deceiving  the  people  in  the  elec- 
tion of  their  higher  representatives,  has  the  claim  to  priority 
in  existence  and  is  by  far  the  graver  evil  in  its  significance. 
And  because  this  party  work  and  control  of  the  party  ma- 
chinery, thus  intended'  to  secure  the  election  of  a  certain  can- 
didate or  certain  candidates,  may  be  repaid  with  money  or 
with  many  other  valuable  considerations,  which  may  be  wrung 
from  the  government  as  "  spoils  of  office,"  it  may  be  asserted 
that  this  part  of  the  contract  not  only  precedes  the  other,  but 
gives  rise  to  it  and  is  its  cause. 

In  applying  a  remedy  to  any  evil,  it  is  of  first  importance  to 
discover  its  cause,  and,  if  possible  apply  a  remedy  for  the  re- 
moval of  this  cause.  Remedies  having  but  a  palliative  pur- 
pose are  of  but  little  significance  toward  the  relief  of  a  long 
standing  evil. 

Thus  far  in  our  analysis  of  the  civil  service  evil,  we  have 
found  no  want  in  the  accountability  due  from  the  minor  or  in- 
ferior officers  of  the  civil  service  toward  those  entrusted  with 
their  appointment.  But  a  marked  defect  has  been  developed 
toward  the  opposite  extreme,  making  these  inferior  officers  owe 
a  servile  allegiance  to  the  appointing  powers. 

Hence,  the  question  is  before  us,  whether  we  should  attempt 
by  legislative  measures  to  lessen  this  allegiance  and  diminish 
the  accountability  of  these  minor  officers  to  their  superiors, 
or,  after  searching  out  the  cause  of  this  unnatural  relationship, 
find  the  true  means  of  averting  it. 

The  former  of  these  plans,  however,  has  already  been 
placed  under  trial.  It  has  been  made  a  law  of  the  country  by 
an  act  of  Congress,  entitled,  "  An  Act  to  regulate  and  improve 
the  civil  service  of  the  United  States." 


94 

This  scheme  or  measure  requiring  all  candidates  for  certain 
of  the  subordinate  offices  which  are  filled  by  appointment,  to 
pass  a  competitive  examination  before  a  distinct  civil  service 
commission,  or  by  examiners  appointed  by  such  a  commission, 
would  seem  to  indicate  that  the  gravity  of  the  existing  civil 
service  evil  was  in  the  fact,  that  men  of  insufficient  qualifica- 
tions were  the  ones  who  most  often  secure  these  minor  ap- 
pointments. And  again,  laws  demanding  that  new  appointments 
in  these  offices  shall  only  be  made  at  the  lowest  grade,  and 
that  appointments  in  the  public  service  shall  be  carefully  ap- 
portioned among  the  several  states  and  territories  and  the  Dis- 
trict of  Columbia  upon  the  basis  of  their  population,  would 
seem  to  make  a  violation  of  these  principles  among  the  graver 
evils  in  the  civil  service  question.  While  a  law  forbidding 
political  assessments  being  made  for  partisan  purposes  would 
purport,  that  a  large  share  of  the  evil  existed  at  this  point. 

It  must,  indeed,  be  very  evident  that  these  and  all  other 
similar  laws  or  efforts  to  accomplish  civil  service  reform,  are 
but  attempts  to  remove  the  results  of  a  great  evil,  and  do  not 
remove  or  lessen,  except  in  a  remote  manner  and  to  but  a 
limited  degree,  the  true  CAUSE  of  our  civil  service  corruption. 

The  true  nature  of  the  civil  service  evil  has  been  distinctly 
defined,  to  be  the  corrupt  traffic  between  office-holders  en- 
trusted with  the  appointing  power  and  seeking  re-elections, 
and,  those  who  are  seeking  the  offices  which  are  filled  by  ap- 
pointment. 

To  whatever  extent  it  is  hoped  that  the  proposed  attempts 
to  "  improve  the  civil  service "  will  obstruct  this  corrupt 
traffic,  by  laws  which  take  away  or  aim  to  complicate  and 
make  less  certain  the  power  to  deliver  or  fulfill  the  promises 
made  by  an  elective  officer  to  those  who  have  assisted  in  the 
management  of  his  election,  the  means  are  at  least  of  doubt- 
ful utility.  And,  while  it  is  true,  that  the  traffic  can  only  be 
of  grave  significance,  when  it  is  possible  that  each  party  to  the 
contract  shall  be  enabled  to  deliver  the  consideration  agreed 
upon  ;  that  is, — to  perform  effective  work  in  controlling  nomi- 
nations and  elections  on  the  one  part ;  and,  to  fulfill  the 
promise  of  an  appointment  on  the  other;  it  is  by  no  means 


95 

certain  that  any  of  the  proposed  measures  will  to  any  consid- 
erable extent  obstruct  this  traffic. 

And  still  further,  it  is  very  evident  that  so  long  as  the  graver 
and  more  significantly  corrupt  work,  that  of  controlling  nomi- 
nations and  elections  to  office,  remains  undisturbed,  all  at- 
tempts to  legislate  against,  or  to  obstruct  the  minor  evils  re- 
sulting from  abuses  of  the  appointing  power,  will  be  fruitless, 
and  futile  toward  accomplishing  true  civil  service  reform. 

The  proposed  means  of  improving  the  civil  service  of  the 
government  admit  of  still  further  elucidation. 

It  is  one  of  the  results  of  the  corrupt  traffic  between  the 
higher  grade  offices,  and  those  filled  by  appointment,  that 
the  men  who  are  appointed  are  not  selected  because  of  their 
true  qualifications  or  especial  fitness  for  the  places  to  be  filled  ; 
but,  that  they  are  appointed  for  personal  and  for  political  rea- 
sons alone. 

To  attempt  to  remedy  this  specific  result,  by  demanding  that 
no  appointments  shall  be  made  except  of  such  candidates  as 
have  passed  a  competitive  examination  before  a  separate  and 
distinct  commission,  arouses  the  question,  whether  the  exami- 
nations of  candidates  for  offices  requiring  an  especial  qualifica- 
tion, if  property  conducted,  would  not  be  better  determined  by 
their  being  submitted  to  those  superior  officers  directly  con- 
cerned, and  under  the  direction  of  whom  the  newly  appointed 
officers  are  to  serve. 

The  proposed  method  introduces  another  and  still  graver 
question  :  Whether  by  taking  any  part  of  the  control  over  the 
appointment  of  the  minor  officers  away  from  their  superiors, 
it  will  not  to  some  extent  prove  to  be  a  defence,  if  not  a  cause 
for  subsequent  insubordination  from  these  inferiors.  The  same 
question  is  aroused  to  a  certain  degree  by  the  propositions, 
that  removals  should  be  governed  by  law ;  that  original  ap- 
pointments may  only  be  made  in  the  lower  grades  ;  and,  that 
vacancies  occurring  in  the  higher  grades  shall  be  filled  only  by 
promotions. 

The  superior  officer  or  Secretary  in  control  of  either  of  the 
executive  departments  of  the  government,  is  largely  responsible 
for  the  successful  management  of  the  branch  entrusted  to  him. 


96 

While  each  of  the  officers  of  his  selection  entrusted  with  the 
charge  of  conducting  the  special  divisions  of  this  department, 
have  not  only  the  responsibility  of  its  successful  management 
resting  upon  them,  but  not  infrequently  are  required  to  give 
bonds  of  security  against  any  pecuniary  loss  resulting  from 
untrustworthiness,  from  carelessness,  or,  from  any  mismanage- 
ment by  their  subordinates. 

To  say  by  law,  that  these  chief  officers, — made  responsi- 
ble for  the  successful  and  harmonious  working  together  of  a 
large  number  of  minor  officers,  clerks  and  assistants,  and  also 
made  pecuniarily  responsible  for  losses  resulting  from  any 
neglect  or  malfeasance  in  office, — shall  have  any  part  of  their 
control  over  these  minor  officers  withdrawn,  or  shared  with 
them  by  a  distinct  commission,  controlling  competitive  exami- 
nations, is,  if  not  contrary  to  the  spirit  of  the  Constitution,  at 
least  of  such  a  nature  as  to  lessen  the  proper  respect ;  weaken 
the  accountability;  and,  invite  insubordination  among  these 
inferior  officers. 

The  Constitution,  by  directing  that  appointments  shall  be 
made  by  the  President  and  Heads  of  Departments,  evidently 
intended  that  the  executive  trust  should  be  centered  in  and 
controlled  from  one  source  or  head,  in  order  to  have  it 
vigorously,  and  justly,  and  equally  administered  throughout. 
Any  scheme,  therefore,  having  the  intent  or  significance  of 
lessening  to  any  degree  the  proper  respect  or  accountability, 
due  from  an  assistant  or  minor  officer  to  his  superior  or 
superiors,  must  weaken  the  plan  of  the  government,  and  be 
at  variance  with  the  spirit  and  intent  of  the  Constitution. 

It  has  been  one  of  the  favorite  arguments  urged  by  those 
who  have  defended  these  proposed  schemes  of  civil  service 
improvement  or  reform,  to  claim,  that  by  removing  the  weight 
of  personal  influence,  held  by  the  President,  by  Senators,  and 
by  members  of  the  National  House  of  Representatives  and 
others  toward  securing  appointments  in  the  government  ser- 
vice, it  would  free  these  high  officers  from  a  source  of  exces- 
sive annoyance  and  labor,  either  in  securing  for  favorites  the 
places  asked  for,  or,  in  denying  the  many  who  present  unsatis- 
factory claims. 


97 

There  is  more  than  one  fallacy,  either  purposely  or  eva- 
sively intended  to  be  conveyed  by  this  specious  argument. 
That  a  host  of  office-seekers,  capable  as  well  as  incapable  for 
the  positions  they  seek,  crowd  about  the  doors  of  every  newly 
elected  officer  having  any  share  in  the  appointing  power,  that 
they  literally  "besiege"  and  annoy  beyond  comfortable  en- 
durance, the  President  and  other  officers  at  the  incoming  of 
each  new  administration,  is  undoubtedly  true.  This,  however, 
is  but  one  side  of  the  story.  The  other  part  has  already  been 
enacted.  It  is  because  men  seeking  the  elective  offices,  AS  CAN- 
DIDATES, have  employed  a  vast  number  of  party  workers,  party 
managers,  manipulators,  and  schemers,  to  control  the  party 
nominations  by  the  opportunities  afforded  by  the  delegate 
system  and  by  permanent  party  organization,  and,  have 
promised  to  repay  these  workers  by  using  their  influence,  or,  by 
securing  for  them  an  appointment  in  the  civil  service  of  the 
government ;  and  further  because,  they  have  promised  offices  to 
more  of  these  political  workers  than  they  can  find  places  for, 
they  have  now  this  vast  army  of  office-seekers  "  besieging " 
them. 

Every  seeker  after  an  office  by  appointment  goes  armed  in 
some  manner  with  a  recommendation,  or,  has  either  a  real  or 
fancied  claim  upon  some  person  elected  to  an  office  in  the 
government,  who  has  or  is  supposed  to  have  an  influence 
with  the  appointing  powers.  That  cranks  and  other  self-sus- 
tained claimants  for  recognition,  urged  on  by  their  own  measure 
of  supposed  partisan  or  personal  political  services,  enter  the 
ranks  of  office-seeking  and  demand  a  reward,  is  not  to  be  de- 
nied or  wondered  at.  It  is  an  effort  toward  securing  an  oc- 
cupation, which  requires  methods  especially  repulsive  to  some 
characters  and  minds,  while  to  others,  less  self-respecting,  it 
affords  a  field  of  possible  success  at  once  inviting  and  en- 
couraging to  their  unstable  natures. 

The  argument,  then,  that  substituting  a  commission  of  ex- 
aminers will  effectually  remove  u  the  pressure"  brought  upon 
the  President  and  other  high  officers  of  the  government  for 
their  influence  or  control  over  the  appointing  powers,  is  un- 
founded and  fallacious,  because  it  is  based  upon  a  half  told 


98 

truth.  It  aims  to  place  the  whole  responsibility  upon  the  dis- 
gusting rabble  of  office-seekers  who  swarm  about  the  offices 
of  each  new  administration,  where,  it  does  not  wholly  belong. 

Further  than  this : — what  evidence  may  be  ventured,  that 
time  will  not  prove  that  a  commission  of  examiners  directed 
by  Congress  and  appointed  by  a  President,  will  not  in  turn  be 
as  readily  corrupted,  and  that  they  will  not  take  the  same 
place  in  the  exchanging  of  favors  between  the  offices  which 
are  elective,  and  those  which  are  filled  by  appointment,  as  that 
heretofore  held  by  these  high  elective  officers  themselves. 
This  commission  must  necessarily  hold  at  least,  a  part  of  the 
same  position,  and  it  must  have  a  similar  political  significance 
to  that  which  has  heretofore  influenced  or  determined  the  civil 
service  appointments.  And,  because  that  which  has  developed 
a  corrupt  traffic,  heretofore,  remains  to  demand  a  corrupt  traffic 
still,  but  little  can  be  hoped  from  such  a  mere  transfer  of  re- 
sponsibilities. 

This  proposed  scheme  or  measure  of  civil  service  reform, 
signifies  then,  but  a  transfer  of  certain  duties  belonging  to  high 
officers  elected  by  the  people,  to  this  commission.  And  the 
moral  and  legal  accountability,  requiring  these  high  elective 
officers  to  make  appointments  in  the  civil  service  wholly  in  the 
interests  of  the  people  and  of  good  government, — and  which, 
by  the  plan  of  our  government  has  been  supposed  to  be  amply 
protected  by  our  right  to  elect  or  reject  these  high  officials, — is 
by  this  plan,  transferred  to  an  appointed  commission,  and  a 
penalty  and  punishment  is  attached  warning  this  commission 
not  to  violate  these  imposed  moral  duties.  That  the  fear  of  a 
penalty  will  correct  this  moral  turpitude  in  men  holding  office, 
can  hardly  be  expected  ;  but,  that  making  the  plan  of  the 
government  more  complex,  will  serve  to  obscure,  and  thus 
protect  from  the  just  condemnation  of  the  people,  this  moral 
baseness  which  has  from  the  beginning  to  the  end  been  the  true 
source  of  our  civil  service  corruption,  all  former  experience 
has  proven  to  be  true. 

Hence,  so  long  as  candidates  for  the  elective  offices  of  the 
government  can  employ  the  services  of  men  to  aid  them  in 
securing  a  party  nomination,  by  means  of  the  corrupt  methods 


99 

of  the  delegate  system,  and  then  secure  their  election  by  party 
glamour  and  partisan  deception,  so  long  will  they  find  a  means 
of  repaying  these  men  either  with  appointments  to  office,  or, 
with  some  form  of  "  spoils"  wrested  from  the  people's  govern- 
ment, to  be  used  for  personal  ends. 

To  anticipate  effective  reform  legislation  from  a  source  which 
is  itself  so  largely  a  factor  in  making  our  civil  service  system 
corrupt,  is  as  unnatural  as  it  would  be  to  seek  the  flow  of  a 
stream  at  a  higher  level  than  its  source.  Legislative  enact- 
ments will  never  have  a  true  significance  toward  removing  the 
source  of  the  evils  in  our  civil  service  system  until  our  legisla- 
tors in  both  branches  of  Congress,  and  the  President  also,  have 
become  true  representatives  of  the  people,  by  being  made 
wholly  and  directly  accountable  to  the  people  for  their  election 
to  office. 

The  true  principles  underlying  a  wise  and  economical  ad- 
ministration of  our  government  throughout  all  its  varied 
phases,  are  not  widely  different  from  those  which  guide  to  suc- 
cess any  well  conducted  corporate  or  business  enterprise 
among  men. 

A  large  corporation  having  the  interests  of  its  stockholders 
for  its  only  concern,  must  wisely  select  its  board  of  directors 
and  its  executive  head.  This  executive,  then,  must  appoint 
the  minor  and  subordinate  officers,  and  through  them  appoint 
the  assistants  and  laborers  throughout. 

Primarily,  the  board  of  directors  and  the  chief  executive 
must  be  truly  and  fully  accountable  to  the  whole  body  of  stock- 
holders in  order  that  the  interests  of  these  stockholders  may 
be  properly  guarded  and  preserved.  And,  this  accountability 
can  only  be  secured  when  these  officers  have  been  honestly 
and  fairly  selected  by  them. 

It  next  follows,  that  the  officers  directing  each  branch  of  the 
business  must  be  accountable,  each  in  turn  to  his  superior,  and 
thus  finally,  through  the  chief  executive  officer  every  part  of 
the  enterprise  will  be  made  accountable  to  the  corporate  body. 

By  a  system,  therefore,  which  makes  every  part  of  the 
enterprise  successively  accountable  to  the  original  authority  or 
body  of  stockholders ;  and,  which  places  the  responsibility 


100 

where  it  maybe  properly  shared  throughout,  there  is  establish- 
ed an  organization  fitted  to  successfully  conduct  any  just  enter- 
prise with  which  it  may  be  concerned. 

To  successfully  conduct  a  free  government  wherein  the  whole 
body  of  people  are  its  stockholders,  will  demand  a  no  less 
guarded  accountability,  and  will  succeed  with  no  less  wisely 
placed  responsibilities,  than  that  demanded  and  required  for 
the  success  of  a  corporate  or  business  enterprise. 

If  there  is  any  fault  in  the  accountability  due  from  the 
minor  or  inferior  officers  to  their  superiors,  then,  the  conduct 
of  the  government  will  be  uncertain,  and  the  responsibility 
would  be  properly  traced  to  the  superior  officers  who  should 
have  full  control  over  these  inferiors. 

If,  however,  there  is  a  fault  in  the  accountability  due  from 
the  superior  officers  of  a  free  government  to  its  sovereign 
people,  then,  just  so  far  will  their  government  become  a 
government  by  the  few ;  and  the  responsibility  of  its  not 
being  a  government  truthfully  representative  of  the  people's 
will,  must  be  traced  to  some  neglect  or  fault  of  the  people 
themselves. 

It  has  already  been  definitely  traced  and  shown,  that  the 
great  series  of  evils  existing  in  our  government  arise  from  the 
want  of  a  proper  accountability  due  from  the  higher  or  elective 
officers  of  the  government,  to  the  people.  And  it  has  further 
been  definitely  shown,  that  this  want  of  accountability  is 
because  the  people  submit,  in  the  election  of  these  officers, 
first,  to  a  government  wholly  conducted  by  the  one  or  the  other 
of  two  permanent  party  organizations  contending  for  power  ; 
and  then,  further  submit  to  the  delegate  system  in  making  the 
parly  nominations. 

Hence,  let  us  no  longer  seek  political  reform  through  these 
office-holders,  from  reform  legislation,  but,  having  traced  the 
responsibility  to  the  people  themselves,  let  us  look  to  better 
methods  for  the  selection  of  these,  our  first  servants,  such  as 
will  make  them  truthfully  our  representatives,  and  make  them 
directly  accountable  to  us.  Then,  and  not  until  then,  will  the 
management  of  our  government  in  all  its  parts  be  made 


101 

through  these  true  representatives,  truthfully  accountable  to 
the  sovereign  people  of  the  country. 

Having  thus  determined  upon  the  only  true  plan  of  estab- 
lishing a  remedy  for  our  civil  service  evils,  it  but  remains  to 
point  out  how  the  method  of  direct  voting  already  described 
as  the  only  true  means  of  reaching  concerted  action  in  con- 
ducting our  elections,  will  not  only  remove  the  direct  evils  of 
the  delegate  system,  and  of  permanent  party  organization,  but, 
will  also  remove  the  corrupt  practices  attending  our  civil  ser- 
vice appointments,  and  the  evils  resulting  from  them. 

At  the  outset,  when  elections  shall  come  to  be  determined  by 
the  whole  people  at  one  direct  election,  and  by  the  proposed 
method  of  voting, — candidates  for  the  elective  offices  will  no 
longer  be  assured  of  success  because  they  are  skilled  in  the 
methods  of  perverting  the  people's  will,  by  manipulating  the 
machinery  of  delegating,  of  caucuses  and  conventions,  and 
conferences,  and  unit  rules  and  so  on  ;  and,  such  candidates 
will  no  longer  be  able  to  claim  themselves  already  elected, 
because  they  have  been  made  the  nominee  of  a  dominant 
party  ;  for  these  methods  of  securing  official  places  will  have 
ceased  to  exist. 

A  new  kind  of  material  will  come  to  be  candidates  for  of- 
fice, new  men,  with  widely  different  purposes  from  those  who 
have  too  often  ruled  over  us,  will  be  called  to  the  front,  when 
the  people  are  permitted  by  this  truthful  method  of  procedure 
to  select  their  own  representatives. 

When  we  have  thus  erected  a  government  truthfully  ema- 
nating from  the  people's  will, — with  the  President  of  the 
United  States  selected  directly  by  the  whole  people  of  the 
nation  ;  with  our  National  Senators  selected  directly  by  the 
people  of  the  state  ;  and  with  the  members  of  the  National 
House  of  Representatives  selected  by  the  people  of  their  dis- 
trict, and,  by  the  proposed  method  of  direct  voting, — without 
the  intervention  of  delegates,  and  without  permanent  party 
organizations  having  any  part  in  its  concern,  we  will  then  have 
a  government  in  which  these  servants  will  be  truly  accountable 
to  the  whole  people. 

When  these   great  office-holders  are  thus  made  truly  ac- 


102 

countable  to  the  people,  it  may  well  be  assured  that  the  people 
have  made  no  corrupt  contracts  with  them ;  and,  that  there 
has  been  no  bartering  with  them  for  "  spoils"  of  any  kind  to 
be  returned  for  the  favor  of  an  election. 

When  the  people  shall  once  rule  in  this  government  through 
honestly  selected  representatives,  there  can  be  no  such  a  thing 
as  "  political  spoils,"  or  party  favor,  or  government  patronage 
to  be  distributed  among  a  few  political  managers.  The  promise 
of  an  appointment  to  office,  or  the  use  of  any  form  of  govern- 
ment patronage  in  repaying  personal  political  services,  has 
only  been  significant  because  the  services  of  a  FEW,  skilled  in 
manipulating  the  machinery  of  the  delegate  system  in  nomi- 
nating, and  in  arousing  the  jealousies  of  partisan  numbers  in 
final  elections,  have  been  of  greater  weight  in  determining 
elections,  than  have  the  votes  of  the  many.  Hence,  when  the 
voice  of  every  citizen  shall  come  to  be  counted  with  equal 
force  in  every  election,  there  will  be  no  opportunity  to  value 
the  effort  of  one  above  another  in  the  support  he  has  given 
toward  the  successful  election  of  any  person  to  office. 

With  a  new  character  of  men,  TRUE  STATESMEN  NOW,  repre- 
senting the  people  in  their  elective  offices,  there  will  be  new 
influences  at  work  guiding  them  in  selecting  the  best  men  for 
the  civil  service  appointments.  Our  first  SERVANTS  will  be 
made  rigorously  and  truthfully  accountable  to  a  true  majority 
of  the  whole  people,  and  they  will  see  to  it,  that  men  appoint- 
ed to  the  subordinate  or  minor  offices  throughout  are  as  truth- 
fully accountable  to  them. 

In  a  government  thus  made  responsive  to  the  people's  will 
at  its  every  phase,  there  will  be  no  possibility  of  a  corrupt 
barter  at  any  point,  without  its  being  at  once  descried  and 
promptly  rebuked,  by  an  enlightened  people  made  jealous  of 
their  rights,  from  long  political  oppression. 

In  such  a  government  no  form  of  political  patronage  or  fa- 
vor will  afford  "  spoils  "  for  those  selected  to  fill  its  offices. 
The  government  itself  will  no  longer  be  extended  so  rapidly 
beyond  its  just  and  necessary  domain.  New  places  for  new 
officers  will  not  be  made  for  the  simple  purpose  of  favoring 
family  relatives  or  political  friends.  Legislative  enactments 


103 

will  then  come  to  be  determined  upon  by  their  merit,  and  not 
because  they  have  a  partisan  or  a  personal  signification.  Exe- 
cutive administration  will  be  required  to  be  just  and  equal 
throughout,  without  favor  or  distinction  to  either  friend 
or  foe.  While  judicial  and  jury  decisions  may  then  be  trusted 
to  be  equity  and  simple  justice. 

There  will  then  be  no  need  for  laws  to  lesson  the  control 
of,  or  to  remove  the  appointing  power  from  those  best  fitted  to 
exercise  it,  as  directed  by  the  Constitution.  No  need  for  laws 
to  prevent  the  high  officers  of  the  government  from  removing 
civil  service  officers  for  purely  personal  or  political  ends.  And 
no  need  for  laws  to  prevent  these  elective  officers  from  assess- 
ing the  weaker  or  appointed  officers  and  making  them  con- 
tribute to  the  former's  election  expenses.  In  such  a  govern- 
ment the  paradox,  or  proposition  requiring  innumerable  laws 
to  restrain  from  evil,  or  from  corrupt  and  personal  schemes  of 
aggrandizement  those  elective  officers  whom  the  people  have 
already  entrusted  with  the  law-making  powers,  will  not  be 
necessary,  and  will  not  be  exhibited  in  its  plan. 

Thus,  the  remedy  for  our  civil  service  evils,  has  been  shown 
to  be  the  one  remedy  for  the  great  series  of  evils  in  the  exist- 
ing methods  of  selecting  representatives  of  the  people.  It  is 
the  remedy  already  so  earnestly  recommended, — that  of  con- 
ducting all  elections  by  a  method  of  direct  voting,  by  which, 
at  one  election,  A  MAJORITY  OF  THE  WHOLE  BODY  OF  VOTERS  CON- 
CERNED, may  reach  concerted  action  with  certainty  and  with 
equal  fairness  to  all. 

A  brief  review  of  the  specific  effects  this  true  method  of  es- 
tablishing political  reform  will  have  upon  the  civil  service  of 
our  country,  will  still  further  compare  it  with  the  scheme  or 
measure  recently  adopted  by  Congress  for  the  purpose  of 
"  regulating  and  improving  the  civil  service  of  the  United 
States." 

At  the  outset, — this  method  of  reform  applies  with  equal 
force  to  the  whole  series  of  evils  existing  in  our  civil  service 
system  throughout.  It  is  not  limited  in  its  application  only  to 
the  lower  grade  officers  in  the  civil  service  employ,  but,  has 
equal  significance  in  removing  the  corrupt  relationship  between 


104 

the  high  elective  officers  of  the  government  and  those  filling 
the  higher  offices  held  by  appointment.  The  public  plundering 
of  the  "  spoils  system  "  so  far  as  it  applies  to  the  minor  or 
subordinate  officers  of  the  civil  service,  has  been  a  mere  trifle, 
a  bagatelle,  when  compared  to  the  great  fortunes  amassed  by 
superior  officers  in  custom  houses,  in  the  offices  of  surveyors 
and  collectors  of  ports,  and  in  other  high  places  under  certain 
administrations.  The  significance,  also,  of  the  personal  politi- 
cal influence  which  may  be  exerted  by  these  high  officials  ex- 
ceeds by  many  fold  that  which  may  be  corruptly  used  by  a 
minor  or  subordinate  official  in  the  civil  service  employ. 

With  the  adoption  of  this  true  method  of  civil  service  reform, 
an  incoming  President  will  have  no  personal  or  partisan 
political  debts  to  pay,  arid,  no  obligations  or  promises  of  reward 
for  personal  work,  in  the  manipulation  of  a  corrupt  method 
which  had  secured  his  nomination  and  election  to  office,  will 
confront  him. 

No  throng  of  place-seekers,  of  party-workers,  party  bosses, 
and  manipulators  of  party  machinery  will  then  crowd  the 
offices  of  the  incoming  Chief  Magistrate,  and  the  offices  of 
those  having  an  influence  with  him,  demanding  their  promised 
reward  for  personal  services  rendered. 

The  President,  and  Heads  of  Departments,  and  every  other 
officer  entrusted  with  the  appointing  power  being  accountable 
to  the  people  for  the  positions  they  hold,  will  then  endeavor  to 
secure  the  best  talent  and  trustworthiness  to  be  found,  and 
will  be  guided  only  by  the  question  of  merit  in  making  ap- 
pointments and  promotions  in  the  civil  service  employ.  And, 
removals  from  office  will  only  be  made  for  just  cause. 

There  will  then  be  adopted  the  very  best  methods  of  es- 
tablishing competitive  examinations,  such  as  will  secure  the 
best  possible  talent  and  trustworthiness,  and  acquirements 
suited  to  the  offices  to  be  filled.  Such  examinations  are  rightly 
conducted  by  the  higher  officers  employed  in  the  department  or 
division  where  the  appointment  is  to  be  made.  These  ex- 
aminers will  then  determine  upon  a  candidate's  practical  as 
well  as  his  theoretical  acquirements,  will  take  into  considera- 
tion his  habits  of  industry  and  economy,  recognizing  every 


105 

phase  of  a  candidate's  especial  fitness  for  the  place  in  which  he 
is  required.  This  method  of  conducting  examinations  and  of 
awarding  appointments  and  promotions  in  the  service,  has 
already  been  fully  tried  in  several  of  the  departments  and 
branches  of  the  public  employ ;  and  its  success  in  each  of  these 
instances  where  it  was  consistently  applied,  was  such  as  to 
fully  recommend  its  universal  adoption  throughout. 

By  this  means  of  establishing  civil  service  reform,  the  offices 
of  the  government  will  fairly  and  properly  compete  with  pri- 
vate and  corporate  enterprises  in  securing  an  equal  degree  of 
talent  and  trustworthiness  in  their  employ ;  and,  for  which  a 
corresponding  rate  of  recompense  will  be  demanded,  and  will 
also  be  secured. 

It  will  establish  a  career  in  the  public  employ  upon  exactly 
the  same  basis  of  fitness  and  accountability,  as  will  correspond 
to  the  same  grade  of  duties  and  responsibilities  in  private  or 
corporate  employments.  And  it  will  also  afford  the  same  se- 
curity for  continued  employment  and  for  promotions  in  the 
public  service,  as  that  which  exists  in  the  higher  grades  of  pri- 
vate enterprises. 

Compared  still  further,  with  the  provisions  offered  by  the 
scheme  recently  adopted  by  Congress,  "  to  improve  the  civil 
service  of  the  United  States,"  this  method  of  reform  is  in 
strict  conformity  with  the  spirit  and  plan  of  the  Constitution, 
On  the  other  hand,  as  it  has  already  been  shown,  the  intro- 
duction of  a  distinct  civil  service  commission  with  its  exami- 
ners and  so  on,  is  an  intrusion  upon  the  duties  and  upon  the 
proper  responsibilities  of  the  higher  officers  of  the  govern- 
ment. It  is  a  fact,  that,  when  competitive  examinations  have 
been  conducted  by  the  superior  officers  of  a  department,  or  of 
a  division  wherein  the  applicants  were  to  be  employed,  they 
have  greatly  aided  in  the  efficiency  of  the  work  done  in  these 
divisions  and  departments.  But  this  does  not  afford  any  real 
basis  whatever  for  the  argument  offered,  that  these  examina- 
tions should  be  transferred  to  a  distinct  commission.  Such  a 
commission  must  inevitably  introduce  new  influences,  and 
make  the  system  of  the  civil  service  employment  more  com- 
plex, without  affording  it  any  corresponding  advantages  what- 


106 

ever.  No  business  man,  nor  corporation  would  employ  a 
separate  commission  to  examine  into  the  qualifications,  either 
of  applicants  for  new  appointments,  or  of  applicants  for  pro- 
motions, in  his  or  their  employ. 

Nor  is  that  part  of  the  scheme,  demanding  that  appointments 
to  the  minor  offices  of  the  government  shall  be  apportioned 
among  the  States  and  Territories,  etc.,  in  proportion  to  their 
population,  based  upon  any  true  principle  of  good  government. 
Nor,  will  it  be  of  any  true  value  to  the  service. 

The  subordinate  offices  of  the  government  are  not  intended 
to  be  sinecures  for  a  certain  number  of  persons  from  each 
state,  and  there  is  no  need  of  establishing  any  routine  method 
for  filling  these  offices.  They  represent  a  certain  work  to  be 
accomplished,  and,  in  a  fair  and  economically  conducted  govern- 
ment, this  labor  should  properly  compete  with  equal  labor  en- 
gaged in  corporate  or  private  enterprises  without  let  or 
hindrance. 

It  is  a  scheme  of  "  reform"  which  cannot  be  applied  to  the 
higher  grade  offices  of  the  civil  service,  and  hence,  will  still 
permit  the  gravest  of  the  civil  service  evils  to  remain  un- 
disturbed. Elective  officers,  entrusted  with  the  appointments 
of  these  higher  officers  will  still  distribute  the  great  "  spoils" 
and  prizes  attending  these  high  places  in  the  civil  service  of 
the  country,  where  they  will  secure  the  most  active  and  efficient 
personal*  and  partisan  service  in  determining  a  party  nomina- 
tion and  an  election  to  office. 

It  is  u  Civil  Service  Reform"  with  its  vengeance  directed 
against  the  weaker  parties  to  the  crime.  Its  defence  is  false 
and  uncertain  throughout,  because  it  is  based  upon  but  half- 
told  truths.  And  it  will  fail  for  these  reasons,  and  because  it 
is  complex  and  uncertain  in  its  application,  and  above  all, 
because  it  is  not  based  upon  the  true  principles  of  a  govern- 
ment made  securely  accountable  to  the  people's  will  at  its 
every  part. 

True  civil  service  reform  can  only  be  secured  by  the  pro- 
posed method  of  conducting  direct  elections,  so  that  our 
elective  officers  entrusted  with  the  appointing  power  shall  be 
made  truly  accountable  to  the  people. 


107 

This  method  of  establishing  a  true  government  by  the  peo- 
ple, and  of  securing  true  political  reform  throughout,  contem- 
plates no  change  in  the  principles  of  our  existing  government. 
It  is  a  radical  change  in  the  method  of  conducting  elections, 
only.  It  introduces  no  new  habits  of  thought  or  change  of 
purpose  among  the  voting  masses.  By  a  simple  provision, 
however,  on  the  part  of  the  individual  voter,  it  will  afford  him 
an  opportunity  to  act  in  concert  with  his  fellows,  while  at 
the  same  time  it  will  secure  for  him  an  equitable  share  in  the 
control  of  his  government. 

The  Political  Reform  which  may  be  secured  by  the  proposed 
method  of  directly  electing  our  official  representatives,  rests 
wholly  with  the  people,  offering  them  the  merit  of  the  plan  as 
a  recommendation  for  its  adoption.  And,  it  will  with  such 
certainty  secure  for  them  an  efficient  means  for  the  defence 
and  preservation  of  their  political  rights,  that  it  may  safely  be 
adopted  by  the  people  at  once,  by  common  consent. 

Because,  however,  this  method  of  directly  electing  the 
people's  representatives  is  a  fundamental  means  in  truthfully 
conducting  a  representative  government,  it  will  require  of  the 
people  of  this  government  the  necessary  effort  to  make  it 
a  part  of  our  written  Constitution  ;  amending  the  existing 
methods  directed  by  the  Constitution  for  the  election  of  the 
higher  officers  of  our  government,  which  have  proven  to  be 
unsafe,  and,  which  have  been  shown  to  be  alarmingly  dangerous 
to  the  existence  and  to  the  continuation  of  political  freedom 
among  us. 


14  DAY  USE 

RETURN  TO  DESK  FROM  WHICH  BORROWED 

LOAN  DEPT. 

This  book  is  due  on  the  last  date  stamped  below,  or 

on  the  date  to  which  renewed. 
Renewed  books  are  subject  to  immediate  recall. 


17 


LD  21A-50m-3,'62 
(C7097slO)476B 


General  Library 

University  of  California 

Berkeley 


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THE  UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA  LIBRARY 


